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ABSTRACT 
Faced with drought and the prospect of widespread starvation, in August 
of 2002 the government of Zambia made the decision that they would no longer 
accept the food aid the United States was offering because it contained grains 
that were genetically modified.  The Zambian government’s decision was based 
on several factors, among them that genetically modified food was unhealthy, 
harmful, and even potentially poisonous for humans, and that allowing genetically 
modified food aid into the country could lead to cross-contamination of crops, 
which they believed would make any produce they chose to export unacceptable 
to the European Union.  At the same time, Malawi looked at similar factors and 
made the opposite decision, that they would allow genetically modified food aid 
on the condition that it be milled into flour before entering the country.  Using 
Robert Putnam’s framework of two-level game theory, this dissertation explores 
and explains the factors that contributed to the two different decisions.  I 
hypothesize that there were three essential factors: first, pressure from the U.S., 
the WFP, and other international institutions caused quite different reactions in 
Zambia and Malawi.  Second, domestic civil society played a role by acting as a 
voice for the people, though their message was at times mixed.  Third, other 
domestic considerations such as concerns about effects on people’s health, the 
damage to the countries’ ecosystem, and public opinion all played a role. 
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Faced with drought and the prospect of widespread starvation, in August 
of 2002, the government of Zambia made the decision that they would no longer 
accept the food aid the United States was offering because it contained some 
grains that were genetically modified.  The Zambian government’s decision was 
based on several factors, among them that genetically modified food was 
unhealthy, harmful, and even potentially poisonous for humans, and that allowing 
genetically modified food aid into the country could lead to cross-contamination 
of crops, which they believed would make any produce they chose to export 
unacceptable to the European Union (EU).  At the same time, Malawi looked at 
similar factors and made the opposite decision, that they would allow genetically 
modified food aid on the condition that it be milled into flour before entering the 
country.  This dissertation most closely covers the months before and after the 
decisions in August and September of 2002, but in order to fully understand the 
situations beforehand, it also stretches back into the 1990s and forward several 
years into the later 2000s. This dissertation will explain and examine the factors 
that went into that decision, and why two countries, faced with the same 
2 
 
dilemma, chose such very different paths. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the entire 
dissertation.  To this end, the objectives of the project, along with the research 
question, are given in the first section.  The next section explains the significance 
of this project and why it is important to the field of International Relations.  The 
next sections very briefly address the theory being used and the methodology for 
the project, with more in-depth discussions of both in further chapters.  It is 
important to understand the background and position of each country being 
studied, and the next sections focus on increasing understanding.  In the last 
section, the layout of the rest of the dissertation is given. 
 
1.2  Study Objectives and Research Question 
The objectives of this study are threefold: 
1. To understand how the different decisions were made in 2002 as to 
whether to accept genetically modified food aid from the U.S. 
2. To understand how domestic and international pressures interacted to 
move each country toward their decision. 
3. To understand how competing interests fed the politics of the situation.   
The research question for this dissertation is: What were the forces and 
pressures at play in Zambia and Malawi in 2002 that caused them to make 




1.3 Significance of the Project 
Foreign aid is a subject that has been written about extensively in the field 
of Political Science.  Food aid has also been written about in the literature, but is 
not as thoroughly covered as other areas in Political Science.  Genetically 
modified technology, the opposing attitudes of the U.S. and EU, and the 
ramifications of both are also studied.  Even the subject of genetically modified 
food aid has been researched and written about, as well as the 2002 decision in 
Zambia and Malawi.  However, on the whole these scholars (see Attwell 2013; 
Bowman 2015; Broadbent 2012; Clapp 2005; Clapp 2012; Cooke and Downie 
2010; Fig 2003; Mwale 2006; Zerbe 2004, all discussed in Chapter 2), have not 
adequately applied theory to the subject, instead choosing to emphasize different 
aspects or detailing the story.  Certainly none of them has applied game theory to 
the subject.  That is what makes this dissertation both unique and valuable.  I 
seek to detail the story, but also to apply game theory to the subject in order to 
gain more insight into the why the situation played out as it did.   
This project presents the explanation of the 2002 situation as a game 
theoretical model being played on two-levels and looking at the players in the 
game, their positions, and their influence.  Applying two-level game theory to 
these decisions will provide a more complete picture of the factors that went into 
Zambia and Malawi’s decisions and will contribute to a richer understanding of 
how two-level game theory can be used in studying the developing world. 
In addition, I made a conscious effort to partially tell this story through the 
eyes of people who experienced it and either helped make the decision or tried to 
4 
 
influence it.  Their insights and perspectives make this dissertation a valuable 
addition to the literature on the subject of genetically modified food aid.  
This dissertation also brings together more thoroughly the debate over 
genetically modified technology and the situation in Zambia and Malawi.  While 
there were many factors that went into the decision, the debate between the U.S. 
and EU over the acceptability of GMOs and the perception of consequences 
played a role and needs to be explored.  This dissertation adds to the 
conversation about genetically modified technology and how it has affected and 
is affecting the developing world.  It also adds to the conversation about 
pressures the developing world experiences because of their place on the world 
stage. 
This project is also significant because it illuminates a situation in which 
millions of people’s lives depended on the decision of their government, a 
decision in which those ordinary people had no say.  It is a story of the pressures 
that exist for and in states, especially in developing states in times of crisis. It is 
important to study how these countries react in times of crisis and the factors that 




Because two-level game theory is the theoretical framework being used in 
this dissertation, this section will look at how the theory works, how it will be 
applied to the case studies, and then discuss how scholars have used it.  
5 
Much of game theory contains the same basic components.  First, as in 
any game, there are players.  These players can be states or people, depending 
on who is making the decisions, and game theory assumes that the players are 
rational (Snidal 1985, 38). In the case of this dissertation, the major players in the 
game include the governments of Zambia, Malawi, and the U.S., specifically the 
United States Agency for International Development (hereafter USAID).1  This 
game also involved levels, in this case an international level, Level I, composed 
of USAID, the World Food Program (WFP) and other institutions, and a domestic 
level, Level II, composed of the Zambian and Malawian people as represented by 
civil society and the pressures they put on the government, and other internal 
considerations such as the potential for people to starve from lack of food and 
the damage bringing in the genetically modified food aid could do to the 
ecosystem of the countries.  This dissertation is about the interaction between 
the two game levels and how they affected each other in the different stages of 
negotiations and discussions between the international and the state, and the 
state and domestic. 
Another element of game theory is that of cooperation or defection.  
Cooperation and defection can be difficult to define clearly in some games, but 
essentially, if a player acts as they said they would act, they have cooperated.  If 
they do not, the player has defected (Axelrod 1984, 12).  For the cases in this 
dissertation, past experiences between the international community and Zambia 
1 The European Union (EU) also had a part to play, and will be discussed further in 
Chapter 6, but suffice it to say, it was the perception by Zambia and Malawi of what the EU might 
think and might do that was a consideration, rather than the EU itself. 
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and Malawi would seem to indicate that cooperation involved continuing to 
accede to the U.S. by accepting what the U.S. offered, in this case the 
genetically modified food aid. Defection therefore would involve not accepting the 
food aid because this indicates a change in the relationship.  Cooperation by the 
U.S. would have involved agreeing to remove the genetically modified food from 
the shipments being sent.  Defection was not doing so.  However, using the 
framework of two-level games allows for a more nuanced look at the choices and 
actions of states than just cooperation or defection.  Indeed, Sebenius (1992, 
364) argues that cooperation or defection is not always relevant to games and
presents a false dichotomy when thinking about states.  Jervis (1988, 329) also 
does not believe that all games must include the cooperation/defection 
dichotomy and instead presents the idea of a continuum rather than a stark 
choice between cooperation and defection.  This is useful when cooperation and 
defection are not always clear cut, as in the cases of Zambia and Malawi.  The 
concepts of cooperation and defection changed with the bargaining between 
levels, and thus it is impossible to say that there was one idea of cooperation or 
defection that remained stable throughout the process. 
There is one aspect of cooperation that is relevant in the cases of Zambia 
and Malawi.  One of the goals among nations is cooperation and many scholars 
(see Oye 1985, Axelrod 1984, Jervis 1988, and Axelrod and Keohane 1985) ask 
how cooperation can emerge.  Axelrod (1984, 12) concludes that cooperation is 
only possible because players will meet again; cooperation can emerge because 
there is an unknown endpoint—the players will meet again and again in an 
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infinite number of games. With no known endpoint, players are more sensitive to 
how their present actions will affect the way others act in the future.  They are 
more likely to cooperate because fostering cooperation among states will provide 
better results for all.  This is true in the cases of Zambia and Malawi with both the 
U.S. and the EU.  They had to carefully play the round of games on both levels 
because there were future consequences for playing poorly. 
This leads to another component commonly used in game theory--
iterations.  An iteration is another round of the game to be played at some point, 
whether immediately or in the future.  Iterations are important because a player 
who does not believe they will ever face their opponent again has more incentive 
to defect rather than cooperate, whereas knowing another iteration is likely 
encourages cooperation.  In this case, Zambia and Malawi had to carefully 
consider how their decision would affect their relationship not only with the U.S., 
but also how it would affect trade with the EU in the next iteration of the game. 
Leading from iterations is another concept common to game theory, the 
shadow of the future.  The shadow of the future is an extension of iterations, and 
is the belief that players must take into account how their present actions will 
affect how future games, or iterations, are played.  In these cases, I hypothesize 
that the shadow of the future should have been important for Zambia and Malawi 
because of the ramifications of not accepting the food aid from the U.S.  In 
making their decisions, the countries needed to decide how much they feared the 
U.S. retaliating with reduced aid (for example) in the future, should they fail to go 
along with U.S. wishes.   On the other hand, they also needed to weigh how 
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important it was to their EU exports that their crops not be contaminated with 
genetically modified organisms.  Each country had to consider how to balance 
the needs of their people with the possible ramifications of their decisions. 
The final component of game theory relevant to this dissertation is win-
sets.  A win-set is the set of circumstances that will allow players to cooperate 
rather than defect in any given situation.  Win-sets expand or contract in relation 
to the number of stakeholders, the situation, and other elements.  Each player 
has a given win-set and part of the game is to ensure that those win-sets overlap 
with part of the opponent’s win-set.  In the case of the 2002 crisis, the win-set for 
the U.S. included both countries accepting the food with no reservations. The 
win-set for Zambia and Malawi included the U.S. removing the GMO food aid. In 
these cases, no country got what it wanted.     
Sometimes players on Level I attempt to influence what is happening on 
Level II by attempting to change the win-set in order to assure the game goes 
their way.  These attempts vary in effectiveness because the players on Level I 
may not be fully aware of the situation on Level II.  Level I players’ attempts at 
change may thus result in what Putnam calls “reverberation” (Putnam 1988, 
454).  Reverberation is a critical component in the game being described in this 
dissertation because it helps account for the differences in outcome between the 
two countries.  For both countries, the pressure to accept or reject the genetically 
modified food from Level I was intense.  This pressure was Level I’s attempt to 
cause reverberations in Zambia and Malawi and change the game.  Those 
attempts, along with several other factors, worked in Malawi.  In Zambia, they 
9 
backfired.  
This theory is used to explore the domestic and international pressures 
associated with the decision about genetically modified food aid, and how the 
interaction of the two-levels affected the decisions made.  In the cases of Zambia 
and Malawi, I have hypothesized that these international pressures played a role 
in the domestic considerations.  Indeed, in these cases the international 
repercussions could be seen as a constituent, in that the fear of international 
response had to be treated as something that could have an effect in the country 
in the future. In each case, predicting the reactions of each state to accepting or 
rejecting the food aid was an unknown but important factor to consider. 
The concept of interconnectedness is essential to seeing the full story, 
thus the need to look at both levels of the game being played.  Domestic 
concerns without any mention of international pressures cannot complete the 
story.  At the same time, only looking at international pressures overstates their 
importance in the decision. Each one depends on the other and must be viewed 
together.  
Two-level game theory has greater explanatory power because it takes 
into account that there is more than just the domestic level to consider when 
making decisions.  Use of this theory increases the complexity of the explanation, 
providing a more thorough exploration. 
The research question will be answered using two-level game theory, or 
the theory that a state’s actions cannot be understood unless one considers two-
levels of play: the domestic and the international.  This dissertation employs the 
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theory of two-level games most famously propagated by Robert Putnam.  The 
first level is the international system and how the state interacts with the system, 
whether with other individual states, groups of states, or with international 
organizations.  The second level is the domestic system, including government, 
the citizenry, and civil society. Both levels must be taken into account.  On the 
international level, statesmen, including elected politicians, ambassadors, or 
other appointed negotiators, who are negotiating are attempting to satisfy the 
domestic groups while avoiding negative consequences and seeking advantages 
from foreign powers or the international community. At the domestic level, 
pressure is brought to bear on elected politicians and bureaucrats by players like 
interest groups and civil society.  Government workers attempt to form coalitions 
of strength from these domestic level groups that will allow them to carry forward 
their agenda.  Neither level of the game can be safely ignored (Putnam 1988, 
34). The process can be seen in Figure 1. 
In order to explain these games, Putnam looks at a hypothetical situation. 
In stage one of the process there is bargaining between the state and 
international negotiators, leading to a cautious agreement. This is Level I in 
Putnam’s model.  In stage two, there are discussions between the state and 
groups of constituents to decide whether to accept the agreement completed in 
stage one.  This is Level II in Putnam’s model.  Any revision of the agreement 
arising from discussions in Level II requires a renegotiation at Level I (Putnam 
1988, 436-7).  This back and forth discussion results in multiple stages at the two 










In relation to this dissertation, ultimately, both Zambia and Malawi were 
responding to pressures on both levels, and trying to satisfy both levels, but were 
in slightly different positions and chose to put the emphasis on different decision-
making criteria.  Putnam’s Level I corresponds to both the discussions that 
happened in regard to the international community, as well as the discussions 
that then happened with the U.S. and the WFP in order to make the decision.  
Level I will be discussed further in Chapter 4.  The discussions that happened 
within Zambia and Malawi when the famine began are on Level II.  There were 
conversations happening within government, amongst the people, in the scientific 




I hypothesize that there were three primary factors, two-level II domestic 
and one Level I international, that played a role in the acceptance or rejection of 
genetically modified food aid in Zambia and Malawi.  These three factors were 
weighted differently between Zambia and Malawi, and resulted in the different 
decisions being made. 
The Level I international factor is international pressure.  The U.S. and EU 
are diametrically opposed in their acceptance of genetically modified food, with 
the U.S. regulating but accepting it, and the EU being completely opposed to it.  
Each entity had an interest in whether the food was allowed into these countries.   
The U.S. might gain another market for their food, genetically modified or 
13 
otherwise, while the EU would have to reconsider accepting exported food from a 
country that had accepted genetically modified food.   Relations with the U.S. and 
the EU were very important to Zambia and Malawi.  In addition to being a large 
donor of aid, the U.S. provides important investment in both countries.  The EU is 
the fourth largest importer for Zambian goods and resources.  For Malawi, the 
EU is the second largest trading partner.  Maintaining good relationships with the 
EU is critical for both countries.  Zambia and Malawi both export food and 
animals to the European Union, in similar amounts.  In 2015, Zambia exported 64 
million Euros of food to the EU, or 14.2% of everything they export there.  Malawi 
exported 70 million Euros’ worth of food to the EU, or 31.4% of the total exports 
to the EU (European Commission 2014).    
The first Level II domestic factor was pressure from the civil society in 
each country, including nonprofit organizations (both native and non-native), 
churches, scientists, universities, and other nongovernmental entities that were 
dealing with the situation on the ground.  Some of these entities were close to the 
situation and watching people go hungry, and thus had a different perspective, 
while others were studying the situation closely and offering their advice.  
Scientists in particular were in a difficult spot because the science on genetically 
modified food was not (and still is not) conclusive. This meant the decision had to 
be made based on incomplete information.   
The second domestic factor is internal considerations.  There were several 
considerations that had to be made.  The first was whether rejecting the 
genetically modified food aid would mean people starved to death.  If the country 
14 
 
did accept the food aid, they had to consider whether it would make the people 
sick.  The third consideration was political pressure from opposition political 
parties within the country.  Another consideration was the possible damage to the 
country’s ecosystem if people planted the genetically modified seeds.  And 
finally, Malawi had one more consideration: it was in a worse position than 
Zambia economically, agriculturally, and with respect to international donors.  All 
of these had to be taken into account before making the decision. 
The pressures on the countries were not quite the same.  As will be seen 
in Chapters 4 through 6, Malawi was in a much worse financial position and had 
a worse relationship with international donors when the crisis began.  In Zambia, 
pressure from the international community coupled with already-existing 
suspicions of the U.S. made them reluctant to accept the food.   
Stages are a critical component of Putnam’s two-level games because 
they help define and separate the actions of each player.  Figure 2 shows the 
game as a whole.  Table 1 shows the stages of the game, including a stage that 
happened before the negotiations between the countries and international 
institutions started. 
 
1.6 Brief Methodological Discussion 
This dissertation is studying two decision-making processes, how they 
happened and why.  Because the dissertation seeks to pull reasons and factors 
from the story, the best methodology to be used is qualitative.  Qualitative 
methodology allows for reasons to be pulled from narratives of those involved, 
15 
Figure 2 Pressures Involved in Decision Making 
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Table 1 Stages of the Games 
Timeline Zambia Malawi Stages 
Early Spring 
2002 
WFP and FAO conduct 
famine risk assessment 
for Zambia and Malawi 
WFP and FAO conduct 
famine risk assessment 
for Zambia and Malawi 
Pre-Game 
Spring 2002 
WFP issues request for 
food aid, U.S. responds 
with offer of food, 
including GM grain 
WFP issues request for 
food aid, U.S. responds 
with offer of food, 




Zambia requests GM 
grain be removed.  
Ambassadorial meetings, 
international pressure, 
attempts to change the 
game, and the WFP’s 
assessment of its ability 
to provide alternative 
food all happen 
Malawi requests GM 
grain be removed.  
Ambassadorial meetings, 
international pressure, 
attempts to change the 
game, and the WFP’s 
assessment of its ability 
to provide alternative 
food all happen 
Stage 2 
17 
Table 1 Continued 




and suspicion over U.S. 
motives cause Zambia to 




and lack of other viable 
options leads to 






Increasing pressures are 
put on Zambia, leading to 
further entrenchment of 
the country’s attitude 




leading to insight.  The specific methodology is case studies in a structured, 
focused comparison using the congruence method.  This methodology has 
similarities to process tracing, which helps explain the history of events, looking 
at the players in the game and how their actions, ideas, and interests helped the 
game play out the way it did.  This study is loosely employing Mill’s most similar 
construct, comparing cases studies of two countries that are quite similar and 
were faced with similar situations, but had a different outcome.   
I use several sources for information.  The first is interviews with people 
involved in the decision in Zambia and Malawi in 2002.  Their insights and 
information allow me to form a clear picture of what their role was, what their 
actions were, and why they acted the way they did.  These interviews add to 
being able to tell the story.  The second major source I use is newspaper articles 
written at the time.  This allows for an in-depth look at what the thinking was at 
the time and what the people were being told about what was happening. 
1.7 Background 
The famine that had been forecast in 2001 hit Southern Africa by July of 
2002.  At that time, 14 million people were at risk of starvation.  Though earlier 
calls for help had gone unheeded, once the famine started in full force, the WFP 
called for help in famine relief.  The U. S. contributed half of the needed food to 
the WFP.  Lesotho and Swaziland, heavily connected to the United States 
through trade by its African Growth and Opportunity Act, both quickly agreed to 
receive the food aid the WFP was promising.  Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and 
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Zimbabwe all initially declined the food aid, citing concerns over the genetically 
modified food that would be included in the U.S.’s shipments. Eventually, three of 
those countries, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe relented and agreed to 
accept genetically modified food aid, if it was milled first.2  Zambia continued its 
resistance.   
Though it is easy to blame the weather for the inability of the African 
people to feed themselves, it is too simple an explanation.  Amartya Sen (1981) 
argues that famines do not arise from a change in weather patterns, though 
certainly they are a factor.  Instead, Sen argues that famines occur when people 
are not able to secure access to food, whether that is due to poor weather, bad 
infrastructure, or a lack of food. Watts (1991, 10) argues that the world has not 
understood famines in the past because they have failed to take into account that 
famine is not the failure of any one system, but rather the failure of the political, 
economic, and social systems.  Watts further argues in another article that being 
poor is not necessarily an indicator that one will go hungry in a famine.  Rather, 
one must take into account the vulnerability of citizens to famine, that is, their risk 
to exposure of crises or shocks, their capacity to handle those shocks, and the 
ability to recover from said shocks (Watts 1993, 118).  Using these criteria, one 
can better understand the famines in Zambia and Malawi.  This dissertation will 
look at the separate decisions of Malawi and Zambia. 
 
                                            
2 Staff Reporter, “Milling GM Food Aid Costs Malawi US$20 Million,” The Nation, September 11, 
2002, http://www.afrol.com/News2002/maw014_gm_foodaid.htm (accessed November 11, 2017) 
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1.7.1 Zambia: History 
Zambia is a landlocked country in southern Africa, with an area roughly 
the size of Texas.  Much of Zambia is occupied by a plateau, meaning that 
temperatures are more moderate than other similar areas of southern Africa.  
Zambia has a rich tribal history, with tribes such as the Bemba, the Lozi, and the 
Lunda having lived peacefully next to each other for centuries before Westerners 
discovered their lands.  Zambia was originally discovered for the West by the 
British explorer and missionary David Livingstone, with British settlers following in 
the 1880s.  The British began to take a much greater interest in Zambia once its 
vast copper resources were discovered, when the British South Africa Company 
received a Royal Charter to explore, develop, and administer what was then 
called Northern Rhodesia.  Zambia remained a British colony until 1964, 10 years 
after Kenneth Kaunda founded the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC), 
originally intended to fight for Zambian voting and civil rights.  Massive protests 
and riots eventually convinced Great Britain that Zambia should become an 
independent nation, and in January 1964 a new constitution was introduced, 
granting internal self-government and the right to elections.  ZANC, now renamed 
the United National Independence Party (UNIP), emerged from the first election 
as the majority party, with Kenneth Kaunda as president.  Full independence was 
granted in October of 1964.  
Since that time, Zambia has enjoyed a relatively peaceful, stable, though 
not always fully-fledged democracy. Kaunda’s initial term lasted 27 years, and his 
one-party system gave way to a multiparty system in 1990, once he was ousted 
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from office.  Protests over changes in the constitution have hindered but not 
stopped the multiparty democracy.  Currently, Zambia is a presidential 
representative democratic republic, with the president serving as head of both 
state and government.  Legislative power is vested in both the executive 
government and parliament, known as the National Assembly.3 
1.7.2 Zambia: Causes of the 2002 Famine 
Zambia faced many of the same challenges as Malawi.  It too was subject 
to erratic rainfall followed by periods of drought, and then in the middle of the 
droughts sudden downpours would flood still-growing crops at critical stages.  In 
addition, many farmers were unable to obtain seed and fertilizer until late in the 
growing season, limiting the amount of time the crops had to grow.  The bad 
weather and poor infrastructure meant that Zambia’s grain production was down 
33% for the 2001-2002 season (GAO 2003, 9-10).  Zambia faced other 
challenges, including already widespread poverty.  At the time, 64% of Zambia’s 
citizens lived on less than a dollar a day and 59% of children under five were 
3 BBC, “Zambia Profile, Timeline,” http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14113084, (accessed
November 1, 2017); Encyclopedia.com, “Zambia,” 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Zambia.aspx (accessed November 1, 2017); Encyclopedia 
Britannica, “Zambia,” http://www.britannica.com/place/Zambia (accessed November 1, 2017); 
History World, “History of Zambia,” 
http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=ad27 (accessed November 
1, 2017); Local Histories, “A Short History of Zambia,” http://www.localhistories.org/zambia.html 
(accessed November 1, 2017); The Commonwealth, “Zambia: History,” 
http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/zambia/history (accessed November 1, 2017); 
Zambia Government, http://www.zambia.gov.zm/ (accessed October 28, 2017); Zambia Tourism, 
“The History of Zambia,” http://www.zambiatourism.com/about-zambia/history (accessed 
November 1, 2017) 
22 
malnourished.  In addition to creating orphans on an unprecedented scale, 
HIV/AIDS had created (and still is contributing to) a situation in which many 
people who could otherwise contribute to the economy were unable to contribute 
because of their illness.  Households with an HIV/AIDS patient earned 30-35% 
less than those without.  This in turn placed the burden of providing both financial 
and health care on a smaller and smaller segment of the population.  In Zambia, 
an estimated 22% of the population was infected.  HIV/AIDS infection rates were 
higher among women, and women make up roughly 70% of the agricultural labor 
force (GAO 2002, 11-12).  Zambia also faced charges of poor governance and 
corruption.  The elections that had taken place in late 2001 resulted in a fractured 
political system.  The Movement for Multiparty Democracy, which had been 
solidly in power for 10 years, failed to do as well as anticipated in the elections 
and was forced into a mixed-party government for the first time in the history of 
Zambia’s democracy (Burnell 2002, 1106).  This further weakened governance in 
the country. 
1.7.3 Malawi: History 
Malawi is a long, thin, landlocked country in southern Africa. Its tribal 
history is one of invasions by outside tribes, with eventual peace coming during 
the 19th century.  Malawi became known to Westerners through the missionary 
and explorer David Livingstone, who arrived in 1859.   More British missionaries, 
traders, and farmers followed him and in 1891 the country was declared the 
British Protectorate of Nyasaland.  In 1953 Great Britain attempted to unite 
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Nyasaland with Northern and Southern Rhodesia.  This move was opposed by 
many, including Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda.  Banda was arrested in 1959, but 
was released in 1960, and helped consolidate the movement towards self-
government and eventual independence.  Independence from Great Britain was 
granted in July of 1964, with Banda as Prime Minister. 
In 1966, Malawi became a republic, with Banda serving as a President 
with a wide array of powers.  As is usual with nascent African democracies, 
Malawi was initially and for many years a one-party state, with the Malawi 
Congress Party (MCP) serving as the single party of power.  Through the 
decades, state-wide unrest grew, and demands for change and a multiparty 
system led to demonstrations and riots.  Parties like the Alliance for Democracy 
(AFORD) and the United Democratic Front (UDF) were formed in opposition to 
the MCP, and in 1993 their voices were heard in a referendum on the one-party 
system.  Malawi is now a multiparty republic, and has an elected President who 
may serve no more than two five-year terms. The president serves as both the 
head of state and government.  The legislative body, the National Assembly, is 
unicameral, with members also being elected for five-year terms.4 
4 BBC, “Malawi Profile, Timeline,” http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13881367  
(accessed November 1, 2017); Encyclopedia Britannica, “Malawi,” 
http://www.britannica.com/place/Malawi (accessed November 1, 2017); Local Histories, “A Short 
History of Malawi,” http://www.localhistories.org/malawi.html (accessed November 1, 2017); Our 
Africa, “Malawi: History and Politics,” http://www.our-africa.org/malawi/history-politics (accessed 
November 1, 2017); The Commonwealth, “Malawi: History,” http://thecommonwealth.org/our-
member-countries/malawi/history (accessed November 1, 2017); The Malawi Project, “History,” 
http://www.malawiproject.org/about-malawi/history/ (accessed November 1, 2017) 
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1.7.4 Malawi: Causes of the 2002 Famine 
Bad weather conditions combined with poor governance and international 
pressures all contributed significantly to the famine in 2002.  The years preceding 
2002 were characterized by erratic weather in the form of heavy rains.  These 
heavy rains were then followed by long periods of drought.  This meant a severe 
reduction in the amount of corn produced (GAO 2003).  The weather problems 
were exacerbated by poor infrastructure, including a poorly functioning 
agricultural sector leading to food shortages and a reduction of available labor 
force stemming from the toll of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
The poor weather patterns meant that the famine should not have come 
as a surprise to any of the nations in Southern Africa; the warning signs were 
there, but little was done to shore up the food reserves that Malawi had managed 
to accumulate.  In 2002, just before the famine truly began to be felt, the 
government of Malawi made the decision to sell off their grain reserve in order to 
begin paying back loans to international financial institutions (Zerbe 2004, 596).  
Politicians in the U.S. were quick to condemn Malawi’s actions, with 
Representative Benjamin Gilman stating:  
Although the flooding that destroyed much of last year’s harvest and the 
dry weather are the primary causes of the food crisis, politics has also 
played an important role. The fact that Malawi's grain reserve was recently 
sold off without any clear explanation raises some very serious questions 
as to the ability and the willingness of the regional governments to act 
decisively on this issue and to come to the aid of their own people. (US 
House of Representatives, 2002, p. 17) 
However, Malawi maintained that it had been forced to sell off its grain 
reserve at the urging of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 
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(WB) in order to help pay back commercial loans made to buy surplus maize in 
past years (Zerbe 2004, 596).5  The original request from the World Bank was 
that Malawi sell off 28,000 of their 165,000 metric tons.  The IMF went further, 
demanding that Malawi reduce their reserves to 60,000 metric tons, which was 
more in keeping with what Malawi had traditionally kept in reserve and what a 
commissioned study had recommended to combat any localized disaster.  
Malawi went even further and decided to sell off the entire reserve in early 2001, 
before information on the 2001 harvest was available.  Had the 2001 harvest 
been as plentiful as previous years, Malawi would have been able to easily refill 
its reserves.  However, a bad harvest meant the reserves could not be filled.  In 
addition, famine early warning systems had predicted a maize shortfall but also 
predicted that the missing maize would be more than compensated for in other 
crops.  This turned out to not be true.6   
The situation continued to get worse as accusations of corruption and 
poor governance were leveled at Malawi, leading to a suspension of debt relief 
services by the IMF and suspension of aid by the U.S., the EU and United 
Kingdom.  In addition, Malawi's creditors demanded that they suspend all food 
and farming subsidies and let the market determine food prices (Pettifor 2003).  
As the famine grew worse, this series of events led to spiraling food prices and 
                                            
5 It is beyond the scope of this project to delve further into the actions of the IMF, WB, and the 
Malawian government, but this is a complicated story and it is not entirely clear who is to blame.  
The accused culprits range from a corrupt government in Malawi to the IMF for forcing 
unreasonable policies such as privatization that did not take into account Malawi’s specific 
circumstances. Malawi’s domestic situation and its consequences for accepting the genetically 
modified food aid will be discussed further in Chapter 6. 
6 International Monetary Fund Factsheet. “Malawi—The Food Crises, the Strategic Grain 
Reserve, and the IMF.” July 2002. https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/malawi.htm 
(accessed September 6, 2017). 
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the Malawian government being forced to obtain yet more credit in order to 
purchase grain on the international market (Zerbe 2004, 597).  Because Malawi 
was in a much worse position than Zambia, their considerations were different.  
Malawi was in a truly desperate situation, with many of its people at risk of 
starvation, and some already having succumbed.   
1.8 Case Selection Justification 
There is ample reason to compare Malawi and Zambia: both countries 
have similar histories and have similar population levels.  They share the same 
geographic region.  Though Zambia is roughly seven times bigger than Malawi, 
the amount of arable land in each country is such that they have similar amounts 
of land available to produce crops.  In addition, Malawi and Zambia are both 
former British colonies liberated in the same year and share similar governmental 
structures based on the British system.  In addition, they have tribal and 
language ties.  On the other hand, Zimbabwe, with its long history of oppression 
at the hands of Robert Mugabe and its subsequent lack of democracy, presents 
a different picture.  Mozambique also has an extremely troubled past and was 
not a British colony, presenting a much different picture for comparison.   
Zambia plays the larger role in this dissertation for several reasons.  First, 
Zambia is the bigger country and received more attention in the media, making 
access to information more easily obtained.  Second, the decision was both more 
controversial and more acrimonious in Zambia.  President Mwanawasa, with his 
dramatic declaration of preferring to die to eating genetically modified food, was a 
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polarizing figure, and as such drew a great deal of attention. 
1.9 Layout of the Dissertation 
This dissertation takes the following format: Chapter 2 provides a literature 
review of game theory in general and two-level game theory in particular.  
Chapter 3 is a more thorough treatment of the methodology used in this 
dissertation, with an explanation of sources and why they were used.  Chapters 4 
through 6 each discuss one of the hypotheses, how they should have worked, 
their background, and the results of interviews and research.  Chapter 4 involves 
Level I, the international component, and the role the international community 
played in the respective decisions by applying different kinds of pressure.  
Chapter 5 explores Level II, the first domestic factor.  This factor is the civil 
societies in each country, and how they played a role in the decision-making 
process by providing information and attempting to influence the government.  
Chapter 6 also explains a Level II domestic factor, that of various internal 
considerations both countries had to take into account before making their 
decisions.  Some of these considerations include opposition political parties, 
protective legislation, and public opinion. Chapter 7 concludes with an 
assessment of how the objectives and research question were answered, how 
well the dissertation fits Putnam’s framework, and what the dissertation 




This dissertation contains multiple topics that have been discussed in 
scholarly literature.  This literature adds to the knowledge and complexity of the 
subject by explaining concepts used in the dissertation and showcasing differing 
viewpoints of those concepts.  This chapter starts with a review of how game 
theory, the theoretical framework being used in this dissertation, has been used 
in International Relations.  The focus is then narrowed to two-level game theory, 
what it means, how it has been used in the literature, and how it will be used in 
this dissertation, including examining how domestic politics play a critical role in 
the theory.  The chapter will then discuss the broad subject of GMOs by looking 
at several areas crucial to this dissertation.  The first area is the debate and 
differing policies of the U.S. and EU in regard to GMOs.  The second area is the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the role it plays in the GMO debate.  The 
next area provides a discussion of GMOs in the developing world, their potential 
and the pitfalls in using them, as well as factors involved in getting use of GM 
technology approved, specifically in Africa.  The last section will examine genetic 
modification as it pertains to food aid.  This section includes an overview of the 
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literature on the 2002 decision Zambia and Malawi to accept or reject genetically 
modified food aid. 
2.2 Game Theory in International Relations 
Game theory is often used in international relations literature as a model 
for how the international system functions because it involves a situation where 
no outside authority exists to enforce agreements between players. This is 
echoed in the anarchy of the international system, which lacks an overarching 
authority figure to enforce agreements between states. 
Game theory is used in two general ways in international relations 
literature. The first involves heavy use of the theory behind it and explanations 
that involve modeling and mathematical formulas.  Those scholars (see Alt, 
Calvert, and Humes 1988, Axelrod 1981, 1984, Jervis 1988, Oye 1985, Sebenius 
1992, Snidal 1985, 1985a, and Tingley 2011) who explore this aspect of game 
theory tend to emphasize theory over application and, indeed, a great deal of 
their research tries to show why different games either cannot be applied to real 
world situations or how they must be modified in order to pertain to real world 
situations. Some, like Tingley (2011) and Axelrod (1981, 1984), never do any 
application, instead preferring to run experiments in a lab.   
Focusing on theory has its uses. A deeper exploration of theory helps us 
understand the theory and its applications better. This thorough understanding 
can then lead to explanations of possible scenarios if states were actually 
applying the rules of the game in their relations with one another, though if they 
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were not game theory is less helpful. In addition, deeper understanding may 
suggest other avenues of research (Snidal 1985, 33). 
The second way game theory is used is to combine a fairly deep 
theoretical perspective with in-depth analysis of the particular situations in the 
games. This approach is less common but is important for this dissertation.  
Though many scholars choose to disregard application in favor of purely 
theoretical work, using game theory in international relations research often has 
advantages. Jervis (1988, 319) argues that game theory is a fruitful avenue of 
research because it uses the central characteristics of international relations, it is 
parsimonious, and it brings together the study of conflict and the study of 
cooperation, which allows it to give wider explanations. Snidal (1985, 28) argues 
that, “the deductive apparatus of game theory allows us to infer new 
understandings about international politics.” 
The relative strength of the use of game theory depends on what it is 
being used for.  If the purpose is application to specific situations Snidal (1985, 
55) argues that its usefulness will indeed be limited, but if the purpose is to
understand international cooperation more generally then the conclusions that 
can be drawn from game theory are very valuable. This dissertation attempts to 
use application in both of the ways Snidal discusses. It applies game theory to a 
specific situation in order to understand what happened in that situation, but the 
dissertation also discusses how the situations that occurred between developed 
and developing countries lead to a better understanding in general of the 
pressures and complexities between the two worlds. 
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2.3 Two-level Game Theory: An Explanation 
Robert Putnam (1988) belongs to the second group of scholars who, while 
focusing on theory, also see that it has practical applications for explaining real 
world situations.  This section discusses Putnam’s argument with specific 
reference to what happened in Zambia and Malawi in 2002.  In “Diplomacy and 
Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games” and other subsequent works, 
Putnam began to explore using game theory in a different way.  Putnam began to 
look at more complex game theoretical models in order to be able to provide 
more nuanced explanations of events involving both international and domestic 
levels.  Putnam capitalized on the movement by Gourevitch (1978), Katzenstein 
(1978), and others who believed that the field of International Relations was 
insufficiently paying attention to the causes and effects of the international 
system on domestic politics and vice versa, and that theories would never be 
complete unless the domestic was taken out of the black box it had been put in 
by other schools of thought. Instead Putnam, etc. wanted to look at all aspects of 
domestic politics: 
A more adequate account of the domestic determinants of foreign policy 
and international relations must stress politics: parties, social classes, 
interest groups (both economic and noneconomic), legislators, and even 
public opinion and elections, not simply executive officials and institutional 
arrangements. (Putnam 1988, 432) 
 
In this school of thought, the question of how domestic behavior can best 
be accounted for is answered by eliminating the traditional false dichotomy of 
searching either international or domestic politics for the explanation.  Putnam 
took this mandate to study both levels and began working on a game theory that 
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would help explain what was happening when states were engaged in 
international bargaining.   
Two-level game theory begins by assuming that statesmen have more 
than one level of concern when navigating certain events.  Essentially, they must 
play the game at the domestic level at the same time they are playing on the 
international level.  This means that they seek to satisfy the international 
institution or country’s demands and requests while at the same time answering 
to entities within their own country such as civil society, opposing political parties, 
and public opinion.  This can make the game a delicate balancing act.  If the 
international institution is not satisfied with what the statesman can offer, they 
may withdraw from negotiations.  Likewise, if the statesman presents a bargain 
that is unsatisfactory to civil society, citizens, or political parties, they may choose 
to either not ratify the decision if there is a formal ratification process, or, in a 
democracy, they may later punish the statesman electorally.  Each level must be 
tended and each level may have an effect on the other level.  As Putnam states: 
At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring 
the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by 
constructing coalitions among those groups.  At the international level, 
national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy 
domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of 
foreign developments. (1988, 434) 
 
The importance of viewing events from a two-level game perspective can 
be seen by its application to the real world.  Two-level game theory eliminates 
the thinking that rational acts are always rational.  In these games and their 
iterations, that which is rational on one level may not be wise at the other level, 
and may destroy negotiations or partnerships (Putnam 1988, 434). 
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According to Pahre and Papayoanou (1997, 5) game theory is well suited 
to help link domestic and international politics because, “it provides scholars with 
what we refer to as rigorous flexibility. Its central concepts (e.g., utility, choice, 
strategy, structure, information, and signals) and mathematical logic provide the 
rigor, but scholars have substantial flexibility in applying the method to specific 
problems.” 
In order to begin fleshing out the theory, Putnam looks at a hypothetical 
situation. In stage one of the process there is bargaining between negotiators, 
the statesman and the representative of the international institution or country, 
leading to a cautious agreement that cannot be finalized until the negotiations of 
stage two. This is Level I, or the international level, because on this level the 
statesman, who represents the state, is trying to satisfy an institution outside his 
own country.  In stage two there are discussions within groups of domestic 
constituents to decide whether to accept the agreement completed in stage one.  
This is Level II, the domestic level.  Any revision of the agreement arising from 
discussions in Level II requires a renegotiation at Level I and thus further stages 
(Putnam 1988, 436-7).   
For the purposes of this dissertation the situation is framed theoretically 
this way: Zambia and Malawi went to the WFP and the U.S. to ask them to send 
food aid that was not genetically modified.  Discussions ensued, but it was 
unclear what the WFP could do and what the U.S. was willing to offer.  This was 
Level I, the international level.  However, both countries had another side to deal 
with.  On the domestic side, Level II, both governments had a host of groups and 
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issues to consider.  These included civil society groups, scientists, public opinion, 
the peril people were in, opposing political parties, the perception of the EU, and 
possible damage to the country’s ecosystem.  Both levels were important to the 
process and what Zambia and Malawi could ask for and what they could get 
depended on elements on both levels.  Level II and what was acceptable on the 
domestic side had to be considered when thinking about Level I and what they 
could get. 
Putnam describes the set of agreements that would win approval from 
constituents at Level II as a win-set.  The larger the win-set, the easier it is to 
gain Level I agreement because Level I negotiators have a wider variety of 
outcomes to choose from.  If the win-sets of the two sides, international and 
state, do not agree, either conflict between the two becomes inevitable because 
there is no common ground to fall on or the entire agreement is at risk of failure 
because no agreement can be reached.  In addition, the larger the win-set the 
more the statesman working in Level I must be careful not to be pushed around 
due to the large number of choices he has.  The more difficult the ratification 
process at home will be, the stronger negotiating position statesmen have on 
Level I.  This is because they are constrained by their own systems and therefore 
cannot agree to much without consent from their citizens and other groups.    
Win-sets are determined by preferences, coalitions, and institutions on 
Level II, as well as the negotiating strategies on Level I.  Strong preferences, 
coalitions, and institutions give the statesman on Level I less leeway and make 
the possibility of ratification more difficult should the statesman choose to push 
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for an outcome contrary to Level II interests (Putman 1988, 436-44).  Both 
Zambia and Malawi had issues that could have expanded or contracted their win-
sets, including domestic institutions, their domestic constituents, the political level 
and relative political power of the decision makers, the desperation of the 
citizenry, and their weak positions on the world stage. 
Domestic institutions also determine the size of the win-set.  If a central 
government is strongly disciplined, the win-set is expanded because of the ability 
to agree to things without fully taking into account the preferences of other 
constituent groups, as well as the guarantee that any position taken by the 
statesman will be supported by the government.  On the other hand, if a 
statesman and his government seek broad consensus, the win-set shrinks 
considerably because of the difficulty of getting many groups and individuals to 
agree to one proposition. 
In the conclusion to the book, Double-Edged Diplomacy, Peter Evans 
(1993, 414-16) reflects on how enfranchisement affects the size of win-sets.  In 
general, the literature seems to suggest that the more democratization there is in 
a country, the smaller the win-set because the statesman is more constrained by 
and cognizant of the will of the people.  However, Evans points out that the 
examples included in the book, including those in the chapter by Martin and 
Sikkink (1993), titled, “U.S. Policy and Human Rights in Argentina and 
Guatemala, 1973-1980,” and the chapter by Kahler (1993) titled, “Bargaining with 
the IMF: Two-level Strategies and Developing Countries,” seem to suggest that 
there is less correlation than previously thought.  In fact, in Guatemala, one of the 
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countries used by Martin and Sikkink (1993), restricted enfranchisement 
contributed to a smaller win-set and more discipline in pursuing that win-set.  In 
Guatemala, the elite were enfranchised and held sway.  The military and 
government managed to successfully convince the U.S. that the human rights 
abuses committed had not been committed by either the government or military, 
but rather were the acts of antigovernment groups (Martin and Sikkink 1993, 346-
347).  Martin and Sikkink (1993, 351) argue that this tactic allowed the 
Guatemalans to successfully narrow the win-set by taking some of the demands 
for reform made by the U.S. completely off the table.  If the Guatemalan 
government was not responsible for the atrocities being committed, stopping 
them could not be part of their win-set.  Guatemala successfully changed the 
conversation. 
Democracy did not seem to play a role in the size of win-set for either 
Zambia or Malawi, since, while there was some consultation with scientists and 
some groups tried to push for their position, neither country consulted their lay 
citizenry before making their decision.  The ratification process, which Putnam 
(1988, 436) states can either be formal or informal, was, in these cases, informal.  
Neither country held a formal vote in parliament or a referendum for the people, 
instead seeking recommendations from committees.  Though there were many 
forces within each country pushing for the food to be accepted, ultimately the 
decision was unilateral.   
Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa and the Zambian government may 
have been concerned about re-election should their decision lead to people’s 
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starvation.  However, this concern seems to have been mitigated by the very 
effective campaign against genetically modified food conducted in both countries.  
The decision being made at the highest levels of government could have 
expanded the win-set of both countries, since one of the determining factors in 
win-set size is the need for ratification and there was no ratification process, but 
in the end both countries used the unilateral nature of their decision to restrict the 
win-set by keeping the acceptable outcomes, in other words those outcomes 
they would accept, narrow.   
The decision was made at the highest levels of government, which 
indicates autonomy from the pressures of Level II bargaining.  According to 
Putnam, this weakens the bargaining position of the player: “However, two-level 
analysis also implies that, ceteris paribus, the stronger a state is in terms of 
autonomy from domestic pressures, the weaker its relative bargaining position 
internationally.” (1988, 449)  A government with a high degree of autonomy has a 
weaker bargaining position in international matters because it does not have to 
consult its citizens before acting.  Protests that a government cannot agree to a 
certain proposition are weakened because it is obvious to all parties that the 
government can agree to almost anything they wish to without asking citizens or 
fearing electoral consequences because of the decision.   
 As previously stated, the win-sets of both countries were limited by the 
desperate situation they were in.  Zambia and Malawi had a limited number of 
sources for the food their people needed.  Practically speaking, their win-set 
included one item: convincing the U.S. to remove any genetically modified food 
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from their food aid shipments.  In Putnam’s terms, that was the set of all possible 
Level I agreements that would win approval on Level II, among the constituents 
(1988, 437).  Neither country was successful in convincing the U.S.  The other 
alternative each country had was to have the food milled before it entered the 
country.  However, this was not a cost the U.S. paid.  Instead, it was up to the 
country to arrange for the milling, a time-consuming and expensive proposition. 
The win-sets of the U.S. are a different case.  For this case, the win-set 
consisted of Zambia and Malawi accepting the food aid as offered.  However, the 
U.S., beyond a concern for the lives of the people of Zambia and Malawi, had no 
incentive to truly negotiate with the countries, or to comply with their requests to 
remove the genetically modified food from the shipments.  The U.S. was not 
going to be hurt economically in terms of trade if Zambia and Malawi did not 
accept the food.  In addition, the rejection of the food aid would mean it could go 
elsewhere and benefit others.  While there was some criticism of the U.S. 
pushing genetically modified food, ultimately the U.S. was offering to help.  In 
addition, the U.S. was restricted in change by several factors including the nature 
of a bureaucracy, the rules already set in place for when and how food aid is 
distributed, and the ever-present agricultural and shipping lobbies who help 
determine much of USAID food aid policy.  
Another concern in determining the win-sets of Zambia and Malawi was 
their relative positions on the world stage.  According to Putnam, more self-
sufficient states have smaller win-sets and can therefore better drive negotiations 
(1988, 443).  Neither Zambia nor Malawi was self-sufficient or in a position to 
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make strong demands, and their position was weaker as a result.  The difficulty 
of this position can be seen not only in the size of their win-set, but in the 
international pressures brought to bear by outside entities, discussed further in 
Chapter 4. 
Another consideration Putnam discusses is that of uncertainty and how it 
changes bargaining tactics.  According to Putnam, Level I negotiators are often 
badly misinformed about the politics of Level II, and this uncertainty has 
implications for bargaining (1988, 452).  It is often impossible to understand the 
real situation in a country if one does not live there, and outside institutions can 
remain unaware of what will truly sway the citizens of a country, or even how the 
politics of a country actually work.  This lack of knowledge leads to uncertainty 
because without a full picture of the domestic level, Level I negotiators are 
uncertain of what is acceptable and what is not.   
Level I negotiators may not understand the size of the win-set for Level II, 
but will obviously understand their own position much better. In these 
circumstances, deals become difficult to make because Level I negotiators are 
uncertain of what can be ratified on Level II. For instance, in both Zambia and 
Malawi, there was a lot of confusion over whether genetically modified food was 
healthy or safe.  In this case, because confusion reigned on Level II, Level I had 
even more uncertainty; because it may not have been clear what would happen 
on Level II, even to those on that level, certainly it would be impossible for Level I 
negotiators to predict.  As Putnam states: “Uncertainty about party A’s ratification 
lowers the expected value of the agreement to party B, and thus party B will 
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demand more generous side-payments from party A than would be needed 
under conditions of certainty.” (1988, 453)  Because the U.S. was unaware of 
whether Zambia or Malawi would accept the food, there might have been more 
discussion and consideration of the idea of excluding genetically modified food 
aid from the shipments than there was.  
A final important concern in determining the size of win-sets in two-level 
games is the strategy of the Level I negotiator, in this case the U.S., the WFP, 
and several other international institutions.  Their specific tactics will be 
discussed further in Chapter 4, but according to Putnam the tactics used can 
vary in method: “…governments do seek to expand one another’s win-sets. Much 
ambassadorial activity—wooing opinion leaders, establishing contact with 
opposition parties, offering foreign aid to a friendly, but unstable government, and 
so on—has precisely this function.” (1988, 454) 
Attempts at changing the win-set of Level II are really an attempt to 
restructure the game and change the minds of those on Level II as to what will be 
beneficial to them (Putnam 1988, 454).  These change attempts are more difficult 
in a two-level game because negotiators on Level I may have no direct contact 
with constituents on Level II.  However, sometimes these international pressures 
“reverberate” within domestic politics, change the course of negotiations, and 
influence what happens domestically (Putnam 1988, 454).   
According to Putnam, reverberation can be problematic. Attempts at 
influencing domestic audiences can go badly if the source of the attempts is 
viewed as an adversary rather than an ally.  However, if the influencer is 
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considered an ally, their attempts may be successful because domestic 
audiences do not want to offend the influencer as that may be costly in 
subsequent games (Putnam 1988, 454-455).  One can see how this attitude 
would be especially important to consider in the case of developing countries, 
who are at the mercy of larger, more powerful countries.  Reverberation is 
therefore a consideration in the decision-making process of Zambia and Malawi.  
The two countries were already at a disadvantage in the games because of their 
weaker position on the world stage, but that did not mean that they were willing 
to accept whatever the WFP and U.S. gave them.  As will be seen in Chapter 4, 
a lot of rhetoric was employed by international institutions and leaders, trying to 
sway the opinion of the southern African countries who were considering 
rejecting the genetically modified food aid, or in other terms, to change their win-
sets to include accepting the genetically modified food aid.  In Zambia, these 
attempts were met with suspicion and distrust of motives.  In addition, both 
countries were already at risk of negative reverberation because the West is 
sometimes viewed negatively by Africans.  Thus, the stage was set for attempts 
at influencing the game to easily go poorly. 
 
2.4 The Importance of Considering Domestic Politics 
In his article “Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of 
Domestic Politics,” Peter Gourevitch flips the script on Waltz’s “second image” of 
the traditional way of only thinking about domestic politics and their effect on the 
international system.  Instead Gourevitch argues that one must also think about 
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the international system’s effect on domestic politics and structure.  Gourevitch 
argues that using domestic politics as an independent or intervening variable is 
problematic because it treats foreign policy as a dependent variable, when in fact 
foreign policy may change the supposedly independent variable of domestic 
politics.  Gourevitch also argues that treating domestic structure as an 
independent or intervening variable can make International Relations scholars 
treat it as irrelevant to their arguments (1978, 881).  Putnam, referencing Snyder 
and Diesing, contends that, “The prediction of international outcomes is 
significantly improved by understanding internal bargaining.” (1988, 435)  If one 
looks at domestic politics as critical to a full explanation of events, then the 
international system becomes an explanatory variable in the story.  Both sides of 
the coin are needed to understand the currency, and scholars who ignore one 
side do so at their peril. 
Snyder and Diesing conclude that international outcomes can only be 
partially understood by looking at what the top leaders in the situations say.  In 
half of the crises they studied, they discovered that top decision-makers failed to 
achieve unity in their thinking.  Thus, Snyder and Diesing conclude that internal 
workings and arguments must be better understood in order to accurately predict 
international outcomes (Snyder and Diesing 1977, 510-25). 
In the introduction of Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic 
Policies of Advanced Industrial States, Peter Katzenstein (1978, 3) discusses 
how domestic politics, specifically the domestic structure of the state, must be 
taken into account as an intervening variable in order to understand a state’s 
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decisions fully. Katzenstein seeks to explore why challenges common to most 
states elicit very different responses.  He contends that if different industrialized 
nations have different domestic structures and have different policy outcomes 
and responses to situations then it must be that domestic structure is one of the 
variables that can account for the difference in outcomes. Katzenstein (1978, 4) 
argues that explanations that focus solely on international and transnational 
interactions cannot adequately explain the difference in states’ responses.  The 
collection of essays he edits in Between Power and Plenty seek to discover why 
states respond differently. 
Peter Katzenstein’s book, Small States in World Markets looks at small 
states in Europe to discover how they differ substantially from larger states. He 
concludes that the balance between domestic and international considerations is 
different for small states because of concerns they have that larger states may 
not. International markets must be of bigger concern to them. I suggests that 
Katzenstein's theory holds true for developed and developing countries.  Like 
smaller states, developing states looking to break into international markets must 
be more concerned about the gatekeepers of those markets, in the form of bigger 
and more powerful states.  In the context of this dissertation, this theory would 
tend towards the argument that because Zambia and Malawi were developing 
countries, the balance between international and domestic concerns was 
different than it would be for developed states, and that in these cases the 
international concerns might hold more weight. Ernst Haas agrees that there 
must be different calculations for smaller, dependent states: “The more 
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dependent the government is on aid, trade, and investments, the more often it is 
likely to yield to such pressure.” (as quoted in Martin and Sikkink 1993, 332)  For 
Zambia and Malawi, their relative position and dependence on aid made them 
the weaker bargainer, less likely to win in any negotiation.  In other words, it was 
never going to be easy for Zambia and Malawi, as smaller states, to convince the 
larger state, the U.S., to change their policies regarding the content and 
distribution of food aid. 
2.5 Specific Examples of the Interplay of Domestic Politics and 
International Issues in the Developing World 
The developing world necessarily interacts with the international system 
and with more developed countries in a unique way.  Power imbalances mean 
that the developing country is always in a weaker bargaining position.  This is 
true in times of need, when large loans must be procured from international 
financial institutions, and it is true in times of crisis when developing countries 
must accept the aid being offered, without much input on what that aid is, when it 
will come, or how it will be delivered.  Gourevitch (1978, 888) discusses the 
differences between developed and developing countries, and how the system is 
set up to advantage the developed countries.  According to him, the developed 
countries have set up a “system of pressures which sharply constrain, indeed, 
wholly determine the options available to developing countries.” (Gourevitch 
1978, 888)  He goes on to say that:  
Since capital, organization technology, and military preponderance are in 
the hands of the core, the core countries are able to set the terms under 
45 
 
which skill, capital, and markets will be provided to the periphery. The core 
forces others into subservience: suppliers of raw materials, purchasers of 
finished goods, manufacturers of whatever the core allows them to do. 
(Gourevitch 1978, 888) 
 
This means that it is important to look at developing countries specifically when 
thinking about the interplay between domestic politics and the international 
system. 
Not all scholars are specifically using two-level game theory when 
discussing the interconnectedness of international and domestic levels, but it is 
possible to see how the game is being played in their articles.  Alt (1987, 151-2) 
discusses the ways in which looking at the domestic policies of Britain and 
Norway in regard to oil fail to capture the whole story.  Alt argues that those who 
believe that Thatcherism alone is responsible for the decline in the economy and 
the rise in unemployment in the 1970s and 80s are not taking into account the fall 
of British trade competitiveness due to both domestic policy and structural 
change and speculative pressure on exchange rates.  One of Alt’s main points is 
that in democracies political leaders have incentives to shore up support 
amongst voters in order to stay in power.  Political leaders manipulate 
instruments of policy in an effort to produce the outcome desired by their 
supporters.  In these efforts they are constrained by ideas and institutions 
inherent in their political system.  Alt argues that in smaller economies (such as 
Zambia and Malawi) trade dependence must be taken into account as a factor in 
the decisions of political leaders. 
In their article, “International Economic Policy Coordination,” Artis and 
Ostry (1986, 8) argue that international cooperation in economic policy is critical 
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because it improves the economy of the participating states.  The authors argue 
that protectionist policies practiced by various states, including the United States, 
after World War II hurt the world economy and, by extension, individual state 
economies (Artis and Ostry 1986, 58-61). Their paper is another example of why 
the international and the domestic are intrinsically linked and must be used to 
explain one another. 
Lisa Martin and Kathryn Sikkink explore how the international and 
domestic meshed together in their chapter entitled, “U.S. Policy and Human 
Rights in Argentina and Guatemala, 1973-1980”  in the book, Double-Edged 
Diplomacy.  Martin and Sikkink researched the bargaining between Argentina 
and the U.S. and Guatemala and the U.S. over human rights violations. This 
article is an especially important one to consider for this dissertation because it is 
an example of the U.S. negotiating with developing countries.  They also point 
out that negotiations between Guatemala, Argentina, and the U.S. had several 
distinct features, one of which is particularly relevant for the purposes of this 
work—there was a severe power imbalance between the players, in the case of 
this study, Zambia and Malawi on one side and the U.S. on the other.  The sides 
were unequal not only in terms of soft and hard power, but also in terms of 
payoffs.  There was little consequence to the U.S. if the countries chose not to 
accept these particular batches of food aid, but the consequences could be 
severe and sometimes disastrous for Zambia and Malawi in the short term and 
possibly the long term if the U.S. had chosen to cut off aid because of a lack of 
willingness on the other countries’ parts.  In addition, in specific reference to the 
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human rights violations, Martin and Sikkink (1993, 347) point out that, “No 
government wants to admit publicly that it violates the basic human rights of its 
citizens, or that improvements in their treatment are due to the pressures of 
another government. Thus, diplomacy on human rights issues rarely becomes 
public knowledge…Governments engage in what we might call, ‘opaque 
negotiations,’ with no public or formal agreements to signify cooperation.”  Or that 
it chose to let its people starve rather than accept food that their own scientists 
were saying was acceptable. 
Lehman and McCoy discuss the debt negotiations Brazil conducted with 
the U.S. in 1992 in their article, “The Dynamics of Two-level Bargaining: The 
1988 Brazilian Debt Negotiations.”  In the article they argue for the efficacy of the 
two-level model in International Relations, stating that,  
Because of increased complexity, this model has greater explanatory 
power than a simple, one-level, unitary model. Strategic moves during the 
negotiation phase at Level I between the state and creditors are 
influenced by the game at Level II between the domestic constituents and 
the state because of the need for domestic constituents to ratify the final 
agreement at Level I. (Lehman and McCoy 1992, 603)   
 
Lehman and McCoy (1992, 605-06) point out that politicians prefer 
international agreements that benefit their constituents.  Lehman and McCoy 
(1992, 608) also make an important argument that is highlighted by the case they 
use.  That is, in the bargaining process there are two possible strategies for 
negotiators. Either they seek concessions from their opponent until agreement is 
reached, or they offer concessions, requiring that they also convince their 
constituents of the wisdom of their actions.  This back and forth can be seen in 
the cases of both Zambia and Malawi.  In Malawi, after first asking for 
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nongenetically modified food aid and being denied, the next move was to make a 
concession: they would accept the food as long as it was milled first.  In Zambia, 
concessions were sought from the U.S. but never granted, making the bargaining 
process (inasmuch as one can call it a bargaining process with such a power 
imbalance) break down. 
In his chapter on how developing countries negotiate with the IMF, Kahler 
(1993, 364, 369) raises an interesting point about why developing countries 
might choose to go against what seems to be their best interest.  Kahler argues 
that the puzzle can at least be partially solved by looking at the internal politics of 
each country. Kahler (1993, 369-370) posits that there are three considerations 
when looking at how the win-sets of developing countries are expanded and 
contracted, and the politics involved in the decision.  The first is that there may 
be ideological objections to the international organization’s proposed strategies.  
Kahler states that such resistance is likely to be more prevalent in countries 
where ideological lines are prominent in the political life of the country.  The 
second consideration is that nationalism may come into play, with players within 
the country objecting to pressure or direction from an outside source.  These 
objections may come from different sources, whether they be governmental or 
originate from civil society, citizens’ groups, etc.  The third consideration is 
economic in nature.  Kahler is arguing specifically about economic changes 
brought about by proposed structural adjustments, but the economic argument 
stands in this case, as the actual argument is about forces and organizations 




Stephen M. Magu’s 2015 article, “Dilemmas of East African Cooperation: 
Domestic Audience and Prisoner’s Dilemma Approaches on Regional 
Integration” is an excellent example of how game theory can be used to illustrate 
situations in the developing world.  Though he does not use two-level game 
theory specifically, Magu discusses the cooperation amongst East African 
countries over the last century, with specific reference to Tanzania’s decision to 
leave the East African Cooperation (EAC) agreement.  Magu uses game theory 
to argue that Tanzania was in a Prisoner’s Dilemma with other countries, where 
cooperation was most desirable but could not be trusted.  Rather than an attempt 
to play the game well, Magu suggests that it was Tanzania’s domestic audience 
that made the decision for the state.  In this case, in the interaction between 
international pressures and domestic concerns, domestic concerns won (2015, 
396). 
 Andonova (2008) studies the effect of the Kyoto Protocol on Russian 
climate change policy to show that international policies and agreements must be 
taken into account when exploring change in policy.  She uses Gourevitch’s 
“second image reversed” question to show that the Kyoto Protocol had an effect 
in several ways.  First, it altered the costs and benefits for the climate regime in 
the country through redistribution of resources (Andonova 2008, 484).  It also 
changed political interests in more subtle ways through capacity building and a 
more thorough diffusion of economic assessments. Andonova’s main dependent 
variables are domestic political processes rather than the more traditional 
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aggregate of state behavior or policies (2008, 485). This helps give a clearer 
picture of more subtle mechanisms at play. 
 Mistry (2015) uses two-level game theory to look at negotiations between 
the U.S. and India regarding nuclear proliferation. India accepted safeguards on 
its nuclear facilities along with some restrictions on nuclear testing.  In turn, the 
U.S. recognized India’s nuclear status and lifted barriers to civilian nuclear trade.  
Mistry points out that Putnam’s framework provides the best answer to how 
successful nuclear negotiations will be; negotiations will be successful when 
technical details win domestic approval in both negotiating countries. 
 The scholarly works discussed are useful in showing how two-level game 
theory can be applied to the developing world.  It is a framework that fits well 
because of the different relationship the developing world has with the developed 
world, international financial institutions, and the international community.  It is an 
important area to consider for the field of International Relations. 
 
2.6 U.S. vs. EU Policy and Attitude Towards GMOs 
Since GM technology began to become prominent in the mid-1990s, the 
U.S. and EU have been at odds in their attitudes towards the technology, how to 
regulate it, and whether it was helpful or harmful for humans and the 
environment.  Much has been written about the differences between the two.  
This section will briefly cover some of that debate. The next section will examine 
how the debate affects Africa, and then discuss whether fears of what loss of EU 
trade would do to African countries are exaggerated.  Finally, the next section will 
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look at the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, what it is and how it influences 
policy in the developing world.   
In 2003 the U.S. brought a complaint to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) against the EU, charging that the EU’s failure to approve the importation 
of genetically modified crops from 1988 to 2004 constituted a de facto 
moratorium that was without scientific basis.  The U.S. charged the EU with thus 
ignoring the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures and declaring that the EU was engaging in unfair trade practices (Pew 
2005, 2).  In 2006, the WTO ruled that the EU had indeed violated the 
agreement.  However, by then it was a moot point because the strict ban had 
ended in 2004, some think because the EU knew the ruling was going to go 
against them (Peterson 2010, 10).7 
Since that time, the rhetoric and competition between the U.S. and the EU 
has not changed.  The debate takes place on two major fronts: scientific 
uncertainty and ethical concerns, that is, whether crops, food, and feed are 
sustainable, and whether they should be given to humans and animals before the 
long term consequences are known (Peterson 2010, 2-3).   
In a case study over the dispute over regulation, Peterson (2010) points 
out that there are several sources of the dispute.  The first is in how regulations 
are made and enforced.  In the U.S. the regulations are centralized, with rules 
coming from the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of Agriculture, 
                                            
7 Euractive, “EU GMO Ban was Illegal, WTO Rules,” May 12, 2006, 
http://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/eu-gmo-ban-was-illegal-wto-rules/ (accessed 
November 7, 2017. 
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and the Environmental Protection Agency.  In contrast, the EU has a 
decentralized rule-making procedure with the EU Commission and agencies co-
existing with national agencies.  However, the U.S. has a more decentralized 
rule-enforcement mechanism because of the number of entities that may bring 
suit while the EU also contends with power struggles between the EU Council, 
European Parliament, and other agencies (Peterson 2010, 4). 
In addition, since the Reagan administration in the 1980s, the U.S. has 
focused on whether the technology is safe for humans to grow and consume, 
whereas the EU has focused on using the precautionary principle, which 
mandates that a new technology or activity be avoided until its long term 
consequences are known (Peterson 2010, 5).  The U.S. and the EU differ 
fundamentally in their approach and their beliefs about how GM technology 
should be handled. 
This dispute has now spilled over into the rest of the world, with some 
countries like Canada, Mexico, China, and Australia following the U.S. example 
and allowing but regulating the growth of GM crops and some like Japan 
following much of the EU in banning growth (Sheikhha 2017, 81-82).  The 
discussion has become especially important in the developing world as countries 
debate whether it is safe or economically wise to import or encourage the growth 
of GM crops within their borders.  Differences in regulations lead to trade 
disputes that developing countries can ill afford (Gostek 2016, 762).  
Africa in particular has been affected by the debate.  Indeed, this 
dissertation exists partially because of the debate between the U.S. and EU.  
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Scholars have looked at the effects.  Robert Paarlberg (2010) has been critical of 
the EU’s stance on GMO food and crops.  In his article, “GMO Foods and Crops: 
Africa’s Choice,” Paarlberg contends that there is scientific consensus that GMO 
foods and crops pose no risk to either humans or the environment, and that the 
EU has known this since 2002, yet the EU remains recalcitrant in its reluctance to 
change position (2010, 609-610).  Paarlberg argues that this is because 
Europeans do not stand to benefit by accepting GMO foods and crops and are 
not hurt by not accepting them.  Paarlberg contrasts this with the very different 
situation Africa is in.  Paarlberg points out that where introducing GM technology 
to European farmers would only benefit a small percentage of them, 60% or 
more of Africans are still connected to farming, and would benefit greatly from the 
technology.  Paarlberg lists several areas where Africans would benefit, including 
insect resistant crops with less pesticide use and drought tolerant maize 
(Paarlberg 2010, 611).  However, African countries must allow trials in-country to 
discover how they work in their environment.  This is a hurdle many nations are 
reluctant to do away with (Paarlberg 2010, 611). 
Morris (2011) also argues that GM technology could play a large role in 
Africa, but points out that there are barriers to this, some of them courtesy of the 
U.S. and EU dispute.  In sub-Saharan Africa, countries are limited in the amount 
of money they can spend on developing GMOs and ensuring their safety.  
Because the governments do not contribute enough to the scientific community, 
the community relies on international agencies for funding, which in turn makes 
them susceptible to the funding source’s attitude towards GMOs (Morris 2011, 
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809).  Morris argues that there are several viable alternatives for African 
countries to escape being caught in the middle of the dispute.  The first is to 
move away from North-South consulting and turn to South-South consulting, with 
developing countries helping each other rather than turning to the North for help 
(Morris 2011, 817-818).  The second solution is for African governments to begin 
to recognize the critical role GM technology could play in their country’s future, 
and invest more heavily in it (Morris 2011, 819).  This will allow them to escape 
the dispute between the U.S. and the EU and better determine their own future. 
 
2.6.1 Is the Fear of the EU Exaggerated? 
While it might be beneficial for African countries to be able to escape the 
dispute between the U.S. and EU, there are some scholars who contend that the 
debate is overblown and that the EU is not as much of a threat to trade as may 
be perceived by African countries reluctant to adopt GM technology.  Anderson 
and Jackson (2005) focus on the implications for African countries once they 
have biotechnology policies in place. They do this by examining the potential 
gains for countries in sub-Saharan Africa if they choose to grow genetically 
modified crops.  The authors use a global economy model to show the effects of 
countries adopting the new technologies.  The model illustrates the “vertical and 
horizontal linkages between all product markets both within the model’s individual 
countries and regions as well as…their bilateral trade flows.” (Anderson and 
Jackson 2005, 388)   
The factors Anderson and Jackson consider are current production versus 
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genetically modified crop production, production shock, and consumption.  
Taking the model through a series of scenarios, the authors show that, even in 
the presence of the EU’s current barriers, the potential advantages to adopting 
GM technology outweigh the potential disadvantages.  Anderson and Jackson 
argue that adopting the GM technology would lead to improved health outcomes, 
and greater productivity (2005, 398, 401).  This article is especially critical 
because of the authors’ inclusion of EU policy and subsequent trade implications. 
In the article, “Economic Impacts of Policies Affecting Crop Biotechnology 
and Trade,” Anderson (2010) again seeks to show that the potential for gain in 
adopting GM technology outweighs the losses that might be incurred because of 
the EU’s restrictive import regulations.  Anderson shows that trying to maintain 
GM free crops and food by restricting what farmers can grow creates more of a 
disadvantage for those within the country in terms of both food consumers in-
country and farmers (2010, 561-562). 
Gruere and Sengupta (2009) also contend that fear of loss of imports to 
the EU have caused irrational policies in developing countries.  The authors 
study standards set up by private corporations and how those standards have 
affected the policy decisions of developing countries.  Gruere and Sengupta 
(2009, 399) found 29 of these cases.  Most of the cases were issues of 
excessive precautionary measures being taken by developing countries for fear 
of EU policies.  The authors contend that this is because of two misleading 
premises.  The first is that the EU and Japan (who is also opposed to GMOs) 
represent the biggest or only possible export markets.  The second is that 
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segregation of non-GM and GM crops is cost prohibitive and infeasible (Gruere 
and Sengupta 2009, 405).  Gruere and Sengupta contend that together these 
two premises have served to disadvantage the growth of GM technology in the 
developing world. 
 
2.7 The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
 In expressing caution or rejection for genetically modified food aid, Zambia 
and Malawi both cited the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety as part of their 
guidance.  This sections explores what the Cartagena Protocol is and its 
influence on whether a country accepts genetically modified food and technology.  
According to the Convention on Biological Diversity website, objective of the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety is to the Convention Biological Diversity is:  
…to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of protection in the field of 
the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms resulting 
from modern biotechnology that may have adverse effects on the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into 
account risks to human health, and specifically focusing on transboundary 
movements.8  
 
The protocol came into effect in May of 2000, with countries coming on 
over the next decade.  The U.S. is not a party to the Cartagena Protocol, but the 
EU is.  Though interviewees from both Zambia and Malawi cited the protocol in 
influencing their decision, neither country was party to the protocol at the time of 
the 2002 crisis.  However, Zambia joined in 2004 and Malawi joined in 2009 
                                            
8 Convention on Biological Diversity, “Text of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,” 
https://bch.cbd.int/protocol/text/ (accessed November 6, 2017) 
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(Gostek 2016, 780-782).9 
Gupta and Falkner (2006) discuss how the Cartagena Protocol has 
influenced the policies and actions of Mexico, China, and South Africa.  The 
authors argue that the protocol has influenced policy in these countries, all of 
them developing, through three avenues.  The first is enhanced choice.  The 
Cartagena Protocol mandates that decisions about whether to import or export 
GMOs must be made based on scientific risk assessments, but also allows for 
precautionary decisions to be made before the risks have been fully assessed.  
In widening the basis under which countries can make decisions as to whether to 
accept the technology or not, the protocol gives countries more choices (Gupta 
and Falkner 2006, 29).  The second avenue of influence is that of enhanced 
access to information from GM exporters.  Under the protocol, GM exporting 
countries are required to provide information on what they are exporting to 
potential importers.  This requirement helps with the first influence, that of making 
the decision on a sound scientific basis (Gupta and Falkner 2006, 30).  The final 
avenue of influence comes in the form of a call in the protocol for capacity 
building to help countries develop biosafety regulatory frameworks (Gupta and 
Falkner 2006, 31). 
All of this means that while Zambia and Malawi were not yet signatories to 
the Cartagena Protocol, they could cite it as reasoning for displaying caution in 
acceptance of the genetically modified food aid being offered and look forward to 
taking advantage of its capacity building provisions once they were signatories to 
                                            
9 Convention on Biological Diversity. “Parties to the Protocol and Signature and Ratification of the 





2.8 GMOs in the Developing World 
The previous sections discussed the debate between the U.S. and EU in 
regard to GMOs.  The issue of genetically modified crops and food and their 
relative safety has been and continues to be greatly debated.  The issue holds 
special importance for the developing world, where, if genetically modified crops 
live up to the claims, great strides could be made in countries’ ability to feed 
themselves.10  On the other hand, if genetically modified crops live up to the 
claims of their naysayers, the introduction of them in the developing world could 
also do considerable damage and further exacerbate the hunger problem.  This 
section will discuss some of the literature on the introduction of GMOs to the 
developing world, examining the implications of acceptance, the factors that lead 
to acceptance, and the pros and cons of doing so. 
In their article, “GMOs and the Developing World: A Precautionary 
Interpretation of Biotechnology,” Lieberman and Gray (2008) explore the 
implications of developing countries, especially African countries, accepting 
genetically modified crops, with particular emphasis on genetically modified food 
aid.  They do this using the framework of the precautionary principle, or the idea 
that until more is known, GMOs should be strictly regulated, if not banned 
altogether (Lieberman and Gray 2008, 396).  The authors contend that both the 
                                            
10 This is of course assuming that agricultural technology is the only concern in developing 
countries’ ability to feed their people.  Though it is beyond the scope of this dissertation, as was 
seen briefly in Chapter 1, technology is not the only reason developing countries struggle with 
feeding their citizens. 
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U.S. and the EU use the precautionary principle, but apply it differently.  The U.S. 
treats GM foods as though they are equivalent to other grown foods, which 
means that they fall under the same governing bodies and regulations as 
conventional farming products.  In contrast, the EU has created new legislation to 
deal specifically with GM technology in both farming and food and in doing so 
has created a stricter protocol (Lieberman and Gray 2008, 396). 
Lieberman and Gray also discuss genetically modified food aid.  The 
authors point out that because GM food has been treated as equivalent to 
conventional food from its introduction, when it comes to food aid, GM food is 
also treated no differently (2008, 399).  Lieberman and Gray provide a brief 
history of U.S. food aid before turning to the issue of genetically modified food 
aid.  From the beginning the program has had critics, and the addition of 
genetically modified food into food aid shipments has only intensified the 
criticisms.   
The major criticism is that the U.S. is using food aid to introduce 
genetically modified food and crops into the developing world, essentially forcing 
the technology on unsuspecting countries in need.  Organizations like 
Greenpeace claim that once the food or crops are in the country, the U.S. has 
created a backdoor wherein USAID’s Program for Biosafety Systems can offer 
assistance and create more dependency on GM food and crops.  Critics claim 
that this helps push countries towards using the U.S. model of treating GM crops 
as equivalent to conventional crops. (Lieberman and Gray 2008, 401-402).   
From the viewpoint of the countries receiving the genetically modified food 
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aid there are a host of reasons not to accept the food.  Many of these reasons 
will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 5 and 6, but Lieberman and Gray 
mention one important reason in their article, and that is the concern that 
accepting the food and subsequently planting the crops will result in a 
dependency on the U.S. for not only the seed, but for the proper pesticides to 
control them (Lieberman and Gray 2008, 405).  This would require a dependency 
on the U.S. that some countries are not comfortable with. 
Writing more recently about the genetically modified crop debate in Africa, 
Mabaya et al. (2015) discuss the factors involved in whether a country is willing 
to adopt genetically modified crops or not.  According to the authors, there are six 
main factors.  The first is ministerial control of biosafety.  Mabaya et al. point out 
that unlike many other issues, the acceptance of genetically modified crop growth 
is one that many parties take an interest in.  This means that often the issue can 
fall under multiple ministries’ responsibilities, including agriculture, trade and 
commerce, food safety, consumer protection, rural development, science and 
technology, and environment (2015, 580).  The number of ministries involved 
often means a lengthy approval process and politicization of the issue. The 
authors point out that in most African countries the oversight of biosafety and 
biotechnology rests in either the ministry of environment or the ministry of 
agriculture.  However, in Zambia, the oversight falls under six different ministries, 
making agreement on anything exceedingly difficult.  In contrast, Malawi’s 
oversight resides under one ministry in one office, the Commission for Science 
and Technology (Mabaya et al. 2015, 581). 
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The second factor discussed by the authors is peer country influence.  
The authors argue that most African countries look to their neighbors for policy 
guidance.  Acceptance by one country can lead to a domino effect of acceptance 
by other countries as they try to keep up with their neighbors.  One reason for 
this is the porous borders between many African countries, which necessitates 
similar policies in order to maintain control (Mabaya et al. 2015, 582).   
The third factor is the state of the seed sector.  If a country has a well-
developed seed sector to produce, market, and disseminate seed, they are more 
likely to favor having genetically modified crops in their country.  In their article, 
Mabaya et al. analyzed the impact of the seed sector on GM application stage 
and policy.  They found a positive correlation between the two (Mabaya et al. 
2015, 583). 
The fourth and fifth factors are related to each other and to the first factor. 
They are advocacy by key political figures, public influence, the media, and 
activism.  Politicians are susceptible to being swayed, and the authors point out 
that the position of the country may change as politicians change.  They 
specifically point out the example of Zambia where President Mwanawasa 
declared the crops and food would never be allowed in, but subsequent 
presidents have softened their rhetoric.  The policy has not yet changed, but the 
presidents are getting progressively closer to acceptance (Mabaya et al. 2015, 
585).  According to the authors, part of this change may be due to the role of 
media and activism in Zambia and other countries.  However, the authors argue 
that African media has proven to be particularly unreliable in pushing viewpoints, 
62 
 
with several media outlets swinging between condemnation and approval without 
apparent reason (Mabaya et al. 2015, 586).  Activism is related to these factors 
because of its use of media and ability to sway politicians. 
 The sixth and final factor the authors argue is that of food security crises.  
They point to evidence that the willingness to adopt genetically modified crops is 
lower during times of relative security and higher during times of crisis (Mabaya 
et al. 2015, 587).  This unfortunately opens African countries to manipulation by 
outside sources eager to push their product on desperate Africans. 
Mabaya et al. (2015) show that many factors go into accepting genetically 
modified crops and food in Africa, but that the process, while difficult, can be 
accomplished while successfully protecting the country.  The authors urge public 
education on the subject, scientific studies and findings being discussed in the 
media, and conferences for political leaders in order to discuss the issues facing 
them (Mabaya et al. 2015, 589).  This is valuable as a way forward for African 
countries to become fully informed, and to cut down on politicization of the issue. 
In their paper written for the Center for Global Development, Elliott and 
Madan (2016) seek to further elucidate the potentials and pitfalls of GMOs for 
Africa.  One point they make is that GM crops have been less effective than they 
could be in Africa because the corporations propagating the seed developed it 
with large-scale farming in mind, rather than the small holdings that most 
Africans have (Elliott and Madan 2016, 8).   
Elliott and Madan argue that there are risks and problems in accepting GM 
technology.  The first is that adopting the technology would threaten African 
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agricultural exports.  The authors use and update the work of past scholars and 
conclude that, even using very conservative estimates of GMO sensitivity, the 
chance of African nations losing trade because of the introduction of GM 
technology is small.  This is because, while the EU is a major importer of 
agriculture from Africa, that market is growing very slowly and is poised to be 
overtaken by other markets such as China which are much more open to 
genetically modified food (Elliott and Madan 2016, 12).  
Another risk Elliott and Madan discuss is that of capacity.  Currently many 
African nations lack the human resources, infrastructure, economic resources, 
and technical capacity to fully take advantage of the new technology.  This 
means that governments must carefully weigh their country’s capacity to succeed 
with a new technology that requires an initial outlay of cash and education.  One 
recommendation the authors make is private public partnerships both in and out 
of country in order to facilitate capacity building for farmers and other 
stakeholders (Elliott and Madan 2016, 14-16). 
Finally, Elliott and Madan give recommendations for making GM 
technology work for African countries.  The recommendations include the 
aforementioned partnerships, cost-effective regulatory frameworks, information 
exchange, cooperation between developing countries, and the acquisition of 
donor funds to help with the transition (Elliott and Madan 2016, 17-18).  With this, 
the authors join other scholars like Paarlberg (2002, 2009) and Anderson and 
Jackson (2005) who believe that genetic modification can successfully alleviate 
some of Africa’s worst hunger issues. 
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 Genetically modified food, crops, and technology represent an incredibly 
complex subject for the developing world.  First is the relative influences of the 
U.S. and the EU, and fears about market manipulation to gain advantage for U.S. 
companies on one hand, and the fear of trade restrictions because of GM crops 
on the other hand.  Adding to the complexity is the Cartagena Protocol, and its 
rules and regulations signed off on by many of the countries of the world.  The 
difficulty of creating good biosafety regulations and the implications of doing so 
also add difficulty to countries’ decisions.  As can be seen by the span of years in 
the literature, in many ways, the debate has not changed significantly since 2002, 
and reviewing the debate helps one understand the atmosphere in which Zambia 
and Malawi made their decision. 
 
2.9 Genetic Modification and Food Aid 
 The debate surrounding GM technology and Africa is not complete without 
addressing food aid.  The subject of this dissertation, the 2002 decisions in 
Zambia and Malawi, was not the only time Africa faced drought.  Because of this, 
some scholars have addressed the subject of genetically modified food aid as a 
whole.  This section will first examine the literature on genetically modified food 
aid and specific examples of the treatment of the 2002 decision and discuss how 
the literature pertains to this dissertation.  Much of the literature found pertains 
only to Zambia’s decision, with few addressing Malawi’s opposing decision at any 
length. 
In her article, “The Political Economy of Food Aid in an Era of Agricultural 
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Biotechnology,” Clapp studies the rejection of genetically modified food aid by 
developing countries.  She argues that, contrary to the literature from the 1990s 
that argued that the reform of food aid policies had led to a depoliticization of the 
food aid regime, the issue of food aid is still debated and that donor motivations 
in the era of biotechnology must be considered (Clapp 2005, 470). 
Food aid shipped from the U.S. has contained genetically modified food 
since the mid-1990s, including to countries were there were moratoriums on 
GMOs, such as Bolivia. While there were some protests, until 2002 the situation 
was mostly such that the food aid was helpful but not critical to the recipient 
nation.  This changed in 2002 when southern Africa faced its worst food shortage 
in 50 years (Clapp 2005, 471).  Clapp then briefly gives part of the history in 
Zambia, including the defensive reaction of the U.S., discussed further in Chapter 
4 of this dissertation, and the criticism of EU policy, discussed more extensively 
in Chapter 6. 
Clapp’s article also goes beyond the scope of this dissertation by tracing 
the history of the motivations for the U.S. giving food aid.  The article also 
discusses the different interpretations of risks and precautions taken because of 
those interpretations, which will be discussed more in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
Clapp’s article is useful for a history, but provides no theoretical framework for 
what happened or why.  In addition, Clapp only very briefly mentions Malawi’s 
decision at all. 
In their report on the status of attitudes towards GMOs, Cooke and 
Downie (2010) focus on three countries—Zambia, Kenya, and South Africa—
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because of their varying acceptance of genetically modified crops.  The report, 
written in 2010, indicates that attitudes in Zambia remain very much the same as 
they were in 2002.  The authors briefly go into the history discussed in this 
dissertation.  They argue that there were several factors that compounded the 
2002 crisis, among them poor harvests, flooding, drought, economic decline, and 
the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, which made it difficult for people to support 
themselves (Cooke and Downie 2010, 5).  Cooke and Downie also discuss the 
debate in Zambia and how quickly it became passionate and emotive, leaving 
little room for scientific facts.  This in turn led to a hardening of positions, and the 
position of the president became the foundation for the national policy (Cooke 
and Downie 2010, 6).  Cooke and Downie also briefly discuss the role of the 
United States in the debate, stating the U.S. needs to be cautious in how they 
advocate for the technology because there is widespread suspicion over their 
motives for doing so (2010, 3). 
One claim Cooke and Downie make is that there was no scientific 
community in Africa outside of South Africa (2010, 1).  This shows a Western 
bias because, while the scientific community may not be anywhere near as 
robust as it is in the West, certainly there are and were scientists educated 
enough to assess the science coming out of the West in regard to GMOs.  
However, it is true that the scientists, particularly in Zambia and Malawi, were 
hindered by fear of what genetically modified crops might do if experimented on 
in-country, a fear that remains today. 
Andrew Bowman (2015) also discusses Zambia’s decision to reject 
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genetically modified food aid in 2002.  Bowman’s article is similar to this 
dissertation in his use of interviews of key players and media coverage.  
However, Bowman argues that the decision did not come down to debates over 
health and environmental risks, but also focuses on issues of sovereignty and 
risk.  Bowman (2015, 1377) claims that the decision was made because the 
Zambian government was concerned over maintaining control over GM 
technology, and that the importation of genetically modified food aid threatened 
that by forcing Zambians to obtain their seed from outside the country.  Bowman 
(2015, 1378) also argues that the crisis highlighted the diminishing state of 
Zambian science because both the government and the citizens treated Zambian 
scientists as lay people rather than experts.  Both factors combined to push 
Zambia towards rejection of the genetically modified food aid.   
Bowman’s article covers much of what is covered in this dissertation.  
However, this dissertation goes well beyond Bowman by adding a theoretical 
framework to illuminate the process of the decisions and by examining Malawi’s 
decision and how the two processes lead to different outcomes. 
David Fig (2003) also offers an analysis of the Zambian decision, one 
written very shortly after the crisis.  After a history of the decision, Fig focuses on 
two main issues: the lack of legal framework Zambia had for protecting 
themselves should GMOs enter their country and the suspect motives of the U.S. 
in pushing for the food to be accepted.  Fig does an excellent job of using the 
media coverage at the time, as well as reports by various institutions to back up 
his arguments, but his article suffers from lack of a broader focus on all of the 
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reasons behind the decision. 
Emma Broadbent’s article (2012) presents a straightforward case study. 
Broadbent examines three major areas: the context and development of the 
debate, the role that evidence played in the debate, and what influenced what 
evidence was used. Broadbent’s article is very useful for history of the decision. 
Broadbent (2012, 15) does mention one element that I also found, the lack of 
openness from members of the Zambian government in discussing the decision 
with researchers. 
Pascal Mwale (2006) takes a very interesting approach to studying the 
decision in Zambia by exploring the form in which public debate about 
biotechnology took place in Zambia at the time of the decision.  Mwale uses his 
article as an intellectual exercise in exploring the concept of “public debate” as it 
pertains to public understanding of science. Mwale writes the article in order to 
examine what public debate is when it comes to science and how it worked in a 
practical application. 
There are also scholars who take a more aggressive approach to 
assigning blame in the genetically modified food aid debate   Bodulovic (2005) 
blames the EU for exacerbating the problem in Africa with their policies.  
Bodulovic argues that the lack of support for biotechnology by European nations 
and the fear of trade loss led to the rejection of the genetically modified food aid. 
Bodulovic’s conviction is strong, but his article fails to consider the many other 




Zerbe (2004) is another scholar who takes a very definite viewpoint of the 
2002 crisis and how it was resolved.  Zerbe argues that the U.S. provided 
genetically modified food aid not because that is what is primarily grown in the 
U.S., nor because they had a sincere desire to help, but instead because 
sending the genetically modified food aid was a way of promoting the adoption of 
biotech crops in southern Africa, which would in turn expand market access for 
U.S. corporations and ultimately undermine smallholder production.  In this way 
U.S. corporations who were pushing to expand their own markets played an 
indirect role in the pressures the U.S. applied.  Zerbe (2004) argues that this 
would ultimately lead to greater food insecurity in Africa.  Zerbe’s article suffers 
from an abundance of cynicism in describing U.S. motives as well as a lack of 
perspective on other reasons for sending the genetically modified food aid, 
including those mentioned above. 
  While Zambia’s decision has been treated by multiple scholars in many 
ways, it is more difficult to find treatment of Malawi’s decision.  William Attwell’s 
article, “’When We Have Nothing We All Eat Grass’: Debt, Donor Dependence, 
and the Food Crisis in Malawi, 2001 to 2003,” examines why the food crisis was 
so severe in Malawi.   Attwell (2013) argues that it was the severity of the crisis 
that led to Malawi’s decision but does not examine the decision closely.  Instead, 
Attwell argues that the crisis was brewing long before it ever happened because 
of poor decision-making by the Malawian government, as well as cancellation of 
aid stemming from allegations of malfeasance.  All of this meant that Malawi was 
unprepared to take care of itself when the 2002 famine hit.  This will be treated 
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further in Chapters 4 and 6. 
2.10 Conclusion 
This brief literature review has served to examine the scholarship of game 
theory in International Relations by looking at game theory broadly before 
narrowing the focus to the specific game theory being used in this dissertation, 
two-level game theory.  It has also discussed the importance of taking domestic 
politics into consideration even when studying International Relations, and 
explored some of the literature that does that in the developing world.  The next 
section examined the differences between the U.S. and the EU and how those 
differences have affected African countries considering adopting GM technology. 
It has also reviewed the scholarship over whether African countries are right to 
fear loss of trade with the EU, or whether there might be other markets to pursue 
with GM crops.  The review also discussed the Cartagena Protocol and its 
influence in Zambia and Malawi’s decisions.  Next, the review looked at the 
potentials and pitfalls of using GM technology in Africa and the factors that lead 
to acceptance of the same.  Finally, the literature review focused on scholarly 
works on genetically modified food aid by examining articles written about the 
decision in Zambia and Malawi and how they help and are different from this 




In any scholarly work it is important to explicate the design of the 
research, how the research is conducted, how the particular methodology will be 
used, and why those choices were made in relation to the research question.  In 
this study, I asked, What were the forces and pressures at play in Zambia and 
Malawi in 2002 that caused them to make different decisions regarding the 
acceptance of genetically modified food aid?  This chapter will first explain the 
research design of the dissertation, with particular attention to why the 
methodologies being used were chosen, as well as their advantages and 
disadvantages.  Next, the chapter discusses case studies and how they can best 
be employed, as well as pitfalls to watch out for when using them.  This includes 
the justification for selecting the cases used in this dissertation.  Analysis is an 
important part of any study, and the ways in which analysis is employed are in 
the next section.  The final sections discuss the sources used in this dissertation, 
including interviews, newspapers, and other secondary sources. 
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3.2 Research Design 
Because this dissertation is studying two decisions, the best methodology 
to be used is qualitative.  Qualitative methodology allows reasons to be pulled 
from narratives of those involved, leading to insight about what happened and 
why.  The specific methodology is case studies in a structured, focused 
comparison using the congruence method, as advocated by George and Bennett 
(2005).  In this methodology, the researcher uses a method structured by writing 
specific questions about the objective of the research.  These questions are then 
answered for each case under consideration.  In order to maintain the structure 
and produce comparable data from each case, the same questions must be 
asked of each case.   
For this dissertation, the same questions were asked in interviews in each 
country, but also the same questions were asked about each of the other 
sources, such as newspaper articles.  This helps both guide and standardize 
data collection, making systematic comparisons easier and generalizable 
findings possible.  The method also allows for an orderly, cumulative 
development of knowledge.  The method is referred to as focused because it 
deals only with certain aspects of the historical record, in this case, the 2002 
decision as to whether to accept genetically modified food aid (George and 
Bennett 2005, 67-70).  In order to understand what happened, many of the 
players in the situation were interviewed, asking them a variety of questions that 
helped give a clear picture of what their role was, what their actions were, and 
why they acted the way they did. 
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The congruence method used in this dissertation is particularly useful in 
this study for a number of reasons.  The congruence method is a methodology 
which begins with a theory.  The theory posits a relationship between the 
dependent and independent variable.  In this study the dependent variable is the 
decision made by each country and the independent variables are the attitudes 
of the actors, the individual decisions, and the pressures from both international 
and domestic entities, including the scientific community, NGOs, and churches.  
The theory is then assessed for its ability to predict or explain the outcome in the 
cases under study (George and Bennett 2005, 181).  If, after determining that the 
outcomes of the cases are consistent with the theory’s predictions, it may be 
possible to posit a causal relationship between the variables. Though the 
terminology used in this study is from George and Bennett, Yin discusses a 
similar methodology which he terms analytic generalization, wherein, “a 
previously developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the 
empirical results of the case study.  If two or more cases are shown to support 
the same theory, replication may be claimed.” (Yin 2009, 38) 
Rather than strict process tracing, this methodology includes what George 
and Bennett (2005, 151) call controlled comparison, that is, a nonstatistical 
comparison of a small number of cases meant to document and analyze 
instances of a phenomenon that are similar, ideally, in every way but one, in this 
case the opposite decisions made in the countries.  Zambia and Malawi faced 
the same famine in 2002 and were faced with the same decision, but made 
opposite decisions.  This study thus qualifies as a controlled comparison. 
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There are several advantages to this methodology according to George 
and Bennett (2005) and Yin (2009).  The first is that the burden on the 
investigator to trace the causal process that leads from the independent variables 
to the final outcomes is lessened.  This means that the method requires less data 
about the cases under investigation in order to be valuable. This is especially 
useful in Africa where data can be difficult to obtain for many reasons. In 
interviewing, in some cases, the people in charge are no longer available, 
whether because they cannot be easily traced, or in some instances with 
countries where HIV/AIDS is so prevalent, the potential interviewees have died.  
Gaining access to documentation is also a problem.  For example, in Zambia any 
minutes from meetings held by parliamentary members, standing committees, or 
ministry committees about the decision were placed in the National Archives and 
cannot be accessed for 30 years.  In Malawi, according to multiple interviews, 
minutes were simply not taken.  This means a reliance on secondary sources 
such as newspaper articles, which detailed what was happening in the countries 
at the time, as well as the decision-making processes.  Though other sources 
might have been found given plenty of time and money, the reality of writing a 
dissertation made that impossible.   
Because of all of these data difficulties, process tracing using an exact 
timeline is simply not possible, making the congruence methodology the most 
likely to yield useful results. According to George and Bennett, the explanation in 
the cases, “may be deliberately selective, focusing on what are thought to be 
particularly important part of an adequate or parsimonious explanation. Or the 
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partial character of the explanation may reflect the investigator’s inability to 
specify or theoretically ground all steps in a hypothesized process, or to find data 
to document every step” (2005, 211). 
Difficulties in gathering information point to other advantages of the 
congruence method.  This method allows for considerable flexibility and 
adaptability.  It can be used in a variety of ways, including helping to refine non-
predictive or explanatory theories so they can be tested. It can also be used as a 
within-case method or as a controlled comparison (George and Bennett 2005, 
183). 
I chose this particular methodology for a number of reasons.  The 
research design is comparative in nature, comparing two countries that are 
similar and examining a particular situation the two countries had in common 
where the outcomes were different.  This dissertation is very loosely employing 
John Stuart Mill’s Method of Difference (also known as a most-similar case 
design) (George and Bennett 2005, 153-154).  While the cases under study are 
similar enough for a comparison, the similarities do not quite rise to the level 
required by John Stuart Mill’s Method of Difference. As noted by George and 
Bennett (2005, 153), Mill’s method requires a strict set of circumstances, namely 
that the cases are similar in all aspects but one.  Zambia and Malawi’s history, 
population, and geography are similar but preclude strict use Mill’s methodology 
because while they are similar in terms of history, population, and geography, 
they are two countries with histories that have diverged.  At the beginning of the 
famine, as has been shown, they were not in the same position financially or with 
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respect to donors and are therefore not similar enough to qualify for Mill’s Method 
of Difference.  In addition, there was more media and international focus on 
Zambia because of the controversy surrounding its decision.  Taken alone, this 
could mean that the controlled comparison is weakened.  However, interviews 
were more readily available in Malawi and I was able to obtain more information 
from them.  This helps to balance the media focus on Zambia, which provides 
more information for that country. 
Zambia and Malawi made different decisions.  This dissertation is an 
attempt to lay out the crisis situation as it happened and explain why the two 
countries diverged in their decision as to whether to accept or reject genetically 
modified food aid from the U.S. through the WFP. 
3.3 Case Studies 
There are many definitions of a case study, but in essence case studies 
allow a researcher to inquire in depth into a particular event, decision, or 
circumstance.  According to Yin (2009, 18), a case study is an empirical inquiry 
that: “investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life 
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident.” George and Bennett (2005, 5) define case studies as a 
“detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test 
historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events.”  Schramm 
(1971, in Yin 2009, 15) defines case studies as: “The essence of a case study, 
the central tendency among all types of case study, is that it tries to illuminate a 
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decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, 
and with what result.”  Qualitative case studies are useful as complements and 
counterpoints to quantitative work because they give the researcher the chance 
to ask fundamental questions not just about what occurred, but why a 
phenomenon occurred, what led up to it, and what happened because of it.  
Gerring (2007, 1) argues that one can gain a better understanding of the whole 
by focusing on a critical part.  This in-depth knowledge of an individual case can 
then be more useful than a shallow knowledge of many cases.  
Some case studies are histories of particular events, studied in order to 
illustrate a larger principle.  The case studies in this research are not histories 
because many of the key players are still alive and available to speak to.  
However, the modernity of the cases do not rise to the level of experiments 
because the behaviors and decisions are in the past and thus cannot be 
manipulated (Yin 2009, 11). 
 
3.3.1 Problems with Case Studies 
While case studies have many advantages, there are also disadvantages 
to using them.  The first objection often raised is procedural in that there is a lack 
of rigor in doing the case study and very little planning involved.  This is patently 
false and easily overcome by any researcher with a sense of academic 
responsibility.  The second issue is that case studies are not widely 
generalizable; while they may be generalizable to theoretical propositions, 
generalizing them to populations or universes is problematic because there is 
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little basis for comparison. The goal of case studies tends to be expanding 
theoretical propositions rather than enumerating frequencies.  Another issue with 
case studies is that they take too long and result in massive, unreadable 
documents (Yin 2009, 14-15).   
 There are ways to combat the disadvantages of case studies.  The first is 
to focus on the quality of the research design.  According to Yin (2009, 40-45), 
there are four areas that must be considered in order to have a solid research 
design, and thus lead to good case studies.  The first is construct validity, or the 
process of identifying correct operational measures for the concepts being 
studied (See also King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 25).  In these case studies 
the operational measure of the dependent variable is a simple one: the decision 
to accept or reject food aid provided by the U.S.  Yin suggests ways to ensure 
good construct validity, including using multiple sources of evidence as a way of 
triangulating the evidence and establishing a chain of evidence between the 
process and the outcome. 
 The next critical area is that of internal validity.  Brady and Collier (2004, 
292) define internal validity as “the degree to which descriptive or causal 
inferences from a given set of cases are correct for those cases.”  Yin (2009, 40-
45) argues that internal validity must answer the questions of whether there are 
other explanations for x causing y.  Internal validity also seeks to show how the 
explanation can be proven, and whether the explanation is airtight.  Because of 
the difficulty of gathering evidence, it will be difficult to determine with any degree 
of certainty whether the explanation given in this dissertation is the only one.  
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However, Yin has recommendations such as using pattern matching, doing 
explanation building, and addressing rival explanations.  To this end, pattern 
matching will be done by using game theory, showing the predicted, theoretical 
pattern of action and comparing that to the actual observed pattern (See Yin 
2009, 136-139). 
External validity is the third area Yin (2009) believes is critical to have a 
high quality research design.  Brady and Collier (2004, 288) define external 
validity as, “the degree to which descriptive or causal inferences for a given set of 
cases can be generalized to other cases.”  Yin (2009, 43-44) explains that in 
analytical generalization the scholar is trying to generalize results from a study to 
a broader theory.  This can be done in part by replicating the findings in different 
cases.  Yin recommends using replication logic in multiple case studies in order 
to make external validity more likely.  
The final area Yin recommends for a good research design is reliability. 
Reliability refers to having a structure, design, and plan such that a future 
researcher could do the same study and come to the same findings and results 
(Yin 2009, 45).  King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, 25) also emphasize the 
importance of reliability, stating that the same procedure needs to be applied in 
the same way in order to produce the same measures.  Yin (2009,41) suggests 
that there are two ways to ensure reliability. The first is to use a case study 
protocol to encourage uniformity.  For this dissertation, case study protocol was 
observed in the main source of evidence by establishing a set of questions to be 
asked of each interviewee, including the pre-interview requests to ensure that 
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they understood what was wanted before agreeing to the interview.  In addition, 
interviews were transcribed and described as close to the event as possible, and 
thematic coding was done multiple times.  I did this in order to firmly establish the 
method of coding and also to make sure I was able to draw out and group all of 
the themes that arose in the interviews so that they could be used to tell the 
story.   
George and Bennett (2005, 69) also list ways of overcoming objections to 
using case studies.  The first is to clearly identify the universe of the cases or 
instances.  In the case of this dissertation, the universe is the four Sub-Saharan 
African countries that were faced with drought in 2002 and thus I had the 
decision to make.  Of those four, two have been chosen to study in depth.  The 
second method to overcome objections is to have a well-defined research 
objective and an appropriate research strategy.  The final method is to employ 
variables of theoretical interest for purposes of explanation.  
 
3.3.2 Case Selection Justification 
Case studies are a key component when trying to explore why a decision 
was made but the cases in the study must be chosen carefully.  According to Yin 
(2009, 54):  “Each case must be carefully selected so that it either (a) predicts 
similar results (a literal replication) or (b) predicts contrasting results but for 
anticipatable reasons (a theoretical replication).”  Since the two countries in 
question arrived at two different decisions, this study must fall under Yin’s second 
type, that of theoretical replication.  It is the purpose of this dissertation to explore 
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the reasons for the opposite decisions.  Cases in a case study must also be 
similar enough to effectively compare.  Gerring (2007, 50) states that:  “Cases 
must be similar to each other in whatever respects might affect the causal 
relationship that the writer is investigating, or such differences must be controlled 
for.  Uncontrolled heterogeneity means that cases are ‘apples and oranges’; one 
cannot learn anything about underlying causal processes by comparing their 
histories.”  Zambia and Malawi were chosen because their histories as British 
colonies who gained independence close to each other establish a shared history 
and brought about a similar governmental structure, because they have tribal 
histories close enough they that they share a common native language, because 
they are both among the poorest countries in the world, and because they share 
much the same geography and amount of arable land.   
One concern that can arise from a limited number of cases is selection 
bias, or selecting on the dependent variable.  Because this study was limited by 
time and money, the question arose of which countries to study.  As has been 
previously mentioned, four countries, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe faced the same decision as to whether to accept or reject genetically 
modified food aid and thus constitute the full population of cases in 2002.  
According to King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, 128), random selection of cases 
is not generally appropriate in qualitative, small-n research.  This meant choosing 
the countries to study.  Access was an issue, and because of that I narrowed the 
selection of countries to two rather than all four.  Because they made different 
decisions, my selection of Zambia and Malawi allowed “for the possibility of at 
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least some variation on the dependent variable,” which King, Keohane, and 
Verba (1994, 129) point out is critical to furthering understanding in small-n case 
studies. 
Only studying two cases was necessary, but it does present some 
limitations.  The main concern is that selection on the dependent variable 
reduces what one can say about the causal effects in the cases (King, Keohane, 
and Verba 1994, 132).   This also means that it is difficult to infer to the other two 
cases in the population.  However, this gives a call to further research in future 
studies.  Despite the potential drawbacks, by selecting cases with variation on 
the dependent variable, the study is still strong. 
 
3.4 Analysis 
There are many recommendations for how to make the quality of analysis 
better in case studies.  Yin (2009, 160-161) in particular has several important 
components to good analysis.  First, analysis should show the author used all of 
the evidence rather than ignoring what did not fit with the picture.  Second, the 
analysis should address, as far as is possible, all rival explanations for what 
happened.  Third, analysis should address the most significant aspects of the 
case study, and fourth the analysis should reflect the prior, expert knowledge in 
the case studies.  All of these elements together, in addition to being wary of the 
aforementioned problems with case studies, produce a high quality analysis. 
Because one of the methods of data generation used in this dissertation is 
interviewing, I use reflexivity to analyze how my embodied identity may have 
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affected the data.  Reflexivity, as defined by Lee Ann Fuji is “a critical, ongoing 
examination of the way the researcher engages with others—be they 
participants, research assistants, interpreters, or other interlocutors. Reflexivity 
involves careful consideration of how issues of positionality, such as the 
researcher’s personal characteristics or theoretical vantage points—shape the 
research process. Such issues bear on the kinds of knowledge claims the 
researcher can advance.” (2017, 13-14)  I, a Caucasian, American female, 
conducted all of the interviews.  Almost all of the interviews were done face to 
face and were conducted with native Zambians and Malawians.  This 
necessitates asking questions like, what were the unseen power dynamics in the 
interviews? Were answers constrained because of the position of the interviewer 
and interviewee?  Did the power dynamics change with the position of the 
person, i.e., were those who felt they had no responsibility in the decision willing 
to be more candid, or was that true of those who felt they had fought for what 
was right?  Or was there no power dynamic because those being interviewed 
were the elites of the nation, thereby correcting any potential power imbalance 
there might have been? (see Fuji 2017, 165)   
It is difficult to determine the power dynamics when you are the one in the 
middle of the situation, but on the whole there were enough factors for and 
against me that I believe there was often a balance of power in the interviews.  
First, the power dynamics might have been different had most of my interviewees 
known I was coming.  The process of getting the interviews, where most were 
obtained by simply walking into their offices, was so informal that I believe it 
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diminished what might have been a power imbalance (a White, American, 
Researcher) in my favor.  I was not coming to them through formal channels, and 
while I always presented my credentials, by not being referred by anyone, I 
believe I was not viewed as intimidating as I might have been.  I see this in 
several ways.  The first is the willingness of the interviewees to talk to me at all.  
The second way is reflected in the transcripts, where one can see that many of 
the interviews involved quite a bit of laughter.  I did not transcribe whole chunks 
of time when the conversation veered into pleasantries and personal talk and 
was so far from the given subject as to be irrelevant.  This was of course not true 
of all of the interviews.  Some, like Duncan Ndhlovu, an aid worker in Malawi who 
asked that his agency not be named because he had permission from his boss to 
speak to me but not official agency approval, was clearly nervous, shifting a lot 
and hesitating in his answers.  This interview was also one of the few where I 
actively felt that the answers were constrained. 
On the other hand, it was odd that so many people agreed to speak to a 
stranger who showed up in their office with only a piece of paper to verify she 
was who she said she was.  This indicates that perhaps my power was greater 
than I perceived.  This also could be attributed to my speaking to elites who knew 
their subject.  However, knowing the subject did not always mean they were 
willing to talk about it. I was able to do almost twice as many interviews in Malawi 
as in Zambia.  At the outset I assumed that the Zambian interviews would be 
much easier to obtain because I have so many contacts from the work I do in-
country.  The opposite turned out to be true.  The ministries who had been so 
85 
willing to talk to me in Malawi were completely unwilling to speak to me in 
Zambia.  Also, it was difficult to get interviewees to recommend anyone else to 
talk to. But the biggest difference in Zambia was that of feeling.  It seemed to me 
that interviewees were either reluctant to discuss the situation or were defensive 
about the decision. Indeed, Robert Sichinga, the former Member of Parliament, 
Minister of Commerce, and Minister of Agriculture whom I had a previous 
acquaintance with, became upset with me several times in the interview when I 
presented “facts” as I had read them or been told them.  This unwillingness to 
speak, sometimes a lack of friendliness, and defensiveness are contrary to all of 
my previous interactions in Zambia, where I have worked extensively. 
I can only speculate why there were such stark differences between the 
two countries.  The most obvious reason is that by not accepting the genetically 
modified food aid, the Zambian government made the de facto decision to 
possibly let their people starve.  Their inaction meant people would suffer.  This 
is not a decision for anyone to be proud of.  In addition, they were harshly 
criticized for the decision they made.  I worked very hard to keep any judgment 
out of my prewritten questions, out of my follow up questions, and out of my tone, 
but I cannot guarantee that some judgment did not slip through. 
Ultimately, I believe I was able to get the truth from my interviewees and 
that power dynamics did not prevent this.  I was limited by people not being 
willing to talk to me and by not having enough time in each country to track down 
everyone I wanted to speak to.  This was much truer in Zambia, where I felt it 
would have taken another six months to convince everyone to speak to me.  In 
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contrast, by the time I left Malawi I had spoken with everyone who had been 
recommended to me, and they were actually starting to recommend each other.  
This is not to say there were not more people, but I feel I had a better foundation 
of interviews in Malawi. 
It is not just the relative positions of the interview and interviewee that 
must be considered.  Context is important.  At the time of the interviews, there 
was a distinct possibility that Zambia and Malawi were both headed back into the 
same situation that had occurred in 2002, with a lack of precipitation in the 
previous few years causing great concern about drought and famine.  It is 
important to ask, did that situation affect the views of those interviewed?  
Ultimately, I do not believe this played a part in their answers.  When asked, 
most interviewees were aware that there might be a future problem, but were 
optimistic that they could handle it with the systems they had in place. 
3.5 Data Sources 
As previously mentioned, sources of data were a matter of great concern 
when gathering data.  Each source had advantages and disadvantages, but all 
were chosen with care.  The primary sources of data for this dissertation are in-
country newspaper articles from the time of the decision, interviews I conducted, 
primarily during the months of July and August of 2016 in the countries of Zambia 
and Malawi, and secondary sources.   
While in-country, I made every effort made to locate and obtain official 
documents about the decisions taken in each country.  Each time I interviewed 
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anyone I asked for supporting documentation, but was unable to obtain any 
official documentation.  In Zambia, I was told by a Political Science professor with 
extensive ties to the government that any official documentation such as meeting 
minutes or committee decisions would already be archived, and that the national 
archives then put a 30-year hold on any researchers accessing the 
documentation, thus making obtaining any official documents impossible for 
another 16 years.  In Malawi, though there did not appear to be a similar hold on 
national archive records, when I inquired at the National Archives and asked 
other interviewees, I was told that I was not allowed access to the archives at all.  
The lack of access to official documents meant that I was forced to rely on 
newspaper articles of the time, interviews, and secondary sources. 
 
3.5.1 Newspaper Articles 
For the purposes of these two case studies, I examined newspaper 
articles about genetically modified food aid in Zambia and Malawi from January 
2001 to May 2003. I widened the date span in order to try to capture as much of 
the debate as I could.  Not all of the articles are from either Zambia or Malawi, 
though all are from Africa.  The articles examined totaled 50, with the large 
majority being from and about Zambia. The articles are all in English and in both 
Zambia and Malawi some of the articles from the major newspapers in the 
countries and some are from lesser known newspapers. 
Newspaper articles are used for many reasons.  The first is that there is 
great advantage in being able to get an almost day-by-day breakdown of what 
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was happening in the countries with the famine and the offer and acceptance or 
rejection of the genetically modified food aid.  The second reason is that 
newspaper articles at the time give access to direct quotes from government 
officials that were unavailable to interview.  These quotes help show what the 
government wanted the people to know or believe about the issue, as when the 
statement of President Levy Mwanawasa of Zambia that he would rather die than 
eat genetically modified food was widely disseminated.  Newspaper articles also 
do an excellent job of indicating something about public opinion, i.e., where 
people disagreed, and who the major players were.  In addition, newspapers give 
an inside glimpse of the thinking by entities outside the government, thus 
creating a better picture of what the people were thinking.  Through a thorough 
reading of the newspaper articles, especially those in Zambia because of the 
larger number of articles written about the situation there, it was clear to see 
which newspapers were for and which were against the idea of accepting the 
food.  The Post published many articles on the subject, with most of them being 
either neutral or in favor.  In contrast, the Times of Zambia published multiple 
articles and editorials strongly opposing genetically modified food aid.  
Representing both viewpoints makes telling the complete story easier.   
There is a major issue with the newspaper articles, and that is that there 
are far fewer articles written about Malawi.  This is because their decision was 
not as controversial and thus did not draw as much attention.  However, many of 
the newspaper articles are referring to the 2002 crisis as a whole and thus give 
information about Malawi as much as they do Zambia.  There is still plenty of 
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evidence about what happened in Malawi, in terms of newspaper articles, but it 
lags behind the number of articles written about the situation in Zambia. 
3.5.2 Interviews 
Interviews were used because though this study is one of modern history, 
I was unable to observe the events directly, and thus had to rely on others’ 
versions of what happened and when.  Though I was unable to speak to 
everyone involved, all of the interviews total over 80 single-spaced pages of 
transcription.  In addition, I interviewed as many key players as possible, adding 
quality where quantity was sometimes difficult to achieve.  In addition to the 
difficulties of getting the interviews as well as the potential power dynamics at 
play, there was one more drawback with interviews: I was asking my 
interviewees to recall events that happened over a decade prior to the interview.  
This must be taken into account especially because GM technology is still such 
an issue in both countries, meaning the interviewees’ recollections could be 
colored by what has happened with the issue in the subsequent years.  This is 
why other sources are used.  All of the interviews were conducted in English. 
Though it was not necessarily the interviewees’ native language, speaking 
English and understanding each other was only a problem with one person, 
Beatrice Chola in Zambia.  Although Mrs. Chola speaks English, the majority of 
her time is spent working with people who are more likely to speak their tribal 
language than English.  All of the interviewees gave me verbal permission to use 
their names and the recordings of our interviews. 
90 
 
Most of the interviews were obtained by simply showing up at the 
appropriate government or organizational office and simply asking until someone 
agreed to speak with me, or by emailing or calling with no prior introduction.  I 
was genuinely surprised by how effective these methods were.  The interviews 
were conducted wherever was most convenient for the interviewee.  This 
included their offices, a hotel restaurant very early in the morning, and in one 
instance in each country, even my residence.  The average length of each 
interview was 30 minutes, the longest was an hour and the shortest was less 
than 10 minutes.  All but three of the interviews were done face to face, with the 
other three on the phone.  The interviews were semiformal and the general 
questions were preapproved by the University of Utah Institutional Review Board 
and were largely the same for each interview.  Different follow up questions were 
asked in each interview in order to pursue different subjects the interviewee had 
brought up.  Two other similarities occurred in every interview: the interviewee 
was asked for and gave permission to record and use what they said, and each 
interviewee was asked for supporting documentation.  All interviewees but one 
gave permission for their words and names to be recorded and used, with one 
other requesting that his specific organization not be mentioned.  For the 
interviewee who would not give permission to be recorded or quoted, I had to 
obtain information he had elsewhere.  Fortunately, that interviewee was willing to 
be of help in setting up other interviews for me, so he was still of help. 
Interviewees were selected based on their position and proximity to the 
decision-making process at the time of the 2002 decision to accept or reject 
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genetically modified food aid.  I sought out people with particular backgrounds in 
four areas:  scientific view, the government view, the international view, and the 
civil society view. I was given permission by each individual to be named in the 
dissertation. 
Zambian interviews were much harder to obtain than Malawian interviews.  
I can only speculate that this was in part because of the decision that was made.  
Indeed, there was often a distinct defensiveness or almost combative attitude 
when interviewing or trying to obtain interviews.  There are of course other 
reasons for this, including differences between the countries, but the different 
attitudes were noticeable. I was often successful in obtaining interviews in 
Zambia because of personal contacts garnered through my work there.  Despite 
the personal contacts, fewer interviews were done in Zambia, but the ones done 
were still critical.   
On the scientific side, two major interviews were conducted.  The first was 
with Richard Chanda, currently the Principal Research Officer of the Seed 
Control Certification Institute (SCCI), the government entity in charge of checking 
for genetically modified seeds entering the country.  In 2002 he was the seeds 
officer for SCCI and thus was involved in the research regarding the decision.   
Doris Musonda is the CEO of the National Biosafety Authority, the 
organization involved in the legalities of letting in the food and who worked to set 
up the legal framework for genetically modified food importation, growth, and 
testing.  She spoke at length of the fears the country was experiencing in regard 
to their lack of protective biotechnology legislation, and thus was able to give me 
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an excellent overview of the situation and how it was eventually resolved. 
On the government side, Yande Mwape, a Program Officer for Disaster 
Management Affairs in the Office of the Vice President was able to speak to the 
government’s alternatives and responses in the wake of the rejection of the food 
aid.  Her interview was quite short, but valuable because of the insight it gave me 
into how the government reacted in the time of crisis. 
Robert Sichinga was a member of the Zambian parliament in 2002 who in 
his political career subsequently served as the Minister of Agriculture and then 
the Minister of Commerce, and was in a unique position to talk about how the 
decision was made, why, and what the international pressures were.  Mr. 
Sichinga was my longest interview.  As a member of the governing party at the 
time, Mr. Sichinga was in full agreement with all of the actions of the government 
and was able to speak at length about the reasons for their actions and 
decisions.  He had a very specific point of view and wanted to make sure I 
understood it.  Mr. Sichinga is the only interviewee who became upset with me 
when I questioned what he said, though this could be in part because we already 
knew each other and he was comfortable doing so. 
For civil society, I was able to talk to both a local NGO as well as an 
international one.  Mrs. Beatrice Chola is the founder and Executive Director of 
Bwafano Community Services in the slum of Chazanga in Lusaka.  Bwafwano 
runs schools, feeding programs, and home care programs.  In 2002 Bwafwano 
was a major recipient of U.S. food aid and was hard hit by the decision to prevent 
all food aid from entering the country and being distributed.  Mrs. Chola was a 
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major player in protesting to different entities and thus gave an inside story of 
how one organization appealed to larger organizations, including the WFP.   
John Deloko, head of the Zambian Save the Children office, was briefly 
interviewed as well.  He appeared reluctant to speak to me and would not answer 
many questions, but his interview is still useful because it confirmed the position 
of a large international NGO. 
In Malawi, these key players included scientists like Dr. Kingdom 
Kwapata.   Dr. Kwapata, who at the time was a scientist but was also the head of 
an NGO called the Human Rights Network, which strongly lobbied the 
government to accept the food aid, was able to speak about civil society efforts to 
sway governmental and public opinion on the issue of GMOs.  In addition, Dr. 
Kwapata is now one of the leading scientists in the country on the subject of 
biotechnology, making him qualified to discuss the efforts of the scientific 
community at the time.   
Professor James Bokosi, a scientist, was also interviewed.  Professor 
Bokosi was a member of the team sent to Mozambique and other countries to 
help make the decision, specifically on the feasibility and wisdom of milling the 
food aid before letting it enter the country.  Professor Bokosi was also in favor of 
letting the food into the country.  However, Professor Bokosi’s interview was 
conducted on the phone and thus I was not able to record it or transcribe it 
directly, though I was typing while he was talking.  The brevity of the interview is 
a weakness because Dr. Bokosi could have given me more information about his 
involvement and the process had we had a longer, face to face interview.   
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Dr. Wilkson Makumba, the current head of the Chitedze National 
Research Station who at the time of the 2002 decision was the National 
Research Coordinator for the Department of Agriculture, was less in favor of 
letting the food in. His interview was useful again because he was a scientist at 
the time and could again speak to what the scientific opinion was, but he was 
also a member of the government and so is knowledgeable about the process of 
the decision-making 
In addition to scientists, multiple members of the government were 
interviewed.  Scholastica Chidyaonga and Madalitso Mwale are the Head and 
Assistant Head of the Department of Disaster Management Affairs, the 
department responsible for distribution of food aid in times of crisis.  Though 
neither person was at the department in 2002, both were able to speak to the 
history of the famine and the decision, how it was made, and which committees 
were consulted, as well as current attitudes towards genetically modified crops.  
Dr. Yanira Ntupanyama is a scientist who is now the Chief Director for 
Environment and Climate Change Management at the Ministry of Natural 
Resources, Energy and Mining.  At the time of the decision Dr. Ntupanyama was 
the Principal Environmental Officer for the ministry.  Her position both then and 
now give her unique authority in two areas: government and science.  As a 
scientist she was able to relate what the available science was, and what was 
believed about it.  As a government official, she was able to speak to the process 




Civil society and international pressure were also important to consider.  In 
addition to Kingdom Kapwata, Tamani Mvula Nkhono was interviewed.  Mr. 
Nkhono is the National Director of the Civil Society Agriculture Network 
(CISANET).  He was critical in getting the viewpoint of farmers as a whole 
because his organization is an advocacy organization for them.  Mr. Nkhono also 
showed an excellent understanding of the situation as a whole and was able to 
speak at length to the history of the situation in Malawi.  Because of his position 
in agricultural civil society, Mr. Nkhono was also knowledgeable about what 
happened when Malawi sold off their grain reserve but did not then build it back 
up before the famine hit, as will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
The international component, including those institutions on Level I such 
as USAID, the WFP, etc., was difficult to obtain through interview, largely 
because of lack of access and organizational rules for speaking publicly of 
actions and decisions.  Nevertheless, I was able to meet with Duncan Ndhlovu, 
an aid worker for an international organization that was key in distributing food 
and urging the governments to accept the food aid.11  Mr. Ndhlovu gave 
information about what his organization was doing, as well as their policies.  This 
gave me excellent background on the international side, though the restriction on 
naming his organization specifically makes using Mr. Ndhlovu’s words more 
difficult. 
Other interviews in Malawi included a journalist, Ephraim Nyondo, who 
                                            
11 Because he did not have official approval to speak with me, Mr. Ndhlovu requested that his 
organization not be specifically named.  However, he then mentioned the name of his 
organization in the interview, knowing that he was being recorded and would be quoted.  
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was the primary writer about the 2002 decision for The Nation, one of Malawi’s 
major daily newspapers.  Mr. Nyondo’s interview was on the phone, was difficult 
to hear, and could not be recorded, so while he gave a general idea of the 
situation, he will not be quoted.  Katherine Chiweza and Boniface Mkoko both 
work for National Biosafety Commission of Science and Technology and gave 
background information or were not directly involved in the situation and so are 
also not going to be quoted.  A table of the interviewees, their positions, area of 
expertise, and the quality of the interview is shown below. 
In total, I was able to obtain seventeen interviews, six in Zambia and 
eleven in Malawi.  Table 2 is a list of the interviewees, their titles, and the area of 
expertise.  It is a small number, but, as can be seen above, I was able to speak 
to people who were very much in a position to know what was happening.  Those 
interviewed were selected based on their proximity to the decision-making 
process, or for their expertise in the field.  Not all key players were interviewed 
because not all were available.  Indeed, though it is somewhat macabre, there 
was some trouble interviewing some of the key players because, in countries 
with a lower life expectancy, many of them had died. 
With more time and money I might have been able to speak to more 
people, but I made a conscious effort to interview people from a diversity of areas 
so that I would have enough information to be able to credibly tell the story.  I feel 
I was able to do this, especially as the interviews were not my only source of 
information.  I had more interviews in Malawi and so was able to obtain more 
information from interviews that way, which was fortunate because there were  
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Table 2 List of Interviewees 
Interviewee 
Name 
Title Area of Expertise Quality 












Founder and CEO, 
Bwafwano Community 
Services 
Civil Society High 
John Deloko Head of Office, Save 
the Children Zambia 






Yande Mwape Program Officer in 
Disaster Management 





Former MP, Minister 





   
Dr. James 
Bokosi 
Lecturer at Bunda 
College, formerly with 

























Formerly CEO of 
Malawi Human Rights 
Network 
Civil Society/Science High 
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Table 2 Continued 
Interviewee 
Name 
Title Area of Expertise Quality 
Dr. Wilkson 
Makumba 










Director of Public 
Biosafety Systems, 
National Commission 




















National Director of 
CISANET 
Civil Society High 
Dr. Yanira 
Ntupanyama 




of Natural Resources, 







GM Journalist, The 
Nation newspaper 
Civil Society Medium 
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fewer newspaper articles about the situation in Malawi. The larger number of 
interviews in Malawi helped balance the amount of information I had from 
Zambia, but even with them there is still more information from Zambia.  
However, without them, a controlled comparison would be impossible. 
3.5.3 Other Secondary Sources 
This dissertation also uses two other kinds of secondary sources.  The 
first, observation of context for the interviews, including dynamics, has already 
been mentioned.  The other secondary source is journal articles and other 
reports from institutions that discuss the situation.  The journal articles help 
provide a larger picture of the crisis, and help situate the dissertation in the 
literature.  The reports include in-depth reports from the WFP detailing the 
situation on the ground in Zambia and Malawi in 2001 and 2002, as well as 
reports from organizations like Greenpeace about the situations in both 
countries.  The Greenpeace report is about the larger thinking on genetically 
modified food aid.  These reports date from the time of the crisis and thus add 
excellent context to what was happening, without the benefit or harm of distance 
from the situation.  They will be used as evidence of the thinking and actions of 
outside entities.   
As with the newspaper articles, there are more journal articles about 
Zambia’s decision than Malawi’s decision.  The reports are distributed equally as 
I have one from the WFP for each country and the Greenpeace report is about 
the situation as whole.  While there is more information from Zambia, there is not 
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so much more information that the cases become unbalanced.  Table 3 shows 
the balance of evidence. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 This chapter has reviewed the methodology being used in this 
dissertation.  First, the research design and the justification for the choices made 
was explained. The methodology, using controlled comparison of a small number 
of cases, is critical to understanding the choices made in the rest of the 
dissertation.  Case studies are being used because they allow for a much more 
in-depth look at what happened and why particular choices were made.  Analysis 
is critical to this dissertation, because it helps the reader to understand the 
different motivations and actions of individuals and governments.   It is also 
important to reflect on the intangible aspects such as context and power 
dynamics that go into field research.  
Reliable sources of data are also very important and were difficult to 
obtain.  Official documentation from Zambia and Malawi proved elusive, and so 
other sources such as newspaper articles and interviews are relied upon.  
However, one must also take into account the drawbacks of interviews about a 
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subject that occurred over a decade prior, and to counter that, newspaper articles 
from the time became a critical component.  The interviews may have gaps, but 
that is part of the purpose for using the newspaper articles as well.  Together 
they help paint a more complete picture of how and why Zambia decided to reject 
genetically modified food aid but Malawi decided to accept it. 
Multiple sources of evidence are important in any study, but especially in 
this dissertation.  Multiple sources of evidence can help improve the quality of the 
data gathered, if done so carefully.  As King, Keohane, and Verba advocate, the 
investigator must “collect data in as many of its observable implications as 
possible.  This means collecting data in as many diverse contexts as possible. 
Each additional implication of our theory which we observe provides another 
context in which to evaluate its veracity.” (1994, 24) I am confident that by using 
a variety of sources I have done that in this dissertation. 
  
CHAPTER 4 
LEVEL I: INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE 
4.1 Introduction 
There are many ways for the international community to exert pressure on 
countries to change policy decisions.  The reasons behind successful pressure 
are debated, and as yet there is no consensus on a formula for successful 
international pressure (see Caraway 2004; Carter 2016; Dunning 2004; 
Emmanuel 2013; Fikru 2016; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Hawkins 1997; Kilby 
2009; Poteet 2003; and Scholl 2009).  Some of the more common ways 
practiced have been through aid conditionality, the formation and enforcement of 
norms and the attendant pressures, and the enforcement of international law.  
Each method has its successes and failures and are discussed in this chapter.   
This chapter first discusses how the pressure from the international level, 
Level I, should function as a factor in two-level game theory.  There are different 
forms of international pressure and the chapter provides explanations for these 
forms along with specific examples of how pressure has been applied in different 
scenarios and how it works or does not work as an agent of change.  The 
chapter then turns to the cases of Zambia and Malawi and how international 
pressure was a factor in their decision-making processes.  The chapter ends with 
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a discussion of how well the cases of Zambia and Malawi fit the theoretical 
framework of two-level games. 
4.2 How International Pressure Functions Within Two-level Games 
International pressure is hypothesized as the Level I factor in the decision-
making of Zambia and Malawi.  Two-level game theory does not specify whether 
the international level has to have an effect on how the game is played, just that 
it is taken into account by the players.  On the international level, or Putnam’s 
Level I, in stage one, statesmen begin negotiations with international entities 
such as international institutions or other countries.  In stage two the statesman 
returns to his own country with a tentative agreement.  In this stage, statesmen 
begin to negotiate an agreement that will satisfy international players without 
angering their domestic constituents. Also in this stage, both players begin to 
form, define, and solidify their win-sets, or the universe of conditions they will 
accept in bargaining.  There may be many stages or iterations of this process. 
The international entities on Level I also begin to form an idea of what the 
domestic situation is that will allow the decision to be made, what the pressures 
are, and what the ratification process will look like.  Level I negotiators may or 
may not have an accurate picture of the domestic situation, but from this they can 
begin to see the size and shape of the win-set for each country.  If there is strong 
resistance in the country to what the Level I negotiator is offering, or if the 
ratification process will be difficult, then the domestic or Level II win-set will be 
smaller.  If there is wide support in the country or the ratification process is 
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informal and does not involve many people, the domestic win-set will be bigger.  
In the cases of Zambia and Malawi, the decision was made on a high level and 
made unilaterally, without the consent of the people, which should have made 
their win-set very big because the high government officials could accept a deal 
they wanted without consulting their people.  However, without a formal and strict 
ratification process in place, both countries were able to set terms and thus 
restrict their win-sets. 
Level I international pressure had the possibility of widening win-sets 
because both countries needed to be concerned with their present and future 
relations with the international community.  For Zambia and Malawi, there were 
two major players’ reactions they had to be concerned with: the U.S. and the EU, 
with other minor players exerting pressure as well.  Each entity should have had 
a vested interest in whether the food was accepted or not.  As will be seen, 
however, there were varying levels of interest and action taken by the U.S. and 
the EU. 
The U.S. attempted to exert enough pressure that they were in danger of 
what Putnam calls reverberation (1988, 454).  Reverberation happens when 
players on Level I attempt to influence the negotiations by exerting pressure on 
Level II.  These attempts can be successful and may change the course of the 
negotiations and the size of the win-set or they may cause a backlash that makes 
the other players entrench themselves in their own position.  As will be seen, this 
was the case in Zambia, where attempts at pressuring government officials led 
them to further question why the U.S. was so insistent on Zambia accepting the 
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genetically modified food aid.  Reverberation provides part of the explanation for 
the divergence in outcome between Zambia and Malawi.  Zambia was criticized 
more sharply, had more attention on its actions, and had more pressure applied 
on it because of its stance.  The sharp pressure led to greater suspicion that 
there were other reasons for the U.S. pressing for the change.  This in turn made 
Zambia more reluctant to accept the genetically modified food aid.  The U.S. 
attempts at changing the win-set for Zambia and Malawi caused negative 
reverberation in Zambia. 
Some scholars agree with the thinking that the U.S. pushing for 
acceptance of GM technology can be counter-productive.  Cooke and Downie 
(2010, 3) have this to say about it: “U.S. advocacy for biotechnology may in fact 
be counterproductive, given the polarized tenor of previous debates and 
widespread public suspicion that such advocacy is merely a front for powerful 
commercial interests.” 
4.3 Forms of International Pressure 
International pressure is meant to persuade or coerce states into 
conformance with a previously defined standard or action.  In this dissertation, 
international pressure, which comes from Putnam’s Level I, was meant to change 
the win-sets of Zambia and Malawi by attempting to persuade them, sometimes 
forcefully, to accept the genetically modified food aid being offered. 
The next sections discuss different forms of Level I international pressure 
and how they are applied in specific situations.  These forms include aid 
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conditionality, international norms, and public opinion. 
4.3.1 Aid Conditionality 
The concept of aid conditionality is simple: donor countries make certain 
demands of the recipient countries and tie the demands to continued aid.  
Recipient countries can either comply with the demands of the donor country or 
institution and continue receiving aid, or they can refuse to comply and risk the 
discontinuation of aid (Emmanuel 2013, 415-16).  There are different types of 
conditionality which are dependent on what the donor is demanding.  Political aid 
conditionality demands that political reform take place before aid continues.  
Economic conditionality demands economic reforms.  In the 1990s, at the height 
of aid conditionality, many developing countries were subject to aid conditionality. 
Conditionality in aid rose to prominence in the 1990s as a means for the U.S., 
IMF, World Bank and other international institutions to force reforms in 
developing countries.  Indeed, the U.S., IMF and World Bank had an entire 
program, the Washington Consensus, predicated on the thinking that all 
developing countries needed to take the same set of actions in order to advance 
economically and politically.  Certain demands were made of developing 
countries, including creating poverty reduction strategies that included opening 
markets to free trade, tightening government and civil service belts, and 
privatization of government-owned industries.  These demands were made of 
countries that were already receiving aid or had asked for more (Stiglitz 2002,16, 
53-54).  If one were to use Putnam’s two-level theory for any international
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bargaining happening between a developing country and an international entity, 
aid conditionality would be considered a Level I activity and pressure. 
Nikolas Emmanuel, in his article, “Democratization in Malawi: Responding 
to International and Domestic Pressures,” argues that there are conditions under 
which aid conditionality can be successful.  Emmanuel’s article discusses the 
democratization of Malawi in the 1990s.  He argues that there were three factors 
that helped Malawi respond to the demands of the U.S. and move towards 
democracy: high levels of aid dependency (defined as the inability to perform 
core functions without the influx of foreign aid or expertise (Emmanuel 2013, 
420), close interdonor coordination, and domestic opposition within the recipient 
country (2013, 416).  Crucially, Emmanuel’s argument concerns both domestic 
and international influences as necessary for aid conditionality to work (2013, 
417).  This is easy to relate to Putnam’s framework.  The U.S., the Level I 
negotiator in this case, applied pressure to Malawi, the Level II state, to get them 
to democratize.  Both the U.S.’s Level I pressure and Malawi’s Level II domestic 
situation played a role in bringing about Malawi’s democratization. 
Brett Carter (2016) also makes the argument that aid conditionality and 
international pressure can be beneficial, particularly in Africa.  Carter argues that 
elections bring about opportunities for citizens to organize themselves and 
protest oppressive governments. By requiring regular elections in African nations, 
Western donors and creditors force African autocrats to provide de facto 
opportunities for protests against their government (Carter 2016, 39). Carter 
points out that it is exceedingly hard to tie aid conditionality and international 
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pressure to a reduction in human rights abuses, for instance, especially in light of 
the poor record of international institutions in actually tying aid to issues like good 
governance, but argues that there is compelling if not conclusive evidence that 
the pressure is effective (2016, 42).  Carter argues that state leaders were less 
likely to employ repressive measures against their citizenry when the state was 
at the height of receiving financial aid and debt-relief.  Indeed, Carter’s research 
shows that African prodemocracy activists have become bolder because of their 
belief that they will face fewer repercussions if their country is receiving Western 
aid (2016, 43-4).  This is important to this dissertation because Carter studies 
situations in which direct actions were not necessarily taken, but international 
pressure was still effective.  This is true of the Level I international pressure that 
was applied to Zambia and Malawi.  No direct action was taken or even 
threatened, but international pressure still played a role.  In the case of Malawi it 
played a positive role.  In the case of Zambia, the pressure backfired and 
negative reverberation set in. 
There are other scholars who argue against the efficacy of aid 
conditionality in applying Level I international pressure to bring about real change 
in developing countries.  Christopher Kilby argues in his 2009 article, “The 
Political Economy of Conditionality: An Empirical Analysis of World Bank Loan 
Disbursements,” that aid conditionality fails in part because the aid agencies fail 
to enforce their own conditions for aid (Kilby 2009, 51).  This failure of 
enforcement then undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the 
conditionality. Kilby (2008, 52) gives several reasons for the lack of enforcement 
109 
 
including the idea that donors are going to give aid anyway and are reluctant to 
actually enforce the consequences when the idea is to help.  Another reason 
given is that donating countries pressure international institutions to give the aid 
regardless of past performance.  In Zambia and Malawi this could have meant 
that any threat by the U.S. to stop providing aid should the countries refuse the 
proffered food aid could have been seen as having no force. The U.S. would 
have been reluctant to threaten or enact any situation where it meant people 
would go hungry. 
Scholl (2009) also discusses the effectiveness of aid and the limits on aid 
conditionality by looking at what would be considered optimal foreign aid policy 
when there is a conflict of interest between the donor and the recipient 
government.  Scholl’s article is largely theoretical and concludes that aid 
conditionality is most effective in bringing about change when the conditions 
given are “supportable by the threat of a permanent aid cutoff” (Scholl 2009, 
378).   This is tied to Kilby’s (2009) article above where if made, threats must be 
carried through in order to effect change. 
Dunning (2004) argues that there are conditions under which aid 
conditionality can be effective. Dunning (2004, 412-13) looked at foreign aid 
given during and after the Cold War and concludes that in the midst of the Cold 
War any conditionality threatened was ineffective because the political situation 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union meant that aid was in part about the 
recipient country’s loyalty to one side or the other.  This meant that threatened 
cutoffs of aid for anything besides acts of disloyalty were unlikely.  After the Cold 
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War Dunning shows that aid conditionality became more effective because donor 
countries were focused on more than loyalty to government type.  
There are strong links between aid conditionality and the situation in 
Zambia and Malawi in 2002, including why the pressure exerted should have 
been successful.  In the rest of this chapter, the situation in the countries 
contained the elements Emmanuel argues are necessary for aid conditionality to 
work.  Those elements include high levels of aid dependency, close interdonor 
coordination, and domestic opposition within the country, discussed at length in 
Chapters 5 and 6.  Zambia and Malawi both had high levels of aid dependency 
(see Emmanuel 2013, 428 for specifics on Malawi’s situation), there was a 
concerted effort by the U.S. WFP, and other international institutions to apply 
pressure (discussed later in this chapter), and there were domestic elements that 
greatly opposed the idea of accepting the food aid.  However, there was one 
crucial component missing in the situation, and that was specific threats of aid 
withdrawal and specific demands.  This did not rise to the level of aid 
conditionality because as far as author can find there was no threat either implied 
or explicit that future aid depended on their acceptance.  Humanitarian aid 
generally falls into a different category, meaning that the only thing the donor 
institutions could do was pressure.  Public opinion and potential international 
condemnation would not allow them to condition future humanitarian aid on the 




Another example of how international pressure can work from Level I is 
given in the work on the effects of norms.  Norms form a critical part of the 
international system where much of international law has not been written and 
enforcement of behaviors can be difficult.  Norms help determine whether a 
behavior is considered acceptable by the international community.  In their 
influential 1998 article, Finnemore and Sikkink define a norm as “a standard of 
appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.” (1998, 891)  Jepperson, 
Wendt, and Katzenstein  (1996, 54) define them as “collective expectations about 
proper behavior for a given identity.”  Norms establish expectations about the 
identity of actors in certain environments and how those actors will behave in that 
environment.  According to Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, norms are either 
constitutive or regulatory.  If they are constitutive then norms “specify the actions 
that will cause relevant others to recognize and validate a particular identity."  In 
contrast, regulatory norms prescribe or proscribe behaviors for identities that 
were previously established (1996, 54).   
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) ask the question of how we can know a 
norm when we see one.  According to their argument, we can only see indirect 
evidence of norms since they are not written down or codified anywhere.  Norms 
have a quality of “oughtness” or shared moral assumptions about behaviors.  We 
can see evidence of norms in justifications of actions and communication 
between actors.  Understanding whether a norm has been formed is more art 
than science.  As yet there is no distinct cutoff line of conformity that determines 
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that something has in fact become a norm.  And indeed, not all norms are global. 
Finnemore and Sikkink argue that some norms may always remain regional, but 
this does not preclude their inclusion in the category of a norm (1998, 892). 
All of the preceding argument raises the question of why norms are 
important to international relations theory.  First, norms matter because the 
formation of norms lies outside of either the state or any international 
organization (Wiener 2009, 176).  This makes the study of what norms are and 
how they are formed critical to an understanding of the international system.  In 
addition, as they are formed and gain strength, norms begin to act as structures 
in the international system, and thus they begin to mold and shape states’ 
behaviors (Fiorini 1996, 364; see also Thomson 1993, 72).  Thus, norms become 
a mechanism for explaining change.   
In her article, “Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Challenging the Property 
Rights Paradigm in Botswana” Poteete (2003) argues that it is important to 
remember that developing states may react differently than industrialized states 
to ideas and norms because of their lack of established bureaucracies and 
expertise in different fields, especially that of economics.  This position then 
privileges institutions over ideas when it comes to implementing new policies. 
According to Poteete, “Institutions influence the degree of attention-specific set of 
policy-makers give to ideas from particular sources. And institutions determine 
the degree of influence any given set of ideas must achieve to change or block 
changes in policy.” (2003, 528) Poteete looks at Botswana and its decisions over 
land property rights.  This article points out that in the area of norm competition it 
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is important to consider that developing countries may be operating under 
different constraints than industrialized countries, and therefore norms may not 
act in the same way. 
The idea that developing countries may react unpredictably is important to 
this dissertation where reverberation and the attempts of Level I players such as 
the U.S. and WFP to change the win-sets of Zambia and Malawi.  Both the U.S. 
and the WFP, as well as other Level I institutions, were playing without complete 
information or knowledge of how Zambia and Malawi would react to the 
pressures being applied to them. 
Though he does not refer to it specifically as a norms issue, Darren 
Hawkins discusses the international pressures put on Chile in the 1970s to 
respect human rights (Hawkins 1997). A military coup against Salvador Allende’s 
government in 1973 led to an authoritarian regime which curtailed many of 
Chile’s traditional and independent political groups. Disappearances and outright 
murder became common (Hawkins 1997, 409-10).  International pressure built 
through the 1970s, with some countries cutting off diplomatic ties and terminating 
economic and military aid to the government. In 1974, the United Nations took 
the then unprecedented step of condemning the Chilean government for its 
human rights abuses.  All of this pressure had mixed results, but continued 
through the 1970s.  The election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 meant the end of U.S. 
support and aid. At the same time, human rights groups continued their 
campaign against the regime.  However, it was not until the Chilean economy 
began to improve and soft-liners began to have more impact that the 
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international pressure could have enough effect to affect change (Hawkins 1997, 
411-18).  Hawkins argues that there were three reasons international pressure 
eventually became effective.  The first is that there was a low cost associated 
with easing repression.  The second is that there were factions within the regime 
that were responsive to the pressure being applied by the international 
community.   The third was that there were relatively strong societal norms 
associated with human rights and widespread agreement that those norms had 
been repeatedly violated (Hawkins 1997, 408-09). 
Hawkins’ reasons for effectiveness can be partially applied in the cases of 
Zambia and Malawi.  For these countries there was not a low cost with acceding 
to the U.S.’s wishes, but there were certainly factions within each government 
that responded well to the pressure.  The third reason for effectiveness, norms, 
can be seen in the discussion over whether it was right to let people starve to 
death now by not giving them the genetically modified food, or risk them getting 
sick from eating the genetically modified food. 
Indonesia after the departure of President Suharto is another example of 
international pressure being effective in the enforcement of norms. After years of 
brutal labor union repression under Suharto, Indonesia was ripe for reforms. 
President Habibie chose to implement what has been referred to in the norms 
literature as “instrumental adaptation,” that is, Indonesia chose to make strategic 
changes that would ease international pressures without implementing enough 
reform to truly change the labor situation (Caraway 2004, 35).  In the case of 
Indonesia international pressure came from international institutions including the 
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International Labor Organization (ILO) and foreign governments.  Though the 
pressure was mostly kept behind the scenes, criticisms by the ILO over labor 
practices slowly worked.  In addition, the IMF encouraged ratification of reforms 
which would bring about more flexibility in Indonesia’s labor institutions (Caraway 
2015, 36). Kai He also discusses Indonesia’s response to international pressure 
after Suharto (2008).  He argues that it was systemic pressure from the 
international system that brought about reform (2008, 51). 
 
4.3.3 Other Pressures 
In countries with few labor, environmental, or quality standards, 
international pressure can be both immense and effective.  Mahelet Fikru argues 
that this has been the case in Africa, where international markets and importers 
have the clout to help enforce standards that have not already been put in place 
by the country (2016, 296).  Indeed, Fikru contends that the implementation of 
standards cannot be understood without the international component. Fikru uses 
stakeholder theory to argue that one must take into account that there may be 
stakeholders outside a country and that they may subsequently be able to 
impose standards where none exist as a condition of their continued interest 
(2016, 297). This argument brings together elements of both norms and aid 
conditionality in that the standards are norms and continued investment is 
dependent upon the implementation of those standards.  It is also an argument 
for there being multiple factors that must be taken into account in order to 
understand a situation. 
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In his article on religious freedom reform in Turkey, Kilinc puts forth 
international pressure as the reason behind the otherwise puzzling religious 
freedom reforms between 2000 and 2012.  Though there are many arguments 
that could be used, Kilinc concludes that the decisive factor was the rise of 
factions in Turkey who sought to join the European Union but knew that Turkey’s 
lack of religious freedom would not pass muster with the EU (2014, 127-8).  As 
with Zambia and Malawi, this was international pressure of a different sort in that 
the pressure was not necessarily explicit, but was there nevertheless because of 
known standards. 
International pressure is not just effective in the developing world.  In their 
article on economic vulnerability, Eggenberger and Emmenegger (2015, 491) 
argue that small states are subject to the whims of larger states, since they are 
more dependent on foreign markets, are more vulnerable to change in the world 
economy but have less political clout than larger states. In this they are much like 
developing countries, and thus serve as good examples of how international 
pressure can work.  The authors discuss the examples of Liechtenstein and 
Switzerland in responding to international pressure to change their banking 
secrecy laws. As with many of the examples used, the successful change in 




Pressure came from all sides, but was not limited to pressure to accept 
the genetically modified food aid.  The attempts at Level I pressure came in 
different ways from different international entities.  Some attempts at pressure 
were personal, attempting to manipulate emotions or point out what the speaker 
had in common with Africans, explaining the necessity of accepting the food as 
well as the acceptability of the food for others.  Other attempts were practical, 
talking about the unlikelihood of being able to replace the genetically modified 
food with nongenetically modified food. The attempts at pressure from Level I 
came from all sorts of institutions and countries, including the U.S. in the form of 
in-country ambassadors and USAID officials, the UN in the form of the WFP, 
international activist groups such as Greenpeace, the World Health Organization, 
and even former James Bond actor Roger Moore, acting as a UNICEF Goodwill 
Ambassador.  
Zambia made the decision to reject the food aid in mid-August of 2002.  
Malawi made the decision to accept the food aid shortly thereafter, in early 
September of 2002, accepting it on the condition that the food not be distributed 
until it had been milled in order to prevent the grain from being planted, thus 
disturbing the Malawian ecosystem and risking crops being rejected by the EU.  
In an attempt at negotiating with Level I, Malawian President Bakili Muluzi had 
requested that the U.S. pay for the cost of milling the genetically modified seed 
as part of Malawi’s conditions for accepting the food aid, but had been refused.12  
12 Staff Reporter, “Milling GM Food Aid Costs Malawi US$20 Million,” The Nation, September 11, 
2002, http://www.afrol.com/News2002/maw014_gm_foodaid.htm (accessed November 11, 2017) 
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These decisions changed the nature of the pressure for Zambia and Malawi.  
 
4.4.1 Pressure from the U.S. 
 Agencies and people pushing for acceptance of the genetically modified 
food aid did not limit their pressure to the political or practical.  An additional 
component of pressure they used were meant to illustrate how Americans, the 
officials themselves, and their families all ate the food.  In addition, various 
officials pointed out the possible toll that could result from ignoring the proffered 
food aid.  In many of these statements, made before Zambia or Malawi’s 
decisions, the U.S. was appealing to all of the countries facing famine.  U.S. 
Ambassador to Zimbabwe Joseph Sullivan offered this assurance in an interview: 
“We Americans eat genetically modified corn with no problems. We see no 
reason why it should present a problem to any other country.”13  International 
Monetary Fund Resident Representative Mark Ellyne also agreed that Americans 
ate genetically modified corn with no issues: "We have corn that we eat including 
a lot more quantities that have been fed to the animals that we consume and 
there has been no side effects."14  Then Secretary of State Colin Powell accused 
southern African nations of failing to properly address the coming famine by 
refusing the food: "In the face of famine, several governments in southern Africa 
have prevented critical US food assistance from being distributed to the hungry 
by rejecting biotech corn which has been eaten safely around the world since 
                                            
13 Staff Reporter. “Zimbabwe: Interview with U.S. Ambassador Joseph Sullivan, IRIN, June 27, 
2002. http://allafrica.com/stories/200206270332.html (accessed August 15, 2017) 
14 Joe Kaunda. “It Will Be Tragic if Lusaka Rejects GM Maize- Ellyne”, The Post August 12, 2002, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200208120657.html (accessed August 15, 2017) 
119 
 
1995."15  USAID administrator Andrew Natsios went even further.  Rather than 
generic Americans, Natsios made the argument that he both purchased and fed 
it to his wife and kids all the time.16  Such assurances were meant to reinforce 
the idea that the U.S. was not trying to push poison onto Africans.   
 In Zambia, Robert Sichinga, a member of the Zambian parliament in 2002 
recalled meetings at the U.S. embassy where similar assurances were made: 
“the embassy had organized these kind of individual, this particular lobby that 
was for genetically modified… was basically justifying the fact that the aid was 
justified because we needed that assistance and there was nothing wrong with 
that food, Americans were eating it and why shouldn't we eat it?”17 
 Another source of personal pressure from the international community 
came in the form of stressing the human cost and number of lives that would be 
lost if the countries did not accept the food.  UN Ambassador to the U.S. Tony 
Hall spoke of the number of people at risk, using the UN estimates of 14.5 million 
people being at risk of starvation in Southern Africa alone.  He said, "These 
people do not have food today. Zimbabwe is heading for disaster. Zambia may 
be even worse."  Ambassador Hall then criticized the “well fed” experts, going on 
to say: "As the region heads for famine, vulnerable people will perish. While the 
US respects the rights of countries to make their own decisions about 
                                            
15 Staff Reporter. “Southern Africa: Powell slams Southern African States Over GM Aid Food.” 
The Standard. September 5, 2002. http://allafrica.com/stories/200209050638.html (accessed 
August 15, 2017) 
16 Brighton Phiri and Webster Malido. “Zambia: Govertnment is Undecided Over GM Maize- 
Kavindele.” The Post. August 12, 2002. http://allafrica.com/stories/200207260327.html (accessed 
August 15, 2017) 




biotechnology, other donors have simply not stepped up to fill the gap if US food 
aid is turned away."18   
In August of 2002, just before the decision was made in Zambia to reject 
the food, the U.S. government accused the Zambian government of 
underestimating the number of people at risk of starvation in Zambia, claiming 
that the number was 2.5 million in Zambia alone. The statement went on to say 
that the U.S. was not making any effort to distinguish between GM maize and 
non-GM maize because both met safety standards set by regulatory agencies.  
Finally, the U.S. responded to the belief that they were pushing GM food for 
ulterior motives by reminding the gathering that the food was procured on the 
U.S. market and shipped by the U.S. at taxpayers’ expense.19 
The pressure and rhetoric towards Zambia only grew from there.  
Ambassador Tony Hall’s rhetoric in particular became harsher.  In December of 
2002 Hall told reporters that, "People that deny food to their people, that are in 
fact starving people to death should be held responsible. . . for the highest crimes 
against humanity in the highest courts in the world."20  He went on to say: "I see 
this as a major problem. And I've got to the point where you get so frustrated with 
these people, they're denying food to their own people, they're using it as a 
political weapon, and nobody says anything, nobody does anything. These 
leaders are getting away with a tremendous amount of illegal acts and it's time 
                                            
18 Bivan Saluseki. “Zambia: Zambia Faces a Disaster if it Continues to Block Food Aid.” The Post. 
November 17, 2002. http://allafrica.com/stories/200211190565.html (accessed August 15, 2017). 
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they be held accountable, especially if people die."21 
Another type of pressure from the U.S. was of a more practical nature.  
Despite the accusations of some in Zambia, the U.S. claimed it simply did not 
have the capacity to deliver only food that was not genetically modified, and that 
the food that was being delivered was the only food that was available.  Though 
he was speaking about Zimbabwe, Ambassador Joseph Sullivan was describing 
the situation for all of drought stricken southern Africa when he said, “So for us to 
be able to be as helpful as we wish to be, it would be important for the 
government of Zimbabwe to waive this restriction and to allow us to supply the 
food that we do have available.”22  Andrew Natsios of USAID echoed this 
sentiment when he said there was no way for the U.S. to produce maize 
specifically for southern Africa because the grain came from the Midwest where 
most of the food was produced using biotechnology methods.23  The message 
from the U.S. was clear: accept the food or get nothing at all from the U.S. 
4.4.2 The World Food Program 
Pressure was not just coming from the U.S.  The World Food Program 
(WFP), a UN program, was in charge of distribution of the food.  Their position on 
the food was more ambiguous than that of the U.S., with an apparent struggle for 
21 Staff Reporter. “Southern Africa: U.S. Hits Out Over African Food Policies.” Agencia de 
Informacao de Mocambique (Maputo). December 17, 2002. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200212210065.html (accessed August 16, 2017). 
22 Staff Reporter. “Zimbabwe: Interview with U.S. Ambassador Joseph Sullivan, IRIN, June 27, 
2002. http://allafrica.com/stories/200206270332.html (accessed August 15, 2017) 
23 Brighton Phiri and Webster Malido. “Zambia: Govertnment is Undecided Over GM Maize- 
Kavindele.” The Post. August 12, 2002. http://allafrica.com/stories/200207260327.html (accessed 
August 15, 2017 
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neutrality.  The WFP had more logistical concerns.  Much of the food that had 
been delivered was sitting in warehouses waiting for distribution and there was a 
time limit on how long the food could sit before spoiling.  If the countries were not 
going to accept the food, the WFP needed to know so they could move the food 
where it would be used.  Days before the decision was made by Zambia to not 
accept the food, Zambia’s WFP representative, Richard Ragan pointed out that 
the lack of decision was preventing the WFP from progressing in their fight 
against the famine, saying, "We have impressed upon the Zambian authorities 
the need to make a decision on the matter.  The sooner they decide what they 
are going to do, the sooner we can get on with the business of feeding hungry 
people."24 
In an interview Judith Lewis, the Regional Director of WFP, she stated the 
neutral position of the WFP stating that it was: “an issue between the recipient 
government and the donor - the country providing the assistance. The World 
Food Programme accepts only food that has been cleared as fit for human 
consumption and we move that food."25  In addition, Richard Ragan also stated 
that the WFP had not received any reports of genetically modified food negatively 
affecting humans.26  WFP Executive Director James Morris also stated that UN 
agencies like the WFP, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the 
24 Staff Reporter. “Zambia: WFP Urges Government to Decide Whether to Accept GM Food.” 
IRIN. July 3, 2002.  http://allafrica.com/stories/200208130608.html (accessed August 15, 2017) 
25 Staff Reporter. “Southern Africa: Focus on GM Food Aid.” IRIN. July 2, 2002. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200207020658.html (accessed August 16, 2017); See also Duncan 
Ndhlovu, Personal Interview, August 13, 2016, Lilongwe, Malawi 
26 Staff Reporter. “Zambia: WFP Urges Government to Decide Whether to Accept GM Food.” IRIN. July 3, 
2002.  http://allafrica.com/stories/200208130608.html (accessed August 15, 2017) 
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WHO, as well as some EU countries, had confirmed that they had seen no health 
problems arise because of the consumption of genetically modified food.27 
 In addition to publicly stating that they did not believe genetically modified 
food to be dangerous to human health, the WFP went a step further and stated 
that they would not be able to successfully end the famine in southern Africa 
without the use of genetically modified grain. WFP Executive Director James 
Morris stated that, "I respect the right of every country on whether or not they 
would accept bio-tech, genetically modified maize. It's their choice.” However, he 
then went to say that, "But we won't be able to do the job to the full magnitude 
necessary without the use of bio-tech, genetically modified food."28   Another 
WFP spokesperson also confirmed the right of the governments to accept or 
reject the food but stated that such a decision would “complicate the work of 
WFP, which may not be able to respond to all those in need of food."29   
 Mrs. Beatrice Chola of Zambia has a different memory of what the WFP 
was doing at the time.  Mrs. Chola is the founder and Executive Director of an 
organization called Bwafwano in one of Lusaka’s largest compounds, Chizanga.  
Bwafwano has many functions, among them sending out home health care 
workers who can bring supplies and check in on those who are most ill in the 
community.  Bwafwano also runs a school for about 600 children in the 
compound, only a small percentage of all the children in the community.  Before 
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the famine in 2002, Bwafwano depended on food aid from USAID to feed the 
children of the school, and sometimes their families.  Once the famine came and 
the government rejected the food aid, Bwafwano was left without the means to 
feed almost 1000 people a day.  Mrs. Chola is well-connected and immediately 
went to her contacts at WFP and UNICEF.  According to Mrs. Chola, her 
pressure was successful.  Of the pressure put on by the WFP she said: “Well, 
they [the WFP] tried very much.  They tried very very much to pressure the 
government…”30 
 In response to the pressure of the WFP to make a decision about whether 
to accept the food, the Zambian Minister of Agriculture Mundia Sikatana struck a 
conciliatory if firm note, saying, "The government appreciates the assistance of 
the United States but we have a moral obligation to look after the health of our 
people." He went on to say, "We are mindful of the gravity of the situation and a 
decision will be made sooner rather than later. Right now it is with the president 
and we await his response."31  In addition, the Zambian government took the 
opportunity provided by the WFP to once again state Zambia’s objection to the 
food.  Vice President Enoch Kavindele also expressed gratitude for the food to 
the UN Special Envoy but again talked about the fear of Zambians that the food 
would do them harm.  President Mwanawasa said in the same forum that there is 
no justification for feeding people poison.32 However, Zambia’s attitude was not 
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always grateful.  Dr. Mbikusita-Lewanika, a member of the team of scientists sent 
to research genetically modified food criticized the WFP by saying that, “it was 
not in order for the United Nations wings to propagate the interests of one nation 
at the expense of those of many member countries.”33 
 The WFP was sympathetic to the views held by many Africans that the 
food would do them harm, but ultimately were not in a position to provide 
southern Africa with sufficient food that was certified non-GMO.  This has been a 
matter of contention amongst countries and others who criticized the WFP’s 
response.  In 2002 Greenpeace contended that the WFP could have either 
sourced the food from elsewhere, or that they U.S. could have provided money 
instead of food.34  The money would have allowed the countries to buy grain they 
trusted from sources they trusted.  However, this ignores the fact that both the 
WFP and USAID are large bureaucracies who cannot change their policies 
quickly or nimbly.  Though there were other solutions, at the time they were not 
available. 
That they understood the pressure the countries were under was clear 
when WFP Regional Director Judith Lewis was asked if the WFP would take the 
position that if a country did not want the genetically modified food aid they would 
get nothing.  She said, “No, we wouldn't want to do that. I have seen too many of 
those children who need this food and I have seen the situation and we have to 
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do everything we can.”35 
 
4.4.3 The European Union 
The role of the EU is a somewhat strange one in these cases.  The EU itself 
should have represented a major international pressure, yet I found no evidence 
of direct involvement or direct threats from the EU that Zambia and Malawi’s crops 
would be unacceptable should these countries accept genetically modified food 
aid.  Indeed, EU Commissioner for Cooperation, Development and Humanitarian 
Assistance, Paul Nielsen, actively denied any threats or involvement, saying:  
From the start, we have consistently stuck to our advice that we do not see 
a problem for the consumption of that maize. At the same time, we deny US 
allegations that European countries have threatened Southern African 
countries [that we would] reduce their economic support and their access 
to the EU market if they accepted GM maize. (Misser 2003, 33) 
  Still, many in the U.S. accused the EU of having strict regulations but 
doing little to assure Africans that eating the food was acceptable, that 
concessions would be made even if the countries accepted the genetically 
modified food aid, or that the EU would provide alternative sources of food so 
that Zambia and Malawi could maintain agricultural trade with the EU. This was 
the argument between the U.S. and EU over whether GMOs were acceptable 
being played out in real time and with real and severe consequences.  As was 
seen in Chapter 2, it could be that the loss of EU trade might have been more 
than replaced by other markets, but that does not appear to have been 
considered.   
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Because the EU was not actively involved in the debate, this Level I 
pressure is an indirect one.  It was fear and perception of EU policies and loss of 
trade, rather than statements or direct pressure from the EU itself, that made 
Zambians and Malawians hesitate to accept the genetically modified food aid. 
From the statements of various government and NGO players it is evident 
that fear of the EU’s standards on genetically modified food and the subsequent 
effect on trade with the EU played a large role in the countries’ decisions, yet as 
far as I could find, the EU largely stayed silent on the entire issue.  The EU was 
urged by the U.S. to take a stand (albeit one that the U.S. wanted) or to help 
provide food if they could not support the idea of the genetically modified food 
aid.  The U.S. ambassador to the UK, William Farrish, blamed the refusal of the 
food aid on “the EU’s unilateral, illegal and unjustified actions, taken without any 
scientific, health or environmental basis, which constrain choice and opportunity 
worldwide.”36  Ambassador Tony Hall also called on Europe to either help avert 
the crisis or to assure Africans that GM food was safe, saying: "The EU has 
made some great statements (on the safety of GM food), at the same time there 
are people who have thrown a lot of doubts, who have been neutral," he said. 
"We cannot be neutral on this issue. . .We need strong statements. We are 
beyond this discussion (on GM) here."37  In addition, then President George 
Bush weighed in, saying, "This [the EU’s regulations] has caused many African 
36 William Farrish, “Biotech is Benign,” The Guardian, June 4, 2003. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/gmdebate/Story/0,2763,969993,00.html (accessed November 1, 
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nations to avoid investing in bio-technologies for fear that their products will be 
shut out of European markets. European governments should join - not hinder - 
the great cause of ending hunger in Africa."38  U.S. Trade Representative Robert 
Zoellick was also critical of the EU’s stance and its consequences, saying, “It 
gets much more worrisome when the European anxieties and fears and 
paranoias prevent starving people from getting food.”39 
In October of 2002 the EU published a new policy on genetically modified 
organisms.  In Zambia this was seen as a sign of support for their stance, with 
the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Vocational Training stating that, “the EU 
is making exactly the same argument that Zambia is making before the 
international community and especially our food donors such as the World Food 
Programme (WFP)."40 The fear of being punished with a cessation of trade with 
the EU for accepting genetically modified food because of its effect on other 
crops was a factor in stopping Zambia from accepting the food altogether and 
make Malawi insist that the grain be milled before it entered the country so 
farmers would not be tempted to plant the grain despite government warnings.   
 Many statements were made about the effect on trade with the EU. 
Bernadette Lubozhya, a scientist with the Kasisi Agricultural Training Centre 
which was conducting a study on the feasibility of accepting the food urged the 
Zambian government to not accept the food because of the implications of EU 
                                            
38 Adam Entous, “Bush Blasts Europe Over Food Aid,” Toronto Star, May 22, 2003.  
39 Staff Reporter, “GM Food Aid: U.S. on Warpath Over GM Food,” The Ecologist, March 2003. 
40 Brighton Phiri. “Zambia: Government Welcomes EU’s Policy on GMOs.” The Post. November 




trade. Lubozhya feared that not only maize and grain markets would be affected, 
but that the EU would also begin to reject flowers, fruits, vegetables, tobacco, 
coffee, and other products because of its ban on GMOs.41  The president of the 
Zambia National Farmers Union Ajay Vashee also worried that accepting the 
grain would create problems in the export markets, especially since Zambia had 
no policy of their own regulating genetically modified organisms.42   
In Malawi different decisions were being made on how to handle the offer 
of genetically modified food aid.  As has been mentioned, they agreed to accept 
the maize on the condition that it be milled first.  Madalitso Mwale, Assistant 
Director of the Department of Disaster Management Affairs, when asked about 
the influence of the EU on the decision said, “That’s why there’s that caution to 
say you only accept the GMO maize in the form of flour.  So that it comes here 
as flour, but not as maize seed…the people are saying if it comes as flour then 
we will have no problems because we will be distributing flour, not the maize.  So 
maybe it’s from that understanding that it’s safe to bring the GMO maize, which 
will be in the form of flour, not the seed here.”43 
 The Zambian government faced down criticism of the decision to deny 
Zambians the genetically modified food aid by arguing that keeping the export 
market open was more important.  When asked why the government was 
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allowing people to starve instead of feeding them, Minister of Agriculture 
Sikatana countered with, "We stand firm in our rejection of the maize for fear of 
losing our export market that is doing well currently."  Sikatana went on to say 
that Zambia was eager to grow its trade in produce with Europe and that the U.S. 
had not taken into consideration the implications of trade with Europe when it 
pushed for acceptance of the food aid.44  In an editorial by the Editorial Board of 
the Times of Zambia, it was pointed out that the rest of the Western world had 
failed to break the EU’s resolve to reject genetically modified food, so why would 
Zambia give in?45 
The EU represented an entirely different type of pressure for Zambia and 
Malawi, that of the almost silent partner who still insists that things be done their 
way.  In the case of Zambia, fear of the cessation of trade with the EU overcame 
the desire to feed its citizens.  In Malawi, fear of cessation of trade prompted a 
different solution, one that would help feed the people while hopefully avoiding 
punishment from the EU.  Either way, the EU represented an enormous though 
indirect international pressure. 
4.4.4 Other Players 
Other institutions, some IGOs and some NGOs, also offered advice and 
pressure on the issue of genetically modified food aid.  The IGOs included the 
44 Ochieng Rapuro. “Zambia: Cynicism Still Hangs Over Biotechnology Foods.” The Standard 
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World Health Organization (WHO) as well as the Southern African Development 
Community).  They each had different opinions on what Zambia and Malawi 
should do.  The NGOs included Greenpeace and ActionAid, a large UK nonprofit.  
All of the statements were made after the decisions had been made in both 
countries, but were important nonetheless because Zambia was still being urged 
to reverse its decision to accept the genetically modified food. 
In August of 2002, shortly after Zambia had officially rejected the aid, the 
World Health Organization came out in support of countries accepting the food. 
WHO had been asked to compile a report about the advantages and 
disadvantages of GMOs, but the decision to reject the food aid was made before 
the report was in.46  WHO delivered the report in November.  The report 
answered 20 questions about GMOs and tried to dispel fears about the safety of 
GMOs, claiming that they were safe for humans to consume.  This failed to sway 
the scientists and government of Zambia, with the Minister of Health claiming that 
the report lacked authoritative answers and ultimately left the decision up to the 
individual countries.47  WHO’s official statement said in part: 
WHO believes that in the current crisis, governments of countries in 
southern Africa must consider carefully the severe and immediate 
consequences of limiting the food aid that is made available for the 
millions of people so desperately in need.48 
 
WHO also predicted that without effective action 300,000 people would 
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starve to death over the next six months.  However, WHO’s support of accepting 
the food was not universal.  Andre Ouadraogo, a WHO regional nutritionist 
advisor talked about the differing opinions within WHO: “There is a definite split 
when it comes to GM. While some health officials are all for it, others were 
vehemently opposed to the use of gene altered maize without proper certification 
that it is 100 percent safe."49 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) pointed out that 
delays in decisions were creating operational problems for moving the food.  
SADC’s recommendation was one that Malawi was already following—accepting 
milled grain while further information was sought on its potential benefits or 
harms.50  This recommendation went unheeded by Zambia. 
Smaller players also offered their opinion on what should be done.  
Greenpeace issued a statement in support of Zambia’s decision saying that, 
"This decision is a triumph of national sovereignty. The US has been putting 
pressure on countries to accept the GM surpluses produced by its farmers.”51  
The Greenpeace statement condemned the U.S. for its attitude and pressure 
towards the southern African countries and claimed that the stance was 
motivated by its links to large agro-tech companies trying to open new markets 
for their products. 
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ActionAid, a large UK charity, made a qualified statement by saying that 
Zambia’s decision should be respected, as long as it didn’t mean people would 
die of starvation.  They further urged the U.S. to follow the UK’s example by 
sending money rather than food.52 And finally, the former James Bond actor, 
Roger Moore, who was acting as a UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador said in a 
statement issued after touring parts of Zambia that the genetically modified food 
aid could be a solution to Zambia’s hunger if farmers pledged not to plant it.53 
 
4.4.5 Response from Zambia and Malawi  
Zambia and Malawi had very different reactions to the pressures coming 
from Level I.  There is less evidence for what was happening in Malawi, but given 
the proximity of these two countries and the fact that they were in similar 
situations, it is likely that they were experiencing many of the same embassy 
meetings.  Malawi and Zambia are close neighbors and likely would have 
experienced much the same thing.  However, their responses were different. 
All of the pressure applied gives rise to the question of whether the 
situation changed the relationships between the countries.  According to Robert 
Sichinga, there may not have been tangible changes, but: 
They were very adversarial, they were very aggressive, they were, they 
would invite you to, say for instance, lunch, and they would push it down 
your throat, saying this is an important thing...And the question was, why 
were you pushing it against us, I mean it's us who are hungry, so why are 
you pushing it down our throats? And that seemed crazy rather than 
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helping the situation. OK? And obviously the U.S. was very, very calm but 
the Embassy officials were very offended by a small country like Zambia 
rejecting buy a big scale supply offer.54 
 
This statement by a Member of Parliament at the time indicates that the 
Zambian government was both aware and wary of the U.S. position.  It also 
indicates that the Zambians were not pleased with the U.S. pressure.  This 
suspicion of the U.S. motives would continue to grow in Zambia as it became 
clearer that they did not intend to accept the genetically modified food aid.  This 
attempt by a Level I negotiator, in this case the U.S., to change the win-set on 
Level II by appealing to their humanity, went too far and negatively reverberated 
in Zambia. 
 Zambia did not remain passive or unresponsive during this time of 
immense pressure.  Indeed, there were a variety of responses.  There are many 
beliefs in Zambia and Malawi concerning genetically modified food, some of 
which persist to this day.  Some people believed and still believe that pushing 
genetically modified food on Africans is a way for the U.S. to control what 
Africans grow, but also to keep Africans from prospering.  The U.S. and 
international community push to accept the food aid was therefore extremely 
suspect to some in Zambia and Malawi.  Robert Sichinga echoed the beliefs of 
many when he said: 
And then the other thing was that there was tremendous amount of 
pressure from the embassy officials of that day. And the question was, 
why were they pressurizing us if it was so good that it would appear on its 
own? Why were they doing that? So clearly it created suspicion to say 
well, you want to do this, and you need to understand the issue of HIV 
aids was said to have been an American generated strategy to limit or to 
cause this diseased to affect the African population. That is basically what 
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it was, so clearly the relationship was that of great suspicion, that was this 
another method that they want to use to limit the quantity, the population, 
the growing population of the Africans, and therefore restrict their capacity 
and ability.55 
 
 Other members of the government publicly echoed Mr. Sichinga’s 
sentiments.  Charles Kakoma, also a member of the Zambian parliament in 2002, 
urged the Zambian government to burn the already delivered maize, saying, “By 
doing so we will be sending a signal to our donors that if they want to help, they 
should do so in good faith. In Zambia we value our lives.  These lives cannot be 
experimented upon." Kakoma argued that the maize should not be donated at 
the expense of starving Zambians.56   
 The fear of being experimented on by the West was not limited to the 
government.  The head of research and development at the All Africa 
Conference of Churches, Dr. Kunijwok Kwawang, accused the West of a new 
form of colonialism when he said, "The process of experimenting on us has 
turned us into guinea pigs," and went on to say, "This is a continuation of the 
slave trade in a modern form, including slavery of the mind, where they have 
made us believe that West is best.” Dr. Kunijwok claimed that the West was 
taking advantage of the drought in southern Africa to, “force these foods down 
the throats of Africans.”  He then claimed that those who were in charge of the 
project were in business and, "the human-well being is not considered when 
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people are out to make money."57 
 Not everyone believed the myth that the U.S. was experimenting on 
Africans and pushing the food for their own gain.  Indeed, some believed that the 
pressure was coming from the opposite side, that those who were opposed to 
genetically modified food were the ones propagating the myths.  Tamani Nkhono, 
then National Director for the Civil Society Agriculture Network (CISANET) in 
Malawi, stated, “There were a lot of myths about GMOs, how GMOS are made, 
the effects of GMOs, all those things. So there was all that talking, especially, 
because much of the position was coming from the EU.  NGOs and the EU.”58   
On a related note, Dr. Luke Mumba, Dean of the School of Natural 
Sciences at the University of Zambia, noted that the EU was in a very different 
position than Africa when it came to food:  
Shortly, when foods that improve health and nutrition are common on the 
shelves (e.g. lower cholesterol, lower blood pressure, improve eyesight, 
etc.) European consumer resistance is expected to diminish. Whereas 
Europe has abundant food, with virtually everyone receiving an adequate 
diet, many in Africa suffer from hunger, malnutrition and poverty. Europe 
can afford the luxury of debate and delay of this technology whereas 
Africa cannot.  Europeans see no need to increase their food output, 
whereas Africans can see every reason to do so. In the light of the need 
for increased farming productivity, Africa must make up its own mind and 
speak for itself.59 
 
 Other Zambian objections to the international pressure came in the form of 
claims of ignorance or protestation that the U.S. was not providing enough 
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Information Service. January 27, 2003. http://allafrica.com/stories/200301290746.html (accessed 
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58 Tamani Nkhono. Personal Interview, August 16, 2016, Lilongwe, Malawi 
59 Luke Mumba. “Zambia: Safety of GMOs.” The Post. July 29, 2002. 
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information about the food or the science behind it. The U.S. protested that 
plenty of information had been given but that Zambia was choosing to act in 
disregard of the scientific facts.60  After the decision had been made, President 
Mwanawasa dispatched scientists to the U.S., Canada, Europe, and South Africa 
to try to discover the truth about genetically modified foods.61 
  Officials in Malawi had a different view of what the U.S. was doing.  Dr. 
Wilkson Makumba, now Director of the Chitedze National Research Station in 
Malawi, was, in 2002, the National Research Coordinator for the Ministry of 
Agriculture and as such was involved in the decision-making process. According 
to Dr. Makumba: 
Well I would not say it was not necessarily pressure, but advice.  By then it 
was coming through, the problem that we had.  There was hunger and 
they were saying, we have got aid, and this is the form of aid that we 
have. So it’s up to you to accept it or not. Just like Zambia, because they 
had the alternative by then, you know?  So at least they had the courage 
to say, no no no, to GMO, it shouldn’t come to our country, because at 
least they had the alternative.  Malawi did not have the alternative, that’s 
why we had to accept it, but with the condition attached to it.62 
 
Ultimately, what the Zambians wanted was for the U.S. to stop pressuring 
Africans to accept food they were uncomfortable with. That they felt they were 
being unfairly pressured is clear from the many statements made by officials at 
all levels.  At the government organized conference in Lusaka Brigadier General 
Godfrey Miyanda, president of the Heritage political party, urged the U.S. to stop 
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threatening and intimidating Zambia.  He said, "Don't intimidate us. Don't 
pressurise us to accept food which we don't know about."  He went on to say, "I 
know, as former minister, that the US government has the capacity to fly in GM-
free maize.  Why stick to this maize which we are not comfortable with?  If they 
are serious with their support, let them assist us with ships or other means so 
that we can get into our lakes and catch the fish to feed our people.”63 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed Level I of a two-level game, and how it 
functions within Putnam’s theory.  International pressure takes various forms, 
including aid conditionality and norms.  This chapter also presented evidence of 
how international pressure functioned on Level I.  First, the U.S. applied pressure 
through official meetings at the U.S. embassy and with members of parliament to 
urge acceptance of the genetically modified food.  U.S. representatives also 
made many statements urging acceptance.  The WFP sought for a more neutral 
tone, making statements about the safety of the food aid, but also urging 
governments to accept the food in order to help their people.  The EU was an 
indirect pressure.  As was mentioned, the EU itself was criticized by U.S. officials 
and politicians for not being more proactive in urging Africans to accept the food 
aid and for allowing their own prejudices to stop them from helping more.  Other 
international institutions also weighed in, adding to the pressure coming from 
Level I. 
63 Brighton Phiri, “Zambia: U.S. Comes Under Attack Over GMOs.” August 13, 2002. The Post. 
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Zambia and Malawi responded differently to the pressure.  Malawi, in a 
weaker position as will be seen in Chapter 6, agreed to accept the genetically 
modified food in September of 2002.  However, Zambia chose a different path.  
The U.S., as a Level I player, attempted to change Zambia and Malawi’s win-sets 
by swaying what was happening in both countries.  In Malawi, the pressure was 
seen as advice.  The U.S. attempts to change win-sets backfired dramatically in 
Zambia.  In Zambia, that “advice” was met with defiance against what Zambians 
perceived as the hidden agenda of the U.S.  Zambia was suspicious of the U.S. 
motives, convinced that the U.S. was attempting to experiment on Africans with 
genetically modified food, and that the U.S. was seeking to benefit its own 
companies by making Africans reliant upon U.S. companies for supplies.  They 
believed that the U.S. was trying to intimidate them into accepting the food and 
that the U.S. could provide other food aid, but was choosing not to.   
In Zambia, negative reverberation happened decisively. Zambia 
responded negatively to the pressure of the US, WFP, and other entities. 
Considering the lack of support for Zambia’s decision, even from sources where 
they should have been able to expect support, such as the EU, and the pressure 
to conform and accept the food, Zambia’s decision was bold. The evidence from 
Malawi is not quite as strong. It is clear that they took the international 
component somewhat in to their decision, but as we will see from later chapters, 
Malawi’s domestic situation was different and they responded more to that 
pressure than to that put on them by the U.S.  This leads to the next chapter, a 
discussion of the domestic pressures that were happening within the countries.  
CHAPTER 5 
LEVEL II: CIVIL SOCIETY 
5.1 Introduction 
Civil society is the first of the Level II domestic factors that is hypothesized 
in this dissertation as having played a role in Zambia and Malawi’s decision-
making process.  Civil society is active in both countries, and various civil society 
groups in both countries were vocal in their opinions of whether the genetically 
modified food aid should be accepted or not.  Whether one agrees that civil 
society is effective in implementing policy and political change, it is a factor that 
must be addressed in order to fully understand decision-making, especially in the 
developing world. 
This chapter will first provide an overview of how this factor fits into the 
theoretical framework of two-level games.  It will then present a short literature 
review of what civil society is, the various schools of thought on whether it is 
effective, and then how civil society functions in the developing world.  It will then 
discuss the evidence of whether civil society was effective in influencing the 
decision, with a specific look at the attempts of civil society to assert influence.  
Two segments of civil society will be discussed at more length because of their 
influence in the matter.  The two segments are the NGO community and the 
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scientific community.  The chapter will end with a discussion of how well the civil 
society of Zambia and Malawi aligns with the two-level game theory. 
 
5.2 How Civil Society Functions Within Two-level Games 
 In Putnam’s (1988) model, the influence of civil society is a second-stage 
Level II, domestic activity. It occurs after the state has begun negotiations on 
Level I when the statesman or domestic negotiator comes back from Level I 
negotiations with a tentative agreement, subject to approval from the domestic 
constituency.  This domestic factor of Level II cannot be ignored because civil 
society groups may have the ability to influence what happens should the 
international negotiations not go the way civil society prefers.  This is difficult for 
several reasons.  First, with something as diffuse as civil society, with its variety 
of associations, a consensus is unlikely to be achieved.  This makes applying 
consistent pressure problematic.  Second, civil society may be limited in its 
effectiveness due to diffuse opinions on the issues at hand.  There can be a wide 
variety of opinions on the matter, not all of them working for the country’s good.  
The third reason has to do with applying pressure.  Civil society’s ability to apply 
pressure, even should they agree on what that pressure should be, is limited.  
This means that civil society, though it might try, would find it difficult to affect the 
win-sets already established by negotiators in the first stage.  In both Zambia and 
Malawi, civil society was involved in the ratification process, but only inasmuch 
as the governments of both countries sought advice on whether the genetically 
modified food aid was safe.   
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However, the very uncertainty engendered by the unpredictability of civil 
society may have helped expand the win-sets of Zambia and Malawi because it 
meant that negotiators on Level I were unable to accurately assess what the win-
set was and what the countries would accept.  Civil society was also vulnerable 
to reverberations (Putnam 1988, 454).   Reverberation occurs when international 
entities attempt to sway the domestic audience.  In the cases of Zambia and 
Malawi, reverberation was possible if institutions on Level I either successfully 
influenced civil society groups to a certain position, or caused certain civil society 
groups to react negatively to the attempted persuasion.  As will be seen, some in 
both countries were convinced by these attempts, but not all. 
5.3 What Is Civil Society? 
The concept of civil society is a contested one.  Some scholars say it has 
a long history, tracing it back to both Roman and Greek states.  Others say that 
the concept was appreciably different in both form and function and can therefore 
only be considered to have existed since the late 18th century, when writers like 
Thomas Paine and Georg Hegel developed the concept of civil society as an 
entity that is parallel to the state, where citizens form associations according to 
their wants and needs (Carothers 1999, 18).  In her book, Civil Society and the 
Aid Industry, Alison van Rooy traces the history of the concept.  Van Rooy posits 
that Alexis de Tocqueville was referring to civil society when he spoke of a spirit 
of community, volunteerism and association in the U.S. (Van Rooy 1998, 9).  
Gramsci viewed civil society as a sphere in which arguments over the 
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advantages and disadvantages of capitalism can safely take place (Van Rooy 
1998, 10, Carothers 1999, 19). 
Shin’ichi Yoshida defines it as: “A spontaneous, concerned group of 
citizens who interact independently of government, while collaborating with it at 
certain times and opposing it at others.” (in Low 1999, 194)  This definition 
seems to preclude organized groups, but has the advantage of conveying the 
actions of a civil society group.  Broman (2002, 1) defines civil society very 
broadly as existing in the public sphere somewhere between individual citizens 
and the government (Broman 2002, 1).  This definition may be too broad to be of 
any practical use when actually thinking through civil society and what it can and 
cannot do.  Blaney and Pasha (1993, 3) argue that one must narrow the 
definition in order to have it mean anything.  Instead, they define civil society as 
“a sphere of social life, involving a stabilization of a system of rights, constituting 
human beings as individuals, both as citizens in relation to the state and as legal 
persons in the economy and the sphere of private association.”  This definition 
again fails to convey what civil society can actually do.  David Holloway defines 
civil society as: “the self-organization of autonomous groups to balance the 
power of the state.” (Low 1999, 194)  Hyden (1997, 5) argues that civil society 
must be separated from the concept of society.  It is not just society, it is that part 
of society that allows individual citizens to interact with the state and the public 
realm.  For this dissertation, the combination of these definitions comes closest 
to conveying both what civil society is and what it can do.  Civil society is made 
up of groups that have organized themselves in order to act as a balance against 
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the state, or to provide services that the state cannot or does not.  Into this 
category fall nongovernmental organizations such as nonprofits, groups of 
technical experts, unions, ethnic associations, churches, and other groups which 
have formed outside of the governmental sphere. 
 
5.3.1 The Effectiveness of Civil Society 
 Much like the definition of civil society, the assessments of its 
effectiveness run the spectrum.  Kunz argues that if it is not effective, civil society 
does not exist: “Civil society is an aggregate of groups and activities, whose 
presence is measured in its cumulative impact on demolishing autocracy (in 
Hutchful 1996, 58).  Scholars like Carothers (1999) contend that the claims of 
civil society to foster and strengthen democracy and boost economic success are 
dubious.  Carothers (1999, 27) also claims that reports of civil society having 
gone global in the form of transnational civil society have yet to be truly proven.   
 Goran Hyden (1997) argues that claims of effectiveness depend on the 
school one is coming from.  Goran lists four schools of thought: associational, 
regime, neoliberalism, and post-Marxism.  Each school draws its original 
inspiration from historical thought leaders.   
The Associational School is the most dominant among U.S. scholars and 
originates from the thought of Alexis de Tocqueville. According to this school of 
thought, civil society strengthens democracy by limiting the power of the state, 
encouraging political participation amongst private citizens, developing 
democratic norms, representing interests outside the state, tempering conflict by 
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showing overlapping interests, training potential political leaders, keeping a 
questioning eye on democratic institutions, and helping to disseminate 
information (Hyden 1997, 8-9).   
The Regime School draws its origins from John Locke.  This school looks 
closely at how state-society relations can best be managed to foster democracy. 
Proponents of this school do not separate state and civil society.  This school 
also focuses on how regimes transition and what constitutes good governance 
(Hyden 1997, 9-10).   
The Neoliberal School stands in contrast to the optimism about civil 
society shown by the Associational and Regime Schools by taking a more 
cautious approach about what civil society can accomplish by itself.  This school 
is inspired by the writings of Thomas Paine in emphasizing the importance of 
structural reform, which in turn strengthens private property.  This school 
believes that a liberal economy provides the circumstances under which civil 
society can thrive, but also believes that economic strength must be supported 
by political strength in order to survive (Hyden 1997, 10-11).   
Finally, the Post-Marxist School also recognizes the influence of social 
structures formed by the economy while having less emphasis on the importance 
of structural reforms.  Scholars in this school of thought believe that socio-
economic status determines the ability to organize and participate, and thus civil 
society is confined to a select minority that possesses the necessary resources 
(Hyden 1997, 11-12).   
Arthur Brooks (2002) suggests that often opinion on whether civil society 
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is effective is formed on ideological lines.  Brooks argues that for conservatives 
civil society acts as a means of limiting the size and power of the government by 
providing services outside of the state and by keeping government accountable.  
On the other hand, many liberals view civil society as allowing activities and 
goods that should be provided by the state in unreliable hands (Brooks 2002, 
140).  Brooks seeks to take out the ideological view by hypothesizing two 
competing beliefs about civil society.  The first is that civil society acts as a 
corrective to dysfunctional governments.  The second hypothesis is that civil 
society accelerates a dysfunctional government’s decline (Brooks 2002, 142).  
Brooks does not come to a conclusion about which hypothesis is correct, but  
suggests that answering which is correct through rigorous study is important in 
the propagation of such civil society entities as nonprofit organizations (Brooks 
2002, 143).  The work on civil society has continued, but the debate over how 
civil society functions and whether it is effective remains. 
This section has provided an overview of thinking about the effectiveness 
of civil society.  Civil society is a factor that needs to be taken into account 
because of the possibility of its influence on the workings of the government.  
Though the definition may be argued over, civil society exists in some form in 
almost every state, weak and ineffective though it may be. The next section 
provides a continuation of the debate over civil society’s effectiveness by looking 
at specific cases of how civil society acts in different countries in Africa. 
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5.2.2 Civil Society in Africa 
In his article, “The Civil Society Debate in Africa,” Hutchful (1996) asks the 
question of how the civil society discussion going on in Political Science applies 
to Africa.  Hutchful’s article is a literature review of civil society in Africa and as 
such argues that civil society does exist in Africa, but that its origins and 
effectiveness are debated.  Hutchful also addresses whether or not the Western 
specificity of the concept means that it cannot be applied outside the West 
(Hutchful 1996, 62).  Hutchful (1996, 75) concludes that the concept of civil 
society can be useful in Africa as long as scholars are wary of the fundamental 
assumptions arriving from its origins in Western thinking.  Certainly civil society 
groups exist in Zambia and Malawi.  For this dissertation, care needs to be taken 
to not apply assumptions of the effectiveness or actions of civil society to the 
groups in Zambia and Malawi.  To do so would be to impose unreasonable 
standards. 
Lewis (2002, 570-571) agrees that civil society has usefulness outside of 
its Western context and argues that rather than a blanket application of what civil 
society is and how it functions in the West, one must look for local applications.  
Makumbe (1998, 306) agrees.  Lewis contends that it makes little sense to 
pretend that civil society’s Western roots mean that it has no use in Africa when 
colonialism was such a large part of African history, and civil society was used as 
an organizing principle in colonial administrations (2002, 580).  One of the 
reasons for choosing to use Zambia and Malawi as case studies was their history 
as British colonies.  It is difficult to trace or prove that this shared colonial history 
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was the reason Zambia and Malawi reflect similar civil societies, but it is helpful 
when comparing the countries that their civil societies seem to function in the 
same manner, i.e., with a somewhat limited degree of effectiveness. 
Stephen Orvis (2001) also agrees that the concept of civil society has 
usefulness for Africa.  Orvis believes that part of the debate over civil society in 
Africa has been that it has been defined too narrowly and had too many 
expectations put on it.  This has led to claims of ineffectiveness where they need 
not have been made (Orvis 2001, 17).  He contends that looking at the full 
spectrum of what can be considered civil society allows a different picture to 
emerge.  Institutions and concepts like patron-client networks, traditional 
authorities and ethnic associations must also be addressed (Orvis 2001, 27-33).  
Makumbe (1998, 309-310) very briefly lists examples of the effects of civil society 
in Africa, such as the struggle for the end of Apartheid in South Africa, the 
successful formation of Zambia’s Movement for Multiparty Democracy, the 
rejection of the one-party system in Malawi, and the overthrow of Zaire’s Mobuto 
Sese Seko by Kabila, supported by various civic groups in the country.  
5.2.2.1 Specific cases of civil society in Africa 
The literature on civil society in Africa is not always about its successes. 
Giles Mohan (2002) critiques major lenders and development agencies’ 
emphasis on the development of civil society in the 1990s by looking at how 
NGO intervention failed in Ghana. Mohan argues that while civil society is 
ostensibly separate from the government, this ignores reciprocal relationships 
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individual organizations maintain with the government, which may influence their 
actions (Mohan 2002, 128-129).  Mohan (2002, 146-148) concludes that the 
concept of civil society, especially in the form of foreign NGOs, has meant that 
the civil society in places like Ghana are in no way independent and in fact have 
become instruments of Western idealism and ideas, ideas that often do not work 
outside of the West.  This theory is interesting in light of the scientific 
communities of Zambia and Malawi described in this chapter.  Some of the 
scientists were independent, but some were also used by the government to 
bolster their argument.  Scientific independence becomes difficult when funding 
comes from the government, and oftentimes in the developing world the 
government is the only available funder, whether of universities or of research 
stations.   
Botswana is an example of how a uniquely African civil society can 
influence the course of democracy.  In their article, “Developing Democracy when 
Civil Society is Weak: The Case of Botswana,” Molutsi and Holm (1990) point out 
that the history of Botswana precluded the development of traditional, Western 
notions of civil society.  Instead, Botswana’s democracy has benefitted from 
village-based participatory institutions.  These institutions started in the early 
nineteenth century and were traditionally a place where village males could 
gather in a meeting called a kgotla in order to raise and debate issues with the 
chief of the tribe or local headman.  Kgotlas remain nonpartisan in that party 
activists are not allowed to organize who speaks or which issues are raised.  
These meetings remain outside government control, but are a powerful way for 
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citizens to have their voices heard.  This in turn strengthens Botswana’s 
democracy (Molutsi and Holm 1990, 324-328). 
 Peter VonDoepp explores how civil society can help with political transition 
in his 1996 article by looking at the cases of Kenya and Zambia in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s.  VonDoepp (1996, 25) contends that it was civil society that 
made the difference in the success of the political transitions.  VonDoepp looks at 
what makes civil society an effective element of change and concludes that there 
are three factors.  The first is the structural basis of civil society in the country.  
Zambia, whose transition was more successful than Kenya’s, had a strong base 
of labor unions.  This allowed them to have more influence when it came time to 
make change.  The second factor, the institutional strength of the constituent 
elements of civil society, is closely related to the first factor.  This factor has to do 
with the degree of autonomy and the available resources a civil society entity 
has.  The third factor is the cultural presence of civil society, in other words, how 
deeply rooted the organization or association is in the culture of the country 
(VonDoepp 1996, 40-42).  There were many factors that went into Zambia’s 
successful transition from a one-party to a multiparty democracy, but the 
existence of these three factors meant that the transition succeeded more 
thoroughly than Kenya’s.  
 Another example of how civil society can intervene in the workings of a 
country and help in transition is perhaps one of the most famous to come out of 
Africa: the end of apartheid in South Africa.  The extent of civil society’s influence 
in ending apartheid is hotly debated.  Daryl Glaser (1997) argues that there was 
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some influence, but one must not exaggerate how much of an effect civil society 
had in ending apartheid.  Glaser (1997, 5) argues that one can stretch civil 
society beyond its actual influence by looking at it as a watchdog for all things 
democratic.  Treating civil society as though it is a monolith ignores the reality.  
However, in South Africa there were elements that contributed to the end of 
apartheid.  The first was the labor movement, which initiated discussions about a 
democratic transition.  The second element of civil society that had an impact in 
Glaser’s opinion was the civic movement within townships.  This led to the 
formation of more civil society organizations (Glaser 1997, 6). 
 One final article speaks directly to the relationship between NGOs and 
GMOs.  The first is an article by Matthew Harsh titled, “Nongovernmental 
Organizations and Genetically Modified Crops in Kenya: Understanding Influence 
Within a Techno-Civil Society.”  In the article, Harsh (2014) studies the influence 
of NGOs on the adoption of GM technology.  Harsh argues that certain NGOs in 
Kenya have successfully helped the acceptance of GM technology because of 
two ideologies.  The first is that advancement of technology is correlated with 
societal progress, and the second is that civil society is a necessary component 
of an informed and representative democracy (Harsh 2014, 172).  Harsh terms 
the confluence of these two ideologies as a techno-civil society.  This is important 
because in 2002 such a civil society did not exist in either Zambia or Malawi, but 
the experience of Kenya points out the ways that civil society could successfully 
influence acceptance or rejection of GMOs.  
 Both the definition and effectiveness of civil society may be argued about, 
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but the prevalence of civil society organizations means that it must be addressed 
in any discussion of Level II domestic influences.  The next section will look at 
what happened with civil society in Zambia and Malawi during the 2002 decision. 
 
5.4 Evidence 
In the cases of Zambia and Malawi, pressure from civil society took just 
one form—advocacy for a certain position.  This makes sense in light of the fact 
that civil society entities cannot vote and often do not have any economic clout 
with which to pressure a government into doing what they want. 
This section first explores the activities of the two major civil society 
players, NGOs and the scientific community.  These two particular groups were 
chosen because of their prominence in the debate.  The section then discusses 
the advocacy by these groups in Zambia and Malawi.  The advocacy of the civil 
society groups fits into four broad categories: the fact that people were starving 
from lack of food, concerns about health should the food be accepted, concerns 
about the effects of genetically modified seeds on the ecosystem and the lack of 
knowledge about the effects of genetically modified foods. 
 
5.4.1 NGOs  
In 2002 there were two major civil society groups in both countries trying 
to apply pressure to the government for their position, NGOs, both international 
and local, and the scientific community.  The scientific community was much less 




NGOs went about advocating in different ways, and the sources of their 
information varied.  In Zambia, the Consumers International Regional Director 
came out strongly in favor of the government’s decision to reject the food aid.64  
After repeated assurances from President Mwanawasa that the genetically 
modified food aid was poisonous but that Zambia did not need it anyway, NGOs 
and other associations started coming out for or against GMOs.  Emily Sikazwe, 
Executive Director of the NGO Women for Change, called President Mwanawasa 
irresponsible, saying, “We shall not allow the president to take us for granted.  
The president should be responsible to the people as they are his employers.”65  
The Forum for Democracy and Development pushed for its acceptance, with the 
national chairman pointing out that rejecting the food was not doing anyone any 
favors.66   
 Other groups accused President Mwanawasa of not understanding or of 
willfully ignoring the situation.  An aid worker at the time, who asked to be 
anonymous, commented, “I don’t think the government is particularly well 
informed on the extent of the food shortages.  I don’t think [the GM issue is] a 
diabolical plot to withhold food by the government, I think it’s just blundering.”67  
Care International, an NGO on the ground in 2002, pointed out the severity of the 
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problem: “The hunger situation is real, a few months ago people had a bit of food 
but they are now running out of food creating a very desperate situation.”68  
Some groups were not necessarily opposed to letting the food in, but were 
concerned about the lack of legal framework in place.  Without that framework, it 
would be difficult to regulate what came into the country, how much, and when.  
The Zambian National Farmers Union (ZNFU) was particularly vocal about the 
need for regulation.  The ZNFU held a meeting in which they discussed GMOs 
and the need for legislation.  The other conclusions from the meeting were that if 
the government decided to accept the maize, all of it must be tested for all GMO 
varieties, and that Zambia should only accept and distribute varieties that were fit 
for human consumption.69  In addition, the ZNFU urged that the grain be milled 
before it was distributed.70 
Similar advocacy was happening in Malawi.  Tamani Nkhono-Mvula 
worked for CISANET, a civil society agricultural network.  Because they had 
access to many farmers’ associations, they were able to conduct gatherings they 
called People’s Voices.  In these gatherings they would educate people on what 
little they knew of genetically modified foods.  CISANET was in favor of accepting 
the food aid, but found that there was a lot of misinformation floating around 
about them.  He saw one of CISANET’s functions as educating people, though 
he did not feel they had all the information they needed.71 
68 Sheikh Chifuwe, “People are Genuinely Starving- Cupper, The Post, November 18, 2002. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200211180242.html (accessed August 16, 2017) 
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In 2002 Dr. Kingdom Kwapata was the head of the Malawi Human Rights 
Network.  He was on the frontlines of pressuring the Malawian government to 
accept the genetically modified food aid.  According to Dr. Kwapata there was a 
lack of understanding about the issues.  When asked who was giving pressure to 
the government he replied: “Civil society organizations. One of the pressure 
groups, and generally, the majority of people didn’t really understand. So my role 
in that context was that I was at the forefront of advocacy to, you know, urge the 
government to accept the maize on humanitarian grounds.”72 
Dr. Wilkson Makumba, head of the Chitedze Research Station, agreed 
that civil society organizations were trying to pressure the Malawian government, 
but argued that they were not necessarily successful and were uninformed:  
…of course sometimes we have unnecessary comments that come from 
civil society organizations, but they are not the things that can make the 
government bow down.  But rather, you know, because the government 
actually has technical advisors, ok? And sometimes the people that are 
anti are not in this country.  They would go and consult the wrong person 
on issues of agriculture.73   
Some in Malawi felt that some NGOs were too aggressive in their 
advocacy.  Dr. Yanira Ntupanyama, then the Chief Environmental Officer in the 
Ministry of the Environment, specifically referenced the Consumer Association of 
Malawi, which was opposed to bringing the food in.  According to Dr. 
Ntupanyama: “We've always had problems with the Consumer Association of 
Malawi. Very assertive, very aggressive in addressing issues of food safety. So 
as much as possible they would love people to bring in things that they are so 
72 Kingdom Kwapata, Personal Interview, August 12, 2016, Lilongwe, Malawi. 
73 Wilkson Makumba, Personal Intervew, August 16, 2016, Chitedze Research Station, Lilongwe, 
Malawi. 
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sure that it's safe.”74  
5.4.2 The Scientific Community 
Olive, Gunasekara, and Raymond (2012, 642) argue that states who hold 
certain normative beliefs related to science operate on a “precautionary 
principle.”  This principle encourages regulatory action even while the science 
remains uncertain because of possible consequences that could result from as 
yet unknown risks. This principle can be seen in how the EU has responded to 
genetically modified foods and in their insistence that others follow their lead. In 
Zambia and Malawi scientists who did not want to accept the genetically modified 
food aid repeatedly invoked the precautionary principle. As Richard Chanda, a 
scientist working in seed certification said of the decision-making process in 
Zambia: “We need to apply precaution…implying that it was not a definite no, nor 
a definite yes, but precautions can only be done when the person has accepted 
that all issues he has raised have been cleared. If they haven’t been cleared, he 
will not.”75  Dr. Mwananyanda Mbikusita-Lewanika pointed out that applying the 
precautionary principle was especially important where there was still no 
consensus amongst scientists.  As Dr. Lewanika said, "The precautionary 
principle requires that care be taken, even if a direct cause and effect relationship 
between an activity and harm to human and animal health, including the 
environment has yet to be established scientifically."76 
74 Yanira Ntupanyama, Personal Interview, August 17,2016, Lilongwe, Malawi. 
75 Richard Chanda, Personal Interview, August 23, 2016, Lusaka, Zambia. 
76 Brighton Phiri, “U.S. Comes Under Attack Over GMOs,” The Post, August 13, 2002. 
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Scientists in both countries worked to convince people of their position 
and were looked to as a neutral source.  Tamani Mvula-Nkhono stated:  
Yes, so, as you said there was little knowledge, but the thing is, because 
there were people who were hearing convincing arguments from both 
sides, from the pro-GMO and also the anti-GMO. All sides were putting 
forth cases that made sense. So for us we needed to go for people we felt 
could be neutral, and that was the university. So the university at that time, 
most of them were pro-GMO.77 
 
Even without consensus, scientists were looked to as a source of whether 
genetically modified food would be acceptable.  Scientists, NGOs, and other 
groups all worked to have influence.  Their objections or support follow. 
 
5.4.3 Risks of Starvation 
 The first broad category civil society used to put forth their argument for 
accepting the genetically modified food aid was that people were in danger of or 
were actually starving, and that denying the food aid would greatly exacerbate 
the problem.  Indeed, according to a risk assessment report conducted by the 
WFP and FAO, in Malawi, people had already starved to death by June of 
2002.78  This made the problem more pressing as there was no sign it was going 
to get better during the summer of 2002. 
As discussed earlier, President Mwanawasa had come under fire for 
denying the severity of the situation in Zambia.  Protests over what was 
happening came from many different segments of civil society, including tribal 
chiefs worried about their people, churches, NGOs, and others. 
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 While urging caution about the safety of GMOs, tribal chiefs, the traditional 
rulers of Zambia, were still concerned for their people.  Chief Chikanta of the 
Kalomo district wanted the country to consult professionals in order to make as 
informed a decision as possible, but had this to say about the urgency of the 
situation on the ground: "Our communities are on the verge of death. There is no 
need for this debate to take two weeks at the expense of dying Zambians."79  
Chief Macha of the Tonga people in the Choma district also expressed concern 
about the situation of his people, asking the government to reconsider its stance 
on accepting the genetically modified food aid.80  
 In November of 2002, after the Zambian government had made the 
decision to reject the food aid, a counsel of the tribal chiefs was held, with a 
presentation on the decision by the Minister of Agriculture, Mundia Sikatana.  
Minister Sikatana was an outspoken supporter of the decision to reject the food 
aid and argued that it was what was best for Zambians.  The tribal chiefs were 
not quite as convinced.  In a statement after the meeting they made a strong 
statement, saying, “What their Royal Highnesses simply want on food security is 
action, not words. Their Royal Highnesses expect your government not to let 
people die from hunger as a result of your policies.”  They went on to say that, 
“Policies that seek to put the security of people in danger are not what their Royal 
Highnesses expect from your government.”81 
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 Care International was trying to provide food for people in very difficult 
circumstances.  The national director issued a statement about what they were 
seeing on the ground, saying that, “There is serious food insecurity at the 
household level, we don't have a consistent food supply.  People are very, very 
hungry, in critical areas people are eating once a day."82 
 In Zambia there was a lot of concern expressed about what was going on, 
but civil society groups were also trying to do something about the situation.  As 
just expressed, Care International was seeking to feed people.  The churches in 
Zambia and Malawi, and indeed all over Africa were also concerned about what 
was going on.  The All Africa Conference of Churches sent out an appeal for 
humanitarian assistance, saying in a statement:  
We, the 168 member churches of the All Africa Conference of Churches 
(AACC) as a continental ecumenical body wish to add our voice to one of 
the most severe and widespread hunger now facing most African 
countries. People are dying daily. Most of those alive are too weak to 
produce more food. The animals are being wiped out.83 
 
As stated earlier, hundreds had already starved in Malawi by June of 
2002.  In addition to starvation, the country was facing a cholera epidemic in 
which thousands would eventually die (Attwell 2013, 564).  This meant that the 
situation was more urgent in Malawi than in Zambia because they had fewer 
reserves and fewer resources to turn to. 
Similar activities were happening in Malawi at the same time.  They were 
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in a different position because ultimately their government decided to accept the 
food, providing that it be milled before entering the country, but before the 
decision was made there were similar appeals being made about the number of 
people suffering from a lack of food.  When asked why the Malawian government 
was convinced, Kingdom Kwapata then of the Human Rights Network answered: 
“Political pressure as well from the grassroots. People were really in need of the 
maize. Yeah, so that pressure was significant. In addition, to maybe institutions 
like mine that were involved, they came to a decision that, let’s accept this.”84  
Tamani Mvula-Nkhono also felt that his organization, CISANET, had an impact:  
This food, the GM food at that time, we accepted it on moral grounds, 
people were dying. We have maize others have given which we don’t 
have evidence that some have died because of it.  The choice that we 
have is let them do it so that they survive at least for one year.  Let them 
not die of hunger. So it was on that moral basis that it was accepted.85 
The appeals that were effective in Malawi failed in Zambia.  Civil society 
was active in both countries.  However, as will be seen, there were other appeals 
given by top officials against accepting the food that held more sway in Zambia, 
such as the health of the people who eat GMOs, concerns about the damage to 
the ecosystem, and the lack of good information on whether GMOs would do 
more harm than good. 
5.4.4 Health Concerns 
Concerns about people starving were real and held sway in Malawi, but in 
Zambia concerns about the damage to people’s health was also a powerful 
84 Kingdom Kwapata, Personal Interview, August 12, 2016, Lilongwe, Malawi. 
85 Tamani Nkhono-Mvula, Personal Interview, August 16, 2016, Lilongwe, Malawi. 
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argument.  Unfortunately, many of the concerns going around were less than 
true, and sometimes completely unproven.  Nevertheless, people were genuinely 
fearful that eating genetically modified food would harm them.  Because this 
issue was largely about public opinion, the specific fears about genetically 
modified food will be covered more thoroughly in Chapter 6.  This section is 
about the information being spread by members of civil society, specifically the 
scientists.  
At the University of Zambia (UNZA), molecular biologist Kazhila 
Chinsembu was a prominent critic of genetically modified food.  He warned that 
genetically modified foods could suppress the immune system.  Dr. Chinsembu 
pointed out that this was especially concerning in an area where HIV/AIDS was 
so prevalent.  In an interview with The Post newspaper Dr. Chinsembu also 
expressed his concern about antibiotics, saying, “These foods could contribute to 
bacteria becoming resistant to anti-biotics so that you need to use higher 
dosages of anti-biotics to get cured.  There are also reports that it suppresses the 
immune system of the body.”86   
In a report to the Zambian government, National Institute of Scientific and 
Industrial Research researcher Dr. Mwnanayanda Mbikusita-Lewanika, who was 
part of the team that would eventually go to the U.S. to study GMOs, 
recommended that the government stop any more import of genetically modified 
foods.  Dr. Lewanika’s report was based on his work with the Ministry of 
Agriculture.  In the report he also reiterated the claim of antibiotic resistance, and 
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also talked about the increased risk of cancer from eating genetically modified 
food.87  Once Dr. Lewanika had gone to the U.S. he came back and reiterated his 
former concerns.  He also added that there was evidence the genetically 
modified food tended to make nonallergenic foods become allergenic due to the 
presence of foreign genes. This would cause more problems with people’s 
health.88 
In a lengthy article for The Post in Zambia, Dr. Luke Mumba, then Dean of 
the School of Natural Sciences at UNZA,  wrote about some of the beliefs that 
were going around in regard to health.  About food safety concerns, Dr. Mumba 
said: 
So far there is not a shred of evidence to suggest that eating GM food will 
be bad for anyone's health. To be more specific there is no experimental 
data so far to prove that GM foods cause allergies, anti-biotic resistance or 
suppression of immune systems in human bodies. These are but some of 
the common myths…89 
 
Dr. Mumba went on to explain that millions of people have been eating 
genetically modified food for years with no deleterious effects and that it was 
unreasonable to assume something different would happen to Africans.  Dr. 
Mumba specifically cited a study in Ireland of genetically modified potatoes 
where after six years no negative effects were seen. Dr. Mumba contended that 
food safety depends on what a food contains, not how it was produced, so non-
nutritional elements, toxins, and other substances that might cause allergies 
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would be there regardless of the food’s origin.90  
 Dr. Wilkson Makumba in Malawi also had concerns about what the food 
would do to people’s health.  He recalled some research he heard about in his 
work: 
And some research of course, it has even shown that like, where they 
have used the guinea, you know? The guinea pigs, they have shown that 
of course they have developed some tumors after feeding with it.  Yeah, 
so we’re looking at that, saying, we might be having those.  And the side 
effects on people.  But we are still waiting for it, you know, the actual 
conclusive work or scientific proof that it did it.91  
 
 Other members of civil society were concerned about people’s health, but 
in the opposite direction.  Kingdom Kwapata, then head of the Human Rights 
Network which was advocating that the food be accepted in Malawi was 
concerned about what would happen if people did not get the food:  
So as I was advocating government should accept this on the basis that, 
you know assuming that this maize is poisonous and people die, right? 
And then you have two options- you either accept the maize and people 
die if it’s poisonous, or you reject the maize, people still die because of 
hunger. So I was saying, either way, just bring it in. If we all perish, then 
that’s fine! As opposed to, you know, withholding it, because you’re 
fearing the consequence. Yeah, so, I think our advocacy worked very well 
during that time.92 
 
 Concerns about what genetically modified food would do to people’s 
health were all over, in the media, and in traditional beliefs.  Most groups in 
Zambian civil society, especially scientists, were concerned about the harmful 
effects of the food, though some still advocated for its acceptance.  Groups in 
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Malawi were also concerned about the harmful effects but felt that the harmful 
effects of starvation were more important to worry about. 
5.4.5 The Ecosystem 
In addition to health concerns, many in civil society expressed worry that 
allowing GMOs into the country would irreparably harm the ecosystem and thus 
disrupt the agricultural sector.  There were a number of fears, including 
disruptions to the informal seed sector, dependency on pesticides, cross-
breeding, and a subsequent destruction of farming.  
Bernadette Lubozhya, an agro-scientist, had two worries about bringing in 
GMOs.  The first was that the informal seed sector, which at the time supplied 
85% of the seed to most of the farming community in Zambia would be 
negatively impacted by the genetically modified seed imported into the country.93   
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) had much the same 
concern.  In addition to harming the informal seed sector, SADC feared that 
bringing in the genetically modified grain would result in the extinction of 
indigenous seeds.  According to Charles Nkomo, the Director of the SADC Plant 
Genetic Resource Center, cross-pollination would lead to the destruction of the 
indigenous varieties.  Mr. Nkomo feared that the genetically modified seed would 
overwhelm the nongenetically modified seed.94 
There was another fear about genetically modified seeds. This was the 
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belief that the genetically modified seeds had been bred in such a manner that 
they were more dependent on pesticides.95  This was a major concern in 
countries where farmers could barely afford seed.  Adding the expense of 
chemical pesticides that could only be purchased from a Western company 
would have been disastrous for the private agriculture sector of both countries. 
For all of these concerns there was an obvious if expensive option: have 
the grain milled before it ever got to the country so that no one could plant it and 
it would not disturb the ecosystem.  This was the option that Malawi took.  As 
Madalitso Mwale, Deputy Director of the Department of Disaster Management 
Affairs said when asked about the danger of Malawians planting the seed,  
…That would be dangerous and would affect the varieties of maize, and 
that would bring problems.  So on the basis most people said, if we are to 
accept GMO maize then it has to be milled at the point of entry so it 
comes here as flour… But this time around as a control measure, it was 
indicated that if we are to accept the GMO maize, then it has to be 
milled.96  
 
Wilkson Makumba and Yanira Ntupanyama, both scientists in Malawi, expressed 
the same fears, that people would ignore the prohibitions against planting the 
genetically modified seed.  As Dr. Ntupanyama said: 
Knowing that I think the main concern was that even myself or even my 
grandmother, if she sees the seed and thinks, oh this seed looks unique 
and she would try to plant it. So the concern was that someone in the 
village or someone who was interested in crops would decide to plant it. 
So if they plant it, then what next? I think at that time we struggled with 
issues that bringing genetically modified seeds or crop into the country 
might end up having problems that other countries in Canada, farmers 
have had problems with Monsanto, where you find some of the genes in 
farmers’ land and then people start questioning, so where did you get 
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this?97   
 
However, Zambia still felt that the other concerns were too great to ignore.  
Instead, scientists in Zambia and other parts of Southern Africa began to look for 
alternative technologies that would increase yield without using genetic 
modification.  Instead of genetic modification, farmers were encouraged to use 
old techniques such as tissue culture to produce more food.98 
 
5.4.6 Lack of Information 
 One of the biggest concerns expressed by civil society groups, especially 
those urging caution in accepting the food, was that they simply did not have 
enough information to make an informed decision.  Some claimed that there was 
enough information, but from the research conducted, they were in the minority. 
A Zambian scientist, Dr. Mulenga, issued a statement before the debate had truly 
started in Zambia.  In April of 2002, Dr. Mulenga said, “I cannot say eat or don't 
eat GM maize, but what is saddening is that these long term effects of GM crops 
are not officially known even though scientific indications are there to show that 
they exist."99  In July of that year, UNZA molecular Biologist Dr. Chinsembu 
argued that research conducted outside of the country was insufficient.  Dr. 
Chinsembu said, “We need to conduct it here in Zambia so that scientists like 
myself can come in.  Although we are very few molecular biologists in Zambia, at 
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least we can help in this matter because the risk assessment should help us 
understand whether the GM maize can lead to bio-diversity loss or 
not."100   Another Zambian agronomist said that the bottom line was that, “we 
need ot know more, and we can’t take chances.  If even the Europeans, with all 
their scientists and research institutions, have doubts, surely there must be good 
reason to be cautious.” (in Cooke and Downie 2010, 6) 
Dr. Luke Mumba disagreed with other scientists’ assessments of the lack 
of knowledge.  In his article in The Post Dr. Mumba articulated his reasons for 
believing in the safety of GMOs.  He argued that genetically foods were 
rigorously tested to ensure that they are safe to eat before they are distributed.  
He pointed out the number of countries that have national biosafety laws in place 
to ensure the safety of the food.  Dr. Mumba also disputed the claim that 
genetically modified food caused immune system repression, saying:  
…findings of a Royal Commission which was set up to investigate the 
validity of the claims that GM foods suppress the immune system 
concluded that “the evidence by Dr Pusztai to indicate that rats had 
depressed immune system was not the result of standard immune 
response tests.” The report further states that “within the scientific 
community there is general agreement that the results of Dr. Pusztai's 
experiment are inclusive insofar as there were flaws in the process, and 
the project was incomplete.”101 
In an effort to combat this lack of knowledge in Zambia, President 
Mwanawasa decided in September of 2002, after the decision to reject the 
genetically modified food aid had been made, to send a team of scientists to the 
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U.S. and EU on a fact-finding mission.102  The U.S. had already offered this 
option to Zambians, and President Mwanawasa took advantage of it.  Speaking 
about the government’s position, he urged that his government not be 
misunderstood because there was no consensus amongst scientists, and that 
Zambia was simply taking precautionary measures.  He stated that, “It’s not 
government’s intention to sacrifice the lives of Zambians by rejecting GM 
maize.”103 
 The debate over whether GMOs were safe raged in Zambia throughout 
the autumn of 2002.  As previously mentioned, WHO issued a report in 
November that stated that there GMOs posed no risk to human health.104  This 
failed to sway most scientists.  In Zambia, tempers began to flare.  At a 
biotechnology conference held in November in Lusaka, pro-GMO scientists 
accused anti-GMO scientists of misleading consumers.  One scientist, Jocelyn 
Websteran, accused the conference’s organizers of creating a conference full of 
bias and bad information.105 
 Some churches also weighed in on the debate, saying that the lack of full 
information about the consequences of genetically modified food amounted to 
treating Africans as guinea pigs in genetic research.  A senior pastor at the 
Gospel Lighthouse Church in Kenya said, “The repercussions of these foods 
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have not yet been established... The Church has a responsibility of investigating 
until it is satisfied that people using GM foods are protected from destruction.” He 
went on to say that it is the responsibility of the church to guard against 
injustices: "When you manufacture a product with the intention of gaining at the 
expense of other people's health simply because they are hungry and poor, and 
do not have the machinery to verify the safety of your products, this is 
injustice."106 
 Because they made the decision relatively early on to accept genetically 
modified food that had first been milled, the civil society debate in Malawi over 
how much was known about GMOs was not as fierce, though questions still 
arose.  Tamani Mvula-Nkhono expressed the debate in Malawi well:   
So the people from Bunda [a technical college] were of the view that there 
is no problem with these things. Whatever is being said is just politics and 
not necessarily that if there could be challenges, fine, maybe in the long 
run, but the choice is there: eat this food and be alive, or die of hunger. So 
that was the choice that people were being faced with. So at CISANET it 
was difficult for us to stand and say, we don’t want this, because in the 
country there was very little knowledge, and the experts are saying it’s ok. 
So we didn’t have a good basis of saying no, though we had organizations 
like ActionAid and other, Oxfam, and other NGOs who were opposing this 
thing.107 
 
 Dr. Wilkson Makumba and Dr. Kingdom Kwapata agreed that scientifically 
it had not been conclusively proven, and so caution was needed in accepting the 
food and that there was no expertise in the country that would allow them to 
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make a fully informed decision.108 
 In the matter of knowledge, civil society, especially the scientific 
community, worked against itself.  There were so many voices saying that there 
was not enough knowledge that those who were saying that the information was 
there for the taking were not listened to. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to explain the first Level II domestic factor’s 
influence, that of civil society.  First, the literature about civil society was 
explored, specifically the differing definitions of the concept.  This leads to an 
understanding of how civil society is used in this dissertation.  Specific 
assessments of how civil society has worked, especially in Africa, led to an idea 
of how civil society may have influenced the decisions in Zambia and Malawi.  
Next, the chapter discussed the positions and actions of different NGOs in 
Zambia and Malawi in order to understand how they tried to exert influence over 
the decision.  The next segment of civil society discussed was the scientific 
community.  Here confusion reigned, as different scientists, many of them 
prominent, advocated for their version of what the science was.  In Zambia a 
group of scientists was sent to the U.S. and the EU to learn more about GMOs 
before making their recommendation.  However, the decision was made before 
the scientists concluded their trip and made their report.  In Malawi the concerns 
of the scientific community were overridden by other concerns.   
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Both NGOs and scientists raised some of the same concerns in both 
countries. The first was a concern that without the genetically modified food aid 
being offered, people would starve to death.  The next major concern was that if 
the food aid was accepted, people’s health would be at risk from eating it.  The 
third concern was that if the food was accepted and farmer chose to plant it 
against all recommendations, the ecosystems of the countries would be 
permanently affected.  The final reflects the reason civil society does not seem to 
have been more influential: groups in both countries felt they simply did not have 
enough information. 
Influence is difficult to assess, especially when so many different positions 
were being put forth.  However, the sheer amount of opinion being propagated 
means that civil society was an element of the domestic that had to be 
considered and dealt with in both countries.  The issue remains the one 
mentioned in the beginning of the chapter—did either country’s civil society have 
enough power to sway the government’s decision?  Another relevant question is 
whether any institution on Level I was able to successfully influence groups on 
Level II.  The evidence for this is mixed, though certainly the influence of the 
EU’s position was felt.  As in Chapter 4, this can be seen as passive, indirect 
persuasion, but the evidence points to it having had an effect.  This served to 
narrow the win-set of both Zambia and Malawi. 
Though civil society is a Level II factor that could have had influence, the 
evidence points to a mixed record of influence. The influence of civil society on 
the decision is in doubt because of the confusion that reigned in the positions of 
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both NGOs and the scientific community.  There was some influence, and 
Zambia did go with the recommendation of the panel of scientists who went 
abroad to study the subject, but because that report did not come until after 
Zambia had made the decision to reject the genetically modified food aid, one 
cannot say that it was an influence in the decision.  Both countries had other 
domestic concerns with accepting the food aid, which will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
CHAPTER 6 
LEVEL II: INTERNAL CONSIDERATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
Internal considerations are the second domestic factor on Level II that are 
hypothesized to have played a role in Zambia and Malawi’s decision to accept or 
reject the genetically modified food aid.  This chapter discusses aspects that 
Putnam (1988, 432) mentions when defining domestic politics, including political 
parties, legislators, and public opinion. There were many issues that came to the 
fore during this time of crisis.  One was that neither country was prepared with 
biosafety legislation that would allow them to regulate what came into the country 
and what was done with GMOs once they were in the country.  Another concern 
for the Zambian government was that members of opposition parties, some of 
them prominent politicians, were critical of both the government’s decision and 
how it handled the crisis.  Public opinion about what the genetically modified 
seed and food would actually do was confused and diffuse, leading to uncertainty 
about which decision the countries would make.  And finally, Malawi’s domestic 
position was much worse and changed their considerations, thus playing a 
greater role in their decision. 
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This chapter first discusses how this factor functions within two-level 
games.  Following that is a literature review of domestic considerations, including 
the concept of “audience costs” and public opinion.  In the evidence section, four 
considerations will be looked at: lack of legislation, public opinion, 
intragovernmental opposition and the domestic position of the countries. 
6.2 How Internal Considerations Function Within Two-level Games 
Internal considerations are the second domestic factor on Level II in this 
two-level game model.  Along with civil society, internal considerations are a 
second stage, Level II activity, occurring after negotiations have begun on Level 
I. Like civil society, internal considerations must be taken into account because if
they are important enough they have the power to derail negotiations with the 
international level by making acceptance of the proposed stage one deal 
unacceptable or impossible.  Internal considerations may also restrict the size of 
the win-set for a country by making deals that do not take into account these 
internal constraints impossible to ratify. 
Internal considerations are especially important because they may be the 
hardest for negotiators on Level I to understand.  This is in part due to the 
diversity of opinions and the number of considerations that need to be taken into 
account when negotiating with Level I institutions.  Unlike civil society groups, 
something like public opinion is unlikely to generate enough cohesiveness for 
officials to be able to predict which way the public will turn.  This means that 
influencing public opinion by Level I negotiators may be attempted, but is 
175 
 
particularly subject to reverberation because of the unpredictability of trying to 
sway public opinion.  This uncertainty makes the win-set smaller. 
 One of the internal considerations that Level I negotiators could not have 
predicted, and therefore could do little about, was the importance placed on the 
lack of biosafety legislation to protect both countries.  Neither country had 
legislation in place, yet they reacted in opposite ways to the offer of genetically 
modified food aid. This means that, even if Level I negotiators had tried to guess 
whether lack of legislation would sway what happened, they would have been 
wrong 50% of the time. 
 The second reason for uncertainty as to how the domestic level would 
respond to initial negotiations between Level I and the government was the 
actions of politicians.  Opposing politicians might have chosen not to politicize an 
issue that was so serious, preferring instead to focus on making sure their 
constituents were eating.  Or, they might have chosen to make an issue of what 
was happening, making accusations and causing problems.  How politicians 
would react meant great uncertainty and this uncertainty meant that it would be 
difficult for Level I negotiators to influence. 
 There was one more consideration Malawi had that Zambia did not.  
Though both countries are among the poorest in the world, in the years leading 
up to the 2002 crisis, Malawi had experienced a series of setbacks and crises 
that put it in a much worse position economically and agriculturally than Zambia.  
This position was a decisive factor in Malawi choosing to accept the genetically 
modified food aid. 
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6.3 Domestic Politics and Internal Considerations 
Politicians, no matter how powerful, are not free to do what they want 
without repercussions, especially in a democracy.  In a functioning democracy, 
the electorate has the power to hold politicians accountable through elections.  
Public opinion is another powerful way of holding politicians accountable, and 
much of this is done through the media of a country.  It is because politicians 
may be held accountable that internal considerations such as legislation, public 
opinion, opposition from other politicians, and other domestic considerations, 
including the status of the country, must be considered on Level II. 
 
6.3.1 Electoral Accountability and Domestic Audiences 
 One of the concerns democratic governments must consider when 
deciding to act is whether they will be punished politically by voters who are 
dissatisfied with their performance.  Gelineau (2013) looks at how citizens in the 
developing world act in terms of holding elected officials accountable.  Gelineau 
looks specifically at how economic interests intersect with approval of elected 
officials.  He studies this in part by using data on public opinion.  Gelineau (2013, 
421) finds that citizens’ likelihood of supporting an incumbent president or 
government is tied to how they view the economy.  If they feel the economy is 
doing well, they will support the incumbent.  If they feel the economy is not doing 
well, they are less likely to support the incumbent.  Gelineau (2013, 423) also 
found that voters are more likely to look at prospective success rather than 
retrospective analysis.  This is one way that a government could survive after a 
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crisis like a famine.  If they are seen to be acting proactively to take care of the 
crisis, even if that crisis is not yet taken care of, they are less likely to be 
punished electorally.  One can see how this occurred in both Zambia and Malawi, 
even though they made different decisions.  In Zambia, the government was very 
proactive in their campaign against the genetically modified food aid, and about 
GM technology in general.  This meant that even after refusing the food aid, the 
government could be seen as having protected the people.  In Malawi they made 
the opposite decision, but again, it was proactive and could be seen to be helping 
the people.  In both countries, the public had reason to believe that their 
government was looking after their best interests. 
Believing that your government is looking after you is an important 
consideration.  If you do not feel your government is doing so, there are ways to 
punish the government.  Though they are looking at the U.S., Levendusky and 
Horowitz (2012) make a powerful argument for why audience costs factor into 
whether a leader is punished.  Audience costs are defined as “the punishments, 
in the form of lower support, meted out by domestic populations against leaders.” 
(Levendusky and Horowitz 2012, 324)  They suggest that there are three factors 
that go into whether these punishments happen or not.   
The first factor is the leader’s partisanship.  Levendusky and Horowitz 
(2012, 325) hypothesize and show that in terms of national crises, partisanship 
plays a smaller role than one might expect.  This is because in the immediate 
aftermath of a crisis voters are likely to be swayed more by how elites are 
framing the issue than by party affiliation.  In addition, the leader acts as the most 
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persuasive voice because they are seen as having an informational advantage 
over the people (Levendusky and Horowitz 2012, 325).   
The second factor in determining audience cost is embedded in the first, 
the reaction of elites. When considering a leader’s actions, if voters do not 
understand the decision, they are likely to look to other elected officials, 
specifically their elected officials, for an explanation.  There are two options here: 
either elites will split along partisan lines or they will unite.  If they split along 
partisan lines, Levendusky and Horowitz (2012, 326) hypothesize and conclude 
that the power of the leader and the nature of the crisis will make voters reluctant 
to see a partisan issue rather than a national one.   
The third factor is whether the leader justifies their decision.  Levendusky 
and Horowitz (2012, 327) suggest that if a leader is able to put forth a reasonable 
explanation for their decision, explaining the logic and importance of the decision, 
the public is likely to accept the decision.  They posit that this is because the 
ability to explain their decision costs the nation less credibility in the international 
community (Levendusky and Horowitz 2012, 327). 
All Levendusky and Horowitz’s findings come down to how much trust the 
people put in the leader in times of crisis.  Because they tend to be the loudest 
voice, leaders have an advantage and often get the opportunity to adequately 
explain themselves and their decision, making audience costs lower than one 
might expect (Levendusky and Horowitz 2012).  One can easily see how this is 
relevant in Zambia and Malawi, where it was the leaders’ decision as to whether 
to accept or reject the genetically modified food aid.  Both decisions could be 
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backed by reasonable explanations mostly accepted by the elite who, of course, 
were not going to suffer from the decision either way.  This different situation in 
Zambia and Malawi shows why Levendusky and Horowitz’s conclusions may not 
fit precisely with what happened in Zambia and Malawi in 2002.  If the elected 
officials of the two countries were not going to be punished, then audience costs 
were not a concern. 
 Debs and Weiss (2016) also look at domestic audiences and international 
events.  They theorize that a country’s resolve in the face of an international 
crisis has a strong domestic component that should not be ignored.  They argue 
that the strength of a state’s bargaining position depends on two factors: how 
favorable the domestic audience is to the outcome and the leader’s competence 
in managing conflict (Debs and Weiss 2016, 404).  They agree with Levendusky 
and Horowitz (2012) that citizens do not automatically punish a leader who backs 
down in a crisis, but that the leader is given an opportunity to explain the 
circumstances and reasoning.  In other words, citizens care about the context of 
a situation (Debs and Weiss 2016, 404). A favorable domestic audience means 
that a government may be able to force more generous concession when 
bargaining in a crisis, because they have the country behind them (Debs and 
Weiss 2016, 425-26).   
Debs and Weiss are not writing specifically about two-level games, but 
their argument can easily be applied.  The support of the people is an important 
consideration on Level II.  Citizen support means a government is strengthened 
when negotiating with Level I because they can use the people’s support to 
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restrict their own win-sets, helping to strengthen their bargaining position.  The 
people’s support also means that reverberation is less likely to occur because 
people supporting their government are not likely to be disaffected enough to 
respond to Level I attempts to change the game through influence on Level II. 
 James Fearon (2004) also writes of international bargaining and domestic 
audiences.  Fearon (2004, 577) contradicts Levendusky and Horowitz (2012) and 
Debs and Weiss (2016) in whether a leader who backs down from a crisis is 
punished domestically.  He also argues that the side with strong domestic 
backing will be less likely to back down in times of international disputes (Fearon 
1994, 570-580).  This is especially interesting in terms of what happened with 
Zambia and Malawi in discussions with the U.S.  The U.S. food aid program has 
wide public support, and the U.S. did not back down when asked to separate the 
genetically modified food aid from nongenetically modified.109  Zambia and 
Malawi, on the other hand, suffered from confusion in their decision and therefore 
a lack of widespread support.  Neither country was able to prevail in their 
argument with the U.S. 
 Ramsay (2004) offers another view of why electoral punishment may or 
may not happen.  Ramsay (2004, 459) looks at how politicians in democracies 
are unique when it comes to international events because they must deal with 
both national and partisan interests and arguments.  In times of crisis, opposing 
                                            
109 According to a recent survey conducted by the University of Maryland, U.S. humanitarian 
assistance, in the form of food and medical assistance, is supported by 81% of Americans.  See 
Steven Kull, “American Public Support for Foreign Aid in the Age of Trump,” Brookings Institution, 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/american-public-support-for-foreign-aid-in-the-age-of-trump/ 
(accessed November 30, 2017). 
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politicians are in a unique position to wound their opponents, as attention is 
focused on the issue.  As will be seen, this happened in Zambia to President 
Mwanawasa as he faced opposition from different political parties.   
 
6.3.2 Public Opinion in the Literature 
Though Africa is incredibly diverse, much can be learned from looking at 
the literature that has been written on other countries’ reactions in certain 
situations, specifically because developing countries face challenges that the 
developed world does not. That is why the emphasis in this section will mostly 
look at public opinion and voters in Africa and the developing world.    
Politicians need to be concerned about what the public thinks of them.  In 
a democracy their very survival as politicians depends on it.  Politicians need to 
take into account that with public opinion if they make the public unhappy they 
may not be re-elected.  According to Baum (2004), this limits the promises 
politicians make because they fear that they will be held accountable for those 
promises in the next election.  By making promises, the politician risks 
punishment, but also ups the ante on what they must do.  According to Baum 
(2004, 603) when looking at foreign policy, this fear of not being re-elected 
because of broken promises means that leaders will often make foreign policy 
decisions privately, out of the public spotlight.  This reduces potential backlash 
but also makes the backlash worse if the actions come to light.  Though it cannot 
be said that either decision was made in secret in Zambia and Malawi, the 
decision was never presented to the public for their approval or rejection.  This 
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could have had repercussions for both governments. 
HIV/AIDS is a problem in much of Africa and is therefore well-studied.  
Jeremy Youde (2009) and Per Strand (2012) have both studied public opinions of 
citizens in Africa on how their government is handling the crisis.  Youde used 
survey data from Afrobarometer to look at the factors that lead to higher support 
for a government’s AIDS policies.  Youde (2009, 230) found something very 
interesting—support for a government’s AIDS policy is tied to general approval of 
the government.  This could mean that approval of a single issue is immaterial 
because it is simply part of a larger whole approval of the government in general.  
That means that efforts to move public opinion on a single issue are bound to be 
difficult because approval or disapproval is tied into a larger network of issues.   
Strand (2012) takes a different tack.  His article looks at how public 
opinion can be mobilized to bring emphasis to issues that may be low on a 
government’s agenda.  Strand (2012, 184) finds that leverage could be used to 
push an issue up the agenda by using vertical accountability (that is, 
accountability between the people and the government), but it is unlikely on AIDS 
unless there is a dramatic increase and shift in public awareness of AIDS.  This 
was also true in Zambia and Malawi in 2002.  Differences of opinion and lack of 
unity on what to do meant that the public’s ability to force change in the 
government was limited. 
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6.3.3 Public Opinion and the Media 
Some scholars have focused on how the media functions in changing the 
minds of the general public.  One relevant study was done by Uche Onyebadi in 
his 2012 article, “Newspaper Agendas and Public Opinion in the 2007 Kenyan 
Presidential Election.” In the article, Onyebadi looks at newspaper coverage in 
the Kenyan election in order to determine whether they had an effect on the 
election.  By studying two of the major newspapers in Kenya, Onyebadi found a 
high and positive correlation between the issues the newspapers chose to focus 
on and what the voters considered their major concerns (Onyebadi 2012, 43).
Onyebadi’s work shows the importance newspapers can have on people’s 
attitudes.  This is especially important in Zambia and Malawi, where much of the 
debate over the genetically modified food aid being offered occurred in the 
newspapers.  It is hard to say whether the diversity of opinions expressed in the 
two major newspapers, The Post and the Times of Zambia, contributed to the 
confusion, or whether they were merely reflecting the already confused state of 
things.  Either way, Onyebadi has shown that newspapers can have an effect on 
public opinion by using their format to steer the public toward certain stories and 
away from others.  By emphasizing one story over another, newspapers exert a 
powerful effect on public opinion. 
One issue that needs to be addressed in looking at how much media can 
affect public opinion is level of access and ability to take advantage of that 
access.  In 2002 Zambia had a literacy rate of 69.1%.110  Malawi’s literacy rate 




was around 62%.111  This means that the majority of adults were capable of 
getting their news through the newspapers, if they had access.  This is important 
because of the extensive use I make of newspaper articles.  If the public never 
read the newspapers then they cannot be considered a factor in public opinion.  
In that case, they are only useful for the information I gathered from them, a not 
insignificant importance.  
In my time spent in Zambia and Malawi both during my formal field 
research and during the times I have visited Zambia for other reasons, I 
informally spoke to many people in both countries who indicated that news of the 
governments’ decisions was widely broadcast via radio.112  In a 2007 article 
Jacob Bor (2007) found that level of radio access played a large role in whether 
an individual considered AIDS an urgent national issue.  This is especially 
important when considering Zambia and Malawi, where the radio is still an 
important means of transmitting information to people. 
Another look at how media can sway public opinion in Africa is given in 
Catie Bailard’s 2016 article, “China in Africa: An Analysis of the Effect of Chinese 
Media Expansion on African Public Opinion.”  In the past decade or so, China 
has been making a concerted effort to expand its investment in Africa.  However, 
public opinion towards China and its efforts has not always been favorable, 
leading China to create a plan to increase its soft power through positive media 
attention.  Bailard (2016, 446) looks at this effort in order to discover whether it 
                                            
111 World Data Atlas, https://knoema.com/atlas/Malawi/Adult-literacy-rate (accessed October 26, 
2017) 
112 Rory Carroll. “Zambians Starve as Food Aid Lies Rejected.” The Guardian. October 16, 2002. 
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2002/oct/17/gm.famine1 (accessed October 31, 2017) 
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was successful by exploring correlations between media saturation and attitude 
towards China.  Bailard (2016, 462) concludes that China’s efforts have been 
successful in changing attitudes.   Bailard’s conclusion of success differs from 
Youde’s conclusion that is difficult to change minds on single issues. 
 
6.4 Evidence 
This section is akin to international pressures on Level I, but instead looks 
at pressures from the domestic side.  Like some of the players on Level I, not all 
of the players on Level II necessarily had the power to affect change, but were 
nevertheless vocal in their support or opposition to the idea.  Some of the 
protests were relatively easy and straightforward for the government to act on, 
such as putting in place legislation in order to protect the countries.  Others were 
much harder to respond to, such as public opinion and belief on what the food 
aid would do to the ecosystem and people’s health.  In those cases, there was a 
lot of confusion over what the truth was, and it was difficult for opposing civil 
society members, scientists, and opposition political leaders to counteract 
strongly held beliefs.  Finally, one other consideration was the state of the 
economy and agricultural sector in Malawi.  Because Malawi was in a different 
position than Zambia, they had an additional consideration. 
This section first discusses the problem with the lack of legislation, how it 
played into the decision, and how the problem was addressed.  It then explores 
two sections of public opinion.  The first is what was believed about the science 
behind genetically modified food, what was said, and why it was or was not 
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believed.  The next section of public opinion will relate what the public believed 
about the harms or benefits of genetically modified food.  Opposition by other 
politicians was also a component in Zambia and is discussed in the next section. 
Finally, the situation in Malawi will be explored to show how it became a much 
bigger factor in Malawi’s decision to accept the genetically modified food aid 
even in the face of concerns about its safety, possible damage to the 
environment, and the lack of legislation in place to protect themselves from it. 
6.4.1 Lack of Legislation 
One powerful internal consideration for both Zambians and Malawians 
was that they had no legal structure in place to regulate genetically modified 
organisms once they were in the country.  That meant that up to that point, 
companies could have imported genetically modified food to plant or sell without 
notifying the government of what they were doing.  Indeed, according to some, 
bio-engineered food was already being sold in the country.113  Without the 
legislation in place, both countries were at risk of permanently ruining their 
ecosystems in terms of trade with the EU.  Yet, it wasn’t until the genetically 
modified food aid was offered that it became a pressing concern.  For some, this 
presented a reason to reject the food entirely, while for others, it meant that they 
needed to quickly get legislation in place. 
In Zambia, the lack of legislation was a reason to reject the food aid.  
According to Doris Musonda, CEO for the National Biosafety Authority, “we didn’t 
113 Sheikh Chifuwe, “Sata Criticizes Government’s Rejection of GM Maize,” The Post, September 
12, 2002. http://allafrica.com/stories/200209120414.html (accessed August 16, 2017) 
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even have the legal framework to regulate or do anything about the GM 
materials. So the government felt it was safer to reject the maize in order to 
protect the country, and especially the biodiversity and seed, to be specific.114  In 
addition to protecting their ecosystem, Zambia felt they needed to give their 
farmers legal recourse should their crops become contaminated with genetically 
modified seed.115 
Some in Zambia were critical of the government’s lack of preparation in 
not already having passed a biosafety act.  Dr. Mwananyanda Mbikusita 
Lewanika said that the government should not have been caught with its pants 
down over the issue of food aid from the U.S. because they had had at least five 
years of being urged to pass protective legislation and had failed to do so, and 
were now paying for their lack of urgency.116  Dr. Lewanika, who was a 
researcher at the National Institute of Scientific and Industrial Research, urged 
the government to issue an interim administrative structure that could address 
GMO issues until a national biosafety framework was established.  He said, “The 
government should take steps that will lead to the development of national 
capacity to detect GMOs in food and foodstuff.”117 
When starting to draft a biosafety policy, members of the government 
looked at other countries for what they had done to protect themselves.  
114 Doris Musonda, Personal Interview, August 31, 2016, Lusaka, Zambia; see also Bivan 
Saluseki, “Lusaka Shouldn’t be Pushed Into Acccepting GMOs,” The Post, July 31, 2002. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200207310099.html (accessed August 11, 2017) 
115 Brighton Phiri and Webster Malido, “Government is Undecided Over GM Maize,” The Post, 
July 26, 2002  http://allafrica.com/stories/200207260327.html  (accessed August 15, 2017) 
116 Mwananyanda Mbikusita Lewanika, “After GM Food Aid, What Next?,” The Post, August 8, 
2002. http://allafrica.com/stories/200208080601.html (accessed August 16, 2017) 
117 Brighton Phiri, “U.S. Comes Under Attack Over GMOs,” The Post, August 13, 2002. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200208130100.html (accessed August 16, 2017) 
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Specifically, Zambians looked to the EU for their policy.  In October of 2002, the 
EU came out with more guidelines regarding GMOs.  The Zambian government 
hailed these new guidelines because they claimed it justified their decision to 
reject the genetically modified food aid.  However, they came under criticism for 
that.  Simon Zukas, National Chairman of the Forum for Democracy and 
Development, accused the government of lying to the people about what the 
report said.  He said, “We want government to be honest and transparent and not 
tell us lies.  Politicians sometimes can tell lies but not government."118  Mr. Zukas 
claimed that the EU had not banned GMO products as the government was 
claiming, but instead recommended that all nonorganic crops be labeled as such. 
Mr. Zukas then went on to say that this was why people were calling for 
President Mwanawasa to go, because he and his government were not doing 
enough to mitigate the suffering of starving Zambians.119 
Despite criticisms, in 2002 Zambia did recognize that GM technology was 
becoming more prominent and being used by more countries and that they 
needed to protect themselves.  In 2002 the government drafted a National 
Biotechnology and Biosafety Policy by holding a series of consultative meetings 
with a number of stakeholders.  The draft policy was then submitted to the 
Department of Science and Technology.  However, the Biosafety Act was not 
signed into law until 2007, long after the crisis had passed.120 
118 Larry Moonze, “Zukas Criticizes Levy for Refusing GMOs,” The Post, November 4, 2002. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200211040050.html (accessed August 16, 2017) 
119 Larry Moonze, “Zukas Criticizes Levy for Refusing GMOs,” The Post, November 4, 2002. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200211040050.html (accessed August 16, 2017) 
120 Bivan Saluseki, “Lusaka Shouldn’t be Pushed Into Acccepting GMOs,” The Post, July 31, 
2002.; see also Doris Musonda, Personal Interview, August 31, 2016, Lusaka, Zambia. 
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In Malawi, people in the government and in civil society were also keenly 
aware that there was no system of protection in place.  Tamani Nkhono Mvula of 
CISANET expressed the concern this way:   
…Our main concern at that time was that as a country, because this has 
just come, it’s an issue that we never thought we were going to come face 
to face with it. So the institutional framework was not there. We didn’t have 
policies, we didn’t have laws to manage issues of biosafety.121 
Yanira Ntupanyama agreed that there was no structure in place, and that Malawi 
needed to protect itself.122  However, in Malawi, this was not seen as a reason to 
reject the food.  Instead, the attitude was that they would accept the food and 
then quickly get a policy in place, to protect them in the future, not only in terms 
of protecting the ecosystem, but also in terms of protection against companies 
that might want to import GMOs, or from scientists who wanted to conduct trials 
on genetically modified seeds.123   
Unlike Zambia, Malawi was able to implement a policy very quickly.  By 
September of 2002, the National Biosafety Act existed.  Malawi had also looked 
to other countries for suggestions on what to put into the act.124  Though the act 
was not issued in time to cover the importation of the genetically modified food 
aid, Malawi felt that they were protected in future instances.125   
The lack of legislation was a problem for both countries, yet they reacted 
to the lack in very different ways.  Zambia used the lack of protective legislation 
as a reason to reject the genetically modified food aid and then went through the 
121 Tamani Nkhono-Mvula, Personal Interview, August 16, 2016, Lilongwe, Malawi. 
122 Yanira Ntupanyama, Personal Interivew, August 17, 2016, Lilongwe, Malawi. 
123 Tamani Nkhono-Mvula, Personal Interview, August 16, 2016, Lilongwe, Malawi. 
124 Boniface Mkoko, Telephone Interview, August 20, 2016, Lilongwe, Malawi. 
125 Yanira Ntupanyama, Personal Interivew, August 17, 2016, Lilongwe, Malawi. 
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process of drafting a biosafety act fairly slowly, whereas Malawi saw the offer of 
genetically modified food as a reason to act quickly and get legislation in place to 
protect themselves.  I posit that this was because, as will be seen in greater 
detail later in this chapter, Malawi had greater need of the food and thus needed 
to act quickly.  Zambia was in a better position and thus used the lack of 
legislation to act differently.  This was just one of the internal considerations both 
governments had to take into account as they made their decision. 
 
6.4.2 Public Opinion 
As has been shown, public opinion can be powerful, and in 2002 in both 
Zambia and Malawi there was great confusion in the public about whether 
genetically modified food was acceptable to eat or to plant.  Though I have not 
been able to find polls taken at the time, the interviews conducted, the 
newspapers of the time, and the many people I spoke with informally all indicate 
that the general feeling was and still is against genetically modified food.  This 
was in part due to traditionally held beliefs about how the food would affect health 
and fertility as well as what people were being told in the media.  Indeed, in the 
midst of the crisis the Regional Director for WFP Judith Lewis said in an interview 
that, "There is a great deal of disinformation, misinformation and lack of 
information regarding the GMO issue.”126 
This section will discuss what the public thought and what they were being 
told during the famine period of 2002.  The areas of concern in public opinion 
                                            
126 Staff Reporter , WFP Clears Air on GMO Food Issue,” Financial Gazette, August 14, 2002. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200208150482.html (accessed August 15, 2017) 
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are: matters to do with science, matters to do with health, and other 
miscellaneous concerns. 
6.4.2.1 Public opinion: Science 
Public opinion about the science of genetically modified food in some 
cases contradicted what the scientists were actually saying.  As was established 
in Chapter 5, many scientists were in favor of GMOs and saying so, saying that 
many of the beliefs being stated were false and not based on actual science.  
Nevertheless, the beliefs persisted.  Part of the issue was that the scientists did 
not have the time, the desire, or the ability to disseminate their information.  
According to Kingdom Kwapata, a biotechnology researcher, this is a common 
problem with scientists.  After clearing many hurdles, Dr. Kwapata is currently 
running trials for genetically modified cotton in Malawi, the first trial of its kind in 
the country.  According to him:  
Sometimes you, as a scientist, you derail from your whole objective in 
science and then you start focusing on managing the public aspects, 
politics, human relations and all of that, yeah? In order to bring people up 
to speed, but also to convince people that, you know, what we’re doing is 
absolutely safe. Yeah, so there’s a lot of resistance.127 
Not all scientists are willing for their projects to be derailed in order to 
educate the public.  This means that the public does not always hear directly 
from the people most likely to understand what is happening. 
Many reasons were given by various people for not wanting to accept the 
genetically modified food aid.  According to Ephraim Nyondo, the main GMO 
127 Kingdom Kwapata, Personal Interview, August 12, 2016, Lilongwe, Malawi 
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reporter for the Malawi Nation Newspaper, there were ethical reasons, with 
people believing that planting genetically modified seeds would make the land 
barren so that farmers would be unable to plant anything else.128  Scholastica 
Chidyaonga, Director of the Department of Disaster Management Affairs in 
Malawi, also recalls that that is the information the farmers had: “the government 
at the national level makes those decisions. But there hasn’t been any research 
on what GMO maize is like. But what I’d heard is that once you put in GMO 
maize you lose local varieties, you know?”129  Ms. Chidyaonga’s statement is 
interesting on several levels. First is her belief that there was no research on 
genetically modified maize.  This was untrue in 2002; there was plenty of 
research, though it was not conclusive.  Second, Ms. Chidyaonga, as a member 
of the government, is not well-informed about what the seeds would actually do, 
even today.  Lastly, the statement that it was the national government that would 
make those decisions reflects a powerlessness over the situation.  In 2002 Ms. 
Chidyaonga was not a member of government, and so had no power over the 
decision. 
Even those who were scientists were hearing very little good about 
genetically modified organisms.  According to Doris Musonda, now CEO for the 
National Biosafety Authority in Zambia, there was a great deal of negativity 
surrounding bringing in the genetically modified food aid:  
…when we started to know or to learn about the GM technology, or GMO 
as it was known at the time, technology, I think it was brought in with a lot 
of negativity. I don’t remember that time hearing much about anything 
positive except that it could increase yields, especially for crops, but apart 
128 Ephraim Nyondo, Telephone Interview, August 5, 2016, Lilongwe, Malawi 
129 Scholastica Chidyaonga, Personal Interview, August 11, 2016, Lilongwe, Malawi 
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from that time I do not remember…but I also considered it mostly 
negative, but I think the fear was about the dominator gene which could 
compromise the seeds in the country, because we were informed that if 
our GM crops were grown then and they cross-pollinated with our local 
varieties, that would be the end.130 
This negativity was especially reflected in the Zambian press.  Some were 
trying to fight against it, stating the positive effects.  Dr. Luke Mumba, then 
UNZA’s Dean of the School of Natural Sciences and now Vice Chancellor of 
UNZA, was one passionate advocate for getting rid of what he termed the 
“myths” surrounding GMOs.  In an article written in The Post in July of 2002, Dr. 
Mumba tried to educate the public in regard to the common beliefs about GMOs, 
trying to state the science in a way that would be understandable to the 
layperson.131  Dr. Mumba also gave interviews in which he tried to allay fears by 
pointing out that fears that genetically modified seed would damage the 
ecosystem.  Dr. Mumba said that the chances of the seed germinating were very 
low, and thus the risks posed to the Zambian ecosystem were negligible.132 
On the other side, the Times of Zambia published a series of editorials 
about the dangers of accepting the food aid.  In one editorial, the Editorial Board 
claims that, “even GMO backers know that its seed cannot gel [germinate] in 
these parts. They are pushing for Zambia to ‘just send the maize to millers and 
feed your hungry’ knowing full well even that exercise is not foolproof to prevent 
farmers from planting its forbidden seed and thereby mess up the country's soil 
130 Doris Musonda, Personal Interview, August 31, 2016, Lusaka, Zambia 
131 Luke Mumba, “Safety of GMOs,” The Post, July 29, 2002.
http://allafrica.com/stories/200207290123.html (accessed August 16, 2017) 
132 Brighton Phiri, “U.S. Comes Under Attack Over GMOs,” The Post, August 13, 2002. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200208130100.html (accessed August 16, 2017) 
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chemistry.”133  The editorial went on to decry those who were speaking in favor of 
accepting the food aid, and commended Minister Sikatana, the Minister of 
Agriculture who was outspoken in his defense of rejecting the food aid:  
And for those Zambians who've joined the bandwagon of saying "just eat 
since you don't invest in science and technology" it is a little too 
presumptuous.  The same people won't be there when the forbidden GMO 
seed causes anarchy in Zambian agriculture. By then the country would 
have been beaten back a great deal. Prevention is cheaper than cure and 
we commend Mr Sikatana's meticulously fulfilled stance against GMOs.134 
Other concerns about the scientific aspect of accepting the food were 
about who would benefit from the acceptance.  Professor Kazhila Chinsembu 
was concerned about who would win and who would lose with acceptance of the 
genetically modified food aid: “If we become excited over GM maize, we risk 
destroying the potential for sustainable food security.  By accepting GM maize, 
we are making ourselves perpetually dependent on seed from these multi- 
national corporations.”135    Pattrice Le-Muire Jones, coordinator of the Global 
Hunger Alliance, was also concerned about who would benefit: "In truth, the real 
winners are the seed/agrochemical companies like Monsanto and the animal 
agriculture corporations like Tyson.”136  I found no evidence that U.S. 
corporations like Monsanto and Tyson pressured Zambia or Malawi directly to 
accept the food.  However, lobbies for GM technology are strong in the U.S., as 
133 Editorial Board, “Opinion,” Times of Zambia, October 31, 2002. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200210310667.html (accessed August 16, 2016) 
134 Editorial Board, “Opinion,” Times of Zambia, October 31, 2002. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200210310667.html (accessed August 16, 2016) 
135 Brighton Phiri and Webster Malido, “Government is Undecided Over GM Maize,” The Post, 
July 26, 2002  http://allafrica.com/stories/200207260327.html  (accessed August 15, 2017) 
136 Staff Reporter, “Focus on GM Food Aid,” IRIN, July 2, 2002. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200207020658.html (accessed October 25, 2017) 
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can partially be seen by U.S. policy on GM technology, and thus the corporations 
were silent partners in U.S. pressure. 
  Finally, warnings were given against some scientists themselves who 
may have hidden agendas.  Though she does not name specific people, Emily 
Sikazwe, the Executive Director of Women for Change, warned in an interview 
that she was not going to name names, but wanted the Zambian people to 
remember that during World War II scientists were complicit in committing crimes 
against humanity; she went on to say, in reference to those scientists who were 
so opposed to the food aid: “I hope our local scientists are not being used to 
commit crimes against their own people."137 
6.4.2.2 Public opinion: Health 
This segment of public opinion is that having to do with health.  This 
subject was partially covered in Chapter 5, looking at what the scientists were 
saying about ill effects.  This segment will focus on what the public heard and 
believed.  There were two considerations here.  On one side were the rumors 
and beliefs about the harms genetically modified foods could bring to the human 
body.  On the other side was the fact that people were in danger of starving, 
something that is also injurious to one’s health. 
There were many beliefs floating around both countries about genetically 
modified food in 2002.  Some were traditional beliefs, that consuming GMOs 
137 Brighton Phiri, “U.S. Comes Under Attack Over GMOs,” The Post, August 13, 2002. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200208130100.html (accessed August 18, 2017) 
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would cause infertility.138  People also believed that genetically modified food 
contained toxic substances that only emerged after cooking.  This would result in 
mutations, cancers, immunodeficiencies, problems with reproduction, and 
deformities in children.139  Other rumors in Malawi included the belief that 
Americans did not actually eat the food themselves, that they instead gave it to 
their animals.  According to this belief, the food was fine for animals, but would 
cause problems if consumed by humans.140  All of this was compounded by the 
belief held by some that the food was another attempt to harm Africans by giving 
them poisonous food.  This tied back to the belief of the origin of HIV/AIDS in 
Africa, where it was believed that a doctor had been conducting experiments to 
give the disease to Africans in order to get rid of them.141  With all of these beliefs 
being propagated by different entities, it is little wonder that people were afraid to 
consume the genetically modified food aid being offered. 
Mrs. Beatrice Chola of Bwafwano was also concerned about giving 
genetically modified food to the almost 1000 people she helped feed every day.  
Many of the people she worked with were HIV positive.  In recalling a discussion 
she had with the WFP she said,  
The problem talking to the manager [is] how it is going to affect the 
children. But they said that the government said that they cannot go on 
with the food which is, which is genetically modified.  I said, you cannot 
because it will bring a lot of illness to the people.  Yeah, and if it is not 
taken care of there most of them are [HIV] positive, so maybe it can affect 
138 Ephraim Nyondo, Telephone Interview, August 5, 2016, Lilongwe, Malawi; see also Madalitso 
Mwale, Personal Interview, August 11, 2016, Lilongwe, Malawi 
139 Kennedy Choongo, “Political Watch: Establishing Safety of GM Maize,” The Post, August 2, 
2002. http://allafrica.com/stories/200208020057.html (accessed August 15, 2017); see also Doris 
Musonda, Personal Interview, August 31, 2016, Lusaka, Zambia 
140 Kingdom Kwapata, Personal Interview, August 12, 2016, Lilongwe, Malawi 
141 Kennedy Choongo, “Political Watch: Establishing Safety of GM Maize,” The Post, August 2, 
2002. http://allafrica.com/stories/200208020057.html (accessed August 15, 2017) 
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them more.142 
Despite her fears, Mrs. Chola remained willing to accept the genetically modified 
food because she felt that it was better to risk the kids getting sick in the future 
than to risk their lives in the present. 
One belief tried to take into account some of the evidence that genetically 
modified foods were not harmful to humans, at least in small quantities.  Dr. 
Wilkson Makumba pointed out that perhaps genetically modified food was safe 
for Americans, because they did not eat it in great quantities.  This was not true 
in either Zambia or Malawi, where people in both countries consume mealie 
meal, nsima, or nshima, a maize-based mush that is a staple three times a day.  
Mealie meal is ground up maize and is eaten at essentially every meal as a 
cheap way to fill stomachs.  Dr. Makumba believed that research had not been 
done on such massive consumption of genetically modified food, and so the 
science could not be relied upon and Africans were still in danger of harmful 
effects from the food.143 
However, efforts were made to counteract these rumors of harm.  Others 
insisted that there was no evidence that genetically modified food either hurt or 
killed humans.  They argued that most processed food already contained some 
traces of genetically modified food and had failed to make people sick, so why 
would genetically modified maize make people sick?144  These beliefs held by the 
public only added to the confusion about what the genetically modified food aid 
142 Beatrice Chola, Personal Interview, July 7, 2016, Chizanga Compound, Lusaka, Zambia 
143 Wilkson Makumba, Personal Interview, August 16, 2016, Lilongwe, Malawi. 
144 Tamani Nkhono-Mvula, Personal Interview, August 16, 2016, Lilongwe, Malawi. 
198 
would do. 
6.4.3 Government Officials 
In addition to what was happening with public opinion, in Zambia the 
government was facing opposition from other members of government.  
President Mwanawasa’s party was the Movement for Multiparty Democracy 
(MMD).  Two other political parties played (and still play) a large role in the 
government, the United Party for National Development (UPND) and the Patriotic 
Front (PF).  Though I found no evidence that the MMD criticized President 
Mwanawasa’s decision, the UPND and the PF both had members who were 
critical of the decision.  
The UPND was particularly critical of the government’s decision.  The 
leader of the party, Saqwibo Sikota, made a statement in direct contradiction of 
the government’s assertion that GM food was a health risk, telling the BBC’s 
Network Africa that there was no scientific evidence of this.145 
Japhet Moonde, UPND MP for Bweenga in the south of Zambia, was 
another of the members of government who was an outspoken critic of how the 
government handled the decision to reject the genetically modified food aid in 
Zambia.  In August of 2002, just before the final decision was announced, Mr. 
Moonde pointed out the severity of the problem in his constituency: "The hunger 
situation ravaging Zambia in general and Southern Province in particular needs 
145 Will Knight, “Zambia Bans GM Food Aid,” October 30, 2002, New Scientist, 
https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn2990-zambia-bans-gm-food-aid/ (accessed November 7, 
2017) 
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urgent attention and caution.  The debate going on as to whether or not to accept 
the GMO must come to an end. A decision should be made in one way or 
another on this matter."146  Mr. Moonde was also critical of what he termed the 
government’s casual approach to the problem, saying that they were treating it 
like it was an academic exercise rather than the crisis it was.  He accused the 
government of playing politics with the situation and being irresponsible with 
people’s lives.147 
The next month, after the government announced that they would reject 
the food aid, one of Mr. Moonde’s fellow UPND members, Vitalis Mooya, also 
went on the attack.  He claimed that people in his constituency were resorting to 
eating poisonous tubers in order to survive, which was just as bad as giving them 
genetically modified food to eat.  Mr. Mooya said that though the decision had 
been made, the government had failed to follow up with a viable alternative for 
feeding starving Zambians, because people in his constituency were in danger of 
dying from starvation.148   
Mr. Mooya’s statements did not go unchallenged.  In October, after he had 
claimed that three elderly people starved to death in his constituency, Mr. Mooya 
was arrested on charges of making false claims aimed at arousing public alarm.  
Under Zambian law, Mr. Mooya’s statements were an offense worthy of arrest.  
Mr. Mooya’s claims were in direct contradiction to the image President 
146 Webster Malido, “End GM Maize Debate Before People Start Dying—Moonde,” The Post, 
August 12, 2002. http://allafrica.com/stories/200208120659.html (accessed August 20, 2017) 
147 Webster Malido, “End GM Maize Debate Before People Start Dying—Moonde,” The Post, 
August 12, 2002. http://allafrica.com/stories/200208120659.html (accessed August 20, 2017) 
148 Speedwell Mupuchi, “MP Asks Government to Act Quickly on Hunger,” The Post, September 
8, 2002. http://allafrica.com/stories/200209090052.html  (accessed August 20, 2017) 
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Mwanawasa was trying to portray, that reports of starvation were greatly 
exaggerated, and according to reports, he ordered the arrest, though the police 
denied they were acting on political orders.  President Mwanawasa echoed his 
critics’ accusations in accusing them of playing political games with people’s 
lives.149  President Mwanawasa had just told his critics what they could expect if 
they continued their slander of his leadership. 
However, this did not stop the opposition to government policy, though the 
players who criticized were in the higher echelons of politics.  Michael Sata, 
founder of the PF and eventual President of Zambia, harshly criticized President 
Mwanawasa’s decision, saying that he should be held accountable.  Sata had a 
vested interest in being critical of Mwanawasa and the MMD, since he had 
broken with the MMD the year before in order to form the PF, and had been 
passed over for Mwanawasa as presidential successor by the previous president, 
Frederick Chiluba.  As Mr. Sata said of the crisis, “Government should not play 
with people’s stomachs.”  Sata claimed that the decision arose partially because 
MMD politicians were not starving themselves and out of touch with what was 
happening in compounds and rural areas.  In a twist of President Mwanawasa’s 
words, Mr. Sata claimed that he would personally eat genetically modified foods 
rather than die from starvation and that he did not understand what all the 
arguing was about, since Zambians had been eating bioengineered foods for 
years.  Mr. Sata even claimed that the food handed out in the 2001 election by 
the MMD in an effort to sway people’s votes came from the U.S. and was 
149 Staff Reporter, “Mwanawasa Cracks Down Over Food Crisis,” IRIN, October 9, 2002. 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200210090438.html (accessed August 21, 2017) 
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therefore genetically modified.  Finally, Mr. Sata asked that he government come 
up with a coherent policy position on GMOs instead of the political statements 
they had been making that were of no help to the people.150 
Guy Scott, a former Minister of Agriculture and also eventual President of 
Zambia, was equally critical of the government, calling their stance on genetically 
modified foods “overly paranoid.”  Mr. Scott also denounced those who were 
supporting the government in their decision, especially NGOs: “What we will see 
now is how many people die as a result of the disruption of the relief programme 
-- and how the various international NGOs that have spoken approvingly of the 
government's action will square the body count with their various 
consciences."151  
6.4.4 Country Position 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Malawi was in a different position than 
Zambia. Though both countries were poor, Malawi was in a worse position 
because recent events had combined to create a perfect storm of need. There 
were two areas in which Malawi was worse off than Zambia: poor decision-
making in terms of their food reserves, and poor relationships with the 
international community.  Much of the details about Malawi are pulled from a fact-
finding mission requested by Malawi and conducted by the WFP and Food and 
Agriculture Orgnanization (FAO) in May and June of 2002, a report from the 
150 Sheikh Chifuwe, “Sata Criticizes Government’s Rejection of GM Maize,” The Post, September 
12, 2002. http://allafrica.com/stories/200209120414.html (accessed August 16, 2017) 
151 Rory Carroll, “GM Food Refusal Sets Precedent,” Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), 
November 1, 2002. http://allafrica.com/stories/200211010493.html  (accessed August 17, 2017) 
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NGO ActionAid from June of 2002, and a report from the World Development 
Movement from October of 2002. 
Malawi is a heavily indebted poor country, or HIPC.  As such, it is often at 
the mercy of its international lenders, as well as other international institutions.  
As a HIPC,   Malawi was subject to the structural adjustment programs of the 
1990s like the Washington Consensus.  This entailed reducing subsidies for 
small farmers and the poor, removal of price control and regulation, and 
privatization of some government agencies, including the Agricultural 
Development and Marketing Corporation, which had been responsible for those 
subsidies and the distribution of food aid (Owusu and Ng’ambi 2002, 10-11).  
This one-size-fits-all approach to development, encouraged by the IMF and 
World Bank and backed by the U.S., had disastrous effects in Malawi.  Without 
price controls, the price of maize increased in the early 2000s and private grain 
traders hoarded supplies.  Owusu and Ng’ambi (2002, 11) contend that this 
helped fuel a culture of corruption amongst government officials.  These 
adjustments and the subsequent corruption that resulted led to a deterioration of 
the relationship between Malawi and international donors.  Eager to please their 
donors, when the IMF suggested in 2001 that Malawi sell off its Strategic Grain 
Reserve (SGR) in order to repay money that had been borrowed partially to build 
up and maintain the reserve, Malawi did as suggested.  Also at the suggestion of 
the IMF, Malawi sold the grain abroad rather than risk depressing maize prices 
by dumping the reserve on the Malawian market (ActionAid 2002, 10-11).   It is 
difficult to know the truth of what was happening.  Malawi insists that they 
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suffered from poor advice given by the IMF.  The IMF claimed that they had “no 
expertise in food security policy and we did not instruct the Malawi Government 
of National Food Reserve Agency [responsible for the SGR] to dispose of the 
reserves.” (Owusu and Ng’ambi 2002, 15)  However, this was later somewhat 
contradicted by the Managing Director of the IMF, when he admitted to giving the 
advice (Owusu and Ng’ambi 2002, 15). 
Whether it was poor advice from the IMF or a desire to please leading to 
misinterpreting what the IMF wanted, selling the grain was not enough to show 
real progress in Malawi, and the donors continued to withhold aid.  Because of 
the corruption and bad governance, the IMF withheld balance of payments 
support and the U.S., the UK, and the EU all suspended development assistance 
(ActionAid 2002, 14). 
The suspension of development assistance, especially by the U.S., is 
critical here.  When the crisis started, Malawi was already in a weak position with 
the U.S.  This meant that even the initial negotiations with the U.S. on Level I 
were bound to not be in Malawi’s favor.  Essentially, Malawi could demand 
nothing of a country that was already withholding other forms of aid.  As seen 
before, Malawi asked the U.S. to pay to have the food milled before bringing it 
into the country. This was an attempt at negotiating in order to expand their win-
set, but even this request was refused, though it meant that Malawi, a country 
already heavily in debt, would have to come up with an additional $20 million to 
pay for the milling themselves.152 
152 Staff Reporter, “Milling GM Food Aid Costs Malawi US$20 Million,” The Nation, September 11, 




 Internal considerations are an important part of the domestic level when 
looking at a two-level game. They have the potential to completely disrupt the 
game by raising issues and concerns with domestic negotiators and putting 
pressure on leaders to change their minds about what they had agreed to when 
negotiating with Level I.  This chapter has shown what the internal considerations 
for Zambia and Malawi were. They include the fact that there was no legislation 
in either country to protect them from biosafety issues with the genetically 
modified food aid. This would mean that they had no recourse against outside 
companies who wanted to flood the market with genetically engineered seed, nor 
would they be able to stop farmers who chose to plant those seeds. This was a 
powerful factor, yet the two countries reacted very differently to it.  Zambia used it 
as a reason to not accept the food and thus to narrow their win-set on Level II.  
Malawi, knowing their circumstances necessitated the acceptance of the 
genetically modified food aid, instead acted quickly to enact legislation that would 
protect them.      
Public opinion was another internal consideration.  As has been shown, 
there was a great diversity of opinions in the public with little consensus.  As with 
civil society, the lack of unity made for no power to sway the government either 
way. It cannot even be said that the government was paying attention to those 
who agreed with their position.  This meant that public opinion was not 
instrumental in either widening or narrowing the win-set for either government.  In 
addition, the attempts by Level I entities to affect public opinion through rhetoric 
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and statements issued by international public officials mentioned previously, 
were not sufficient to unite the public and give them one voice.  Reverberation, 
though attempted, was also not a force in this case. 
In Zambia the government had to contend with opposition from other 
political leaders.  This was especially important because a successful protest 
against the government’s actions by an opposing party leader could jeopardize 
the position of the president and his party in the next election.  This could have 
led to a narrowing of the win-set because the Zambian government would have 
been afraid of electoral repercussions.  However, the response of the Zambian 
government was to continue its campaign of articulating its position, and to try to 
shut down opposition from other political parties through intimidation, and on one 
occasion arresting an opposition politician for spreading misinformation. 
In Malawi, there was one more consideration that had to be taken into 
account.  Domestically, the country was in great disarray, with poor decisions 
about selling of their Strategic Grain Reserve and accusations of poor 
governance and corruption affecting the country’s relationship with donors.  This 
significantly decreased what they could demand from the U.S. and made 
bargaining a difficult proposition.  This, more than any other factor, appears to 
have been the decisive issue for Malawi. 
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTION 
7.1 Introduction 
In 2002, reaction against U.S. pressure, attitudes towards GMOs, and lack 
of protective legislation for GM technology successfully prevented the distribution 
of genetically modified food aid provided by the U.S. in Zambia, but not in 
Malawi.  This dissertation has sought to trace the events that happened, the 
attitudes that were prevalent at the time, and the major arguments for and 
against accepting the food aid using the framework of two-level game theory to 
incorporate both international and domestic explanations for the actions of the 
two countries.  The research question for the dissertation is: What were the 
forces and pressures at play in Zambia and Malawi in 2002 that caused them to 
make different decisions regarding the acceptance of genetically modified food 
aid? 
This chapter discusses the whole of the dissertation, with particular 
attention to how it answers the research question, how it achieved the objectives 
set forth in Chapter 1, the limitations of evidence, and the application of Putnam’s 
theoretical framework of two-level game theory.  The chapter ends by explaining 
the contributions the dissertation makes to the knowledge of different areas. 
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7.2  Objectives and Hypotheses 
The objectives of the study were as follows: 
1. To understand how the different decisions were made in 2002 as to
whether to accept genetically modified food aid from the U.S.
2. To understand how domestic and international pressures interacted to
move each country toward their decision.
3. To understand how competing interests fed the politics of the situation.
This section will discuss the objectives and hypotheses of the dissertation 
and how they were answered. 
The first objective of the dissertation was: To understand how the different 
decisions were made in 2002 as to whether to accept genetically modified food 
aid from the U.S.  This was done using a variety of sources. The first was to trace 
what happened by using the newspaper articles.  This showed what the thinking 
was as given by government officials and scientists, giving a day-by-day 
breakdown of the process. In addition, using newspaper articles from the time 
meant that direct quotes from government officials, scientists, civil society 
members, etc., could be used.  This is important because using direct quotes 
means making less interpretation of what officials were thinking and instead 
presenting a straightforward account.  In addition to the newspaper articles, the 
interviews conducted and presented helped show the process of decision-making 
in 2002 by speaking to people who were in a position to know what happened as 
well as the different factors that helped determine the outcomes for Zambia and 
Malawi. 
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This dissertation hypothesizes that there were three factors that led to the 
different decisions in Zambia and Malawi in 2002.  The first factor comes from 
Level I of Putnam’s game theoretical model, the international level.  There were a 
number of international institutions and countries that weighed in and influenced 
the decision of the two countries.  The first was the U.S.  As the main 
contributors of the food aid to the WFP, they were the most prominent developed 
country in the debate.  As such, representatives from the U.S. played a large role 
on Level I, dealing with negotiators from both Zambia and Malawi.  The U.S., 
Zambia and Malawi all had their win-sets, that is, the set of propositions under 
which they would accept a deal.  The U.S. win-set was simple: Zambia and 
Malawi accepted the food as is.  Zambia’s and Malawi’s win-sets were also 
initially simple: to get the U.S. to only send food aid that was non-GMO. 
In trying to guarantee their win-set, the U.S. representatives applied great 
pressure through rhetoric and criticism to Zambia and Malawi.  In Malawi, 
because of domestic constraints they already had, they were in no position to 
bargain, and eventually accepted the genetically modified food aid, on the 
condition that it be milled.  Malawi attempted to change its win-set by asking the 
U.S. to bear the expense of milling the grain, but was rebuffed.  In Zambia, 
matters were different.  Pressure from the U.S., which was really an attempt to 
change the game by persuading Level II, domestic groups and citizens within 
Zambia, that the food was good and should be accepted, made the Zambians 
suspicious of U.S. motives.  Members of government began to wonder why the 
U.S. representatives were trying to so hard to get the food accepted.  They 
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began to ask who was going to benefit and why.  This pressure from Level I 
caused negative reverberations and made the Zambians step away from the 
offer of genetically modified food aid and become defiant in the face of 
international criticism.   
This is one of the main areas of divergence between Zambia and Malawi.  
Malawi was not in a position to bargain, and due to aid cuts before 2002, were in 
an even more desperate situation because they could not even borrow money to 
buy maize.  In addition, they had sold their reserves in order to pay off debt, so 
also did not have reserves.  Zambia, though poor, felt it was in a better position 
to try to bargain, and used its suspicions about U.S. motives to reject the 
genetically modified food aid.   Thus, Level I negotiations and reverberations 
seem to have had more of an effect in Zambia than they did in Malawi. This is 
one of the ways this dissertation contributes to the knowledge on the subject of 
the 2002 decisions, by showing the different motivations and incentives each 
country had to make the decision they did. 
Other entities who applied pressure were the WFP, the WHO, and some 
NGOs like Greenpeace and ActionAid.  Each of these had their own point of view 
as to what Zambia and Malawi should do.  The WFP sought to remain neutral, 
while also being pragmatic that without the genetically modified food aid, they 
simply did not have enough food to distribute to stave off the famine in Southern 
Africa. 
The EU is a curious factor on Level I.  I hypothesized that fear of loss of 
trade with the EU would play a role in Zambia and Malawi’s decisions, and it did, 
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but not in the way I expected.  The EU was an indirect influence because, while 
its policies were part of the argument for rejecting the food aid, the EU itself did 
not enter the debate, and in fact was criticized by the U.S. and others for not 
taking a more active role and urging the southern African countries to accept the 
food.  Because of this lack of action, the EU’s role on Level I was both as 
important—in the sense that Zambia and Malawi feared loss of trade and used 
the EU as an example of not approving of GM technology—and not as 
important—in the sense that they made no threats of loss of trade—as I first 
assumed.  
The indirect influence of the EU points to new knowledge in regard to 
Putnam’s theoretical framework: international entities on Level I do not have to 
be directly involved in the game to have influence on the game.  This is an 
important addition that adds to the knowledge of how two-level games work.  Not 
only is it important to look at the immediate players of Levels I and II, it is also 
important to take into account other influences that are not so direct, but 
nonetheless powerful in affecting the game.  According to many statements given 
by government officials, civil society members, and others, the EU had an impact 
on the decision, but not because the EU was trying to influence the game.   
The second hypothesis comes from Putnam’s Level II, the domestic level.  
On the domestic level, the statesman who negotiated with Level I comes back 
with a tentative agreement, contingent upon domestic forces in the country 
approving it.  For this dissertation, there are two domestic factors. The first is civil 
society, which in the cases of Zambia and Malawi included most prominently 
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NGOs and the scientific community, as well as smaller players such as tribal 
chiefs and churches.  Though civil society is active in both countries, its influence 
is unclear.  Both countries had groups for and against accepting the food within 
their countries.  This domestic Level II factor can be important because civil 
society groups may have the ability to influence what happens in the negotiations 
with Level I.   However, influence is difficult to assess, especially in the cases of 
Zambia and Malawi.   The diversity of groups trying to have a voice made 
applying pressure problematic because there was a lack of unity in what they 
believed and what they wanted.  Also, civil society’s ability to influence a 
decision, especially a decision made in the highest levels of government, is 
limited.  Without influence over ratification of any deal struck with those on Level 
I, they were unlikely to affect the win-sets in Zambia and Malawi.   
However, the variety of opinions put forth by the civil societies in Zambia 
and Malawi also meant that those on Level I had great uncertainty about what 
would be agreed to.  This made trying to influence the game more difficult, 
because with such a diversity of opinion, it was difficult to say what would 
effectively influence the countries.  This uncertainty may have helped expand the 
win-sets of the countries.  Also, attempts by those on Level I such as the U.S. 
and the WFP to influence the domestic Level II were made more difficult because 
of the diversity and diffusiveness of civil society. 
As was said before, influence is difficult to assess, and especially so in the 
case of civil society.  The evidence is not conclusive either way.  Certainly there 
were groups who advocated for the result the countries eventually accepted, but 
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this does not mean that the decision was a result of civil society’s influence.  This 
is especially true because civil society was so far removed from where the 
decision was made. 
The third hypothesis is another domestic factor, internal considerations.  
According to Putnam (1988, 432), these may include legislators, political parties, 
and public opinion.  In Zambia and Malawi the internal considerations of Level II 
included all of these plus one more factor, the situation Malawi was in.   
Neither country was prepared for the possible effects of introducing GM 
technology into their country.  Both lacked legislation that would protect them.  In 
addition, public opinion was divided and diverse about what the effects of 
bringing the food aid would be.  Also, in Zambia, politicians from opposition 
parties were attacking the government for its decisions. 
Malawi had a greater concern than Zambia.  Its recent history of 
interference from the IMF and the World Bank gone wrong had led to further 
poverty, more borrowing from outside the country, and corruption and bad 
governance within the country.  These internal considerations meant that they 
were not in a position to demand anything of Level I negotiators, and indeed, 
they acquiesced to accepting the genetically modified food aid.  This is in part 
because there was one more important consideration in Malawi—people had 
already starved to death.  This consideration is the second reason for divergence 
between the two countries decisions. 
Internal considerations are important in two-level theory because they play 
into the negotiations between Level I and Level II.  The uncertainty and 
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unknowns of internal considerations make it difficult for Level I players to change 
the game by attempting influence.  Level I players may attempt to influence 
internal considerations, but the unpredictability of domestic politics and other 
factors make it difficult. 
Exploring the three hypotheses of the international and domestic factors 
allowed me to achieve both Objective 2 and Objective 3.  Objective 2 was: To 
understand how domestic and international pressures interacted to move each 
country toward their decision.  This is an especially important objective because 
it ties into the theoretical framework of the dissertation.  On the international 
level, Zambia was concerned about what the GM crops would do to trade with 
the EU, and on the domestic level, it was concerned about the potential damage 
to its ecosystem and people.  In addition to concern about trade with the EU, 
Malawi had to contend with its poor relationship with the international community 
on the international level, and on the domestic level it was concerned about the 
starvation of its people versus the potential damage to the ecosystem.  This 
dissertation has shown that, though each country placed emphasis on different 
factors, both had domestic and international concerns.  This is another area this 
dissertation emphasizes that other works on the subject have not.   
Objective 3 was: To understand how competing interests fed the politics of 
the situation.  This objective was fulfilled through all of the hypotheses as well.  
Looking at Level I allowed me to see the conflicting interests of the U.S. and EU 
and how their conflict spilled over into Zambia and Malawi.  In addition, the 
evidence from Level I shows the differences in objectives between the U.S., WFP 
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on one hand and Zambia and Malawi on the other.  Looking at Level II 
illuminated the conflicts within the countries that were pushing for and against 
acceptance of the genetically modified food aid.  Civil society was active, but its 
influence was blunted by confusion and debate and the lack of institutional 
channels for such influence.  These competing interests influenced the decisions 
in both countries. 
7.3 Assessment of Sources 
The nature of sources is critical to the effectiveness of a study, and I 
strove to find the best sources available to understand the situation in both 
countries.  One difficulty that might have been solved given a lot more time and 
money was that there was no official documentation from either Zambia or 
Malawi.  This means that I was not privy to the actual negotiations or discussions 
that occurred both between the U.S. and the countries and within the countries 
themselves.  The lack of access to meeting minutes also meant that I was only 
able to assess the public statements of officials.  What was said behind closed 
doors might have been very different and changed the conclusion.  This is why it 
was important to speak to as many people who were involved as possible, to 
strengthen the argument of which factors were important in the decisions. 
The delineation of stages in the negotiation process was another area 
where difficulty in accessing sources was made harder.  I was unable to access 
meeting minutes for the governments in Zambia and Malawi and for the 
discussion at USAID and the WFP.  Having those minutes would have made 
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process tracing much easier because it would have allowed me to create a 
timeline.  The exact stages of negotiation were impossible to show with evidence 
I had available.  Being able to show the stages of negotiation would have 
strengthened the use of the theory by being able to show exactly how 
reverberations worked through showing the pressures as they occurred and as 
Zambia and Malawi responded to them.  However, I feel that I was partially able 
to make up for this lack by using newspapers and interviews to trace the public 
statements of U.S. and international officials, and in turn the reactions by Zambia 
and Malawi.  So, while the minutes would have strengthened the argument, lack 
of them does not represent a critical failure in this dissertation. 
7.4 Implications and Contribution 
This dissertation has contributed to knowledge in several areas, from 
general areas to specific ones.  The first is the understanding of the power 
imbalance between the developed and developing world and how that plays out 
in real situations.  This is an important area in International Relations scholarship.  
Zambia and Malawi both came from a position of weakness, and this showed in 
how their individual games played out with the U.S. and other international 
institutions.  Developing countries often face this situation when dealing with 
international institutions, and this dissertation shows that the story of how each 
country responds is complex and varied.  Though perhaps nothing can be done 
about power imbalances, this dissertation adds to the literature of how countries 
are affected by the imbalances that exist in the international system, specifically 
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in terms of the developing and developed worlds.  This dissertation addresses a 
weakness in the literature of how power dynamics play into the decisions of 
developing countries. 
The second area is a contribution to the debate on GMOs and the 
developed world’s influences, responsibilities, and obligations to the developing 
world when it comes to GM technology.  Both the U.S. and the EU could have 
made the situation easier for Zambia and Malawi, the U.S. by removing the food 
or agreeing to bear the cost of milling it, though they were unlikely to do so 
because it would have required a change in how U.S. food aid is distributed.  The 
EU could have helped by more actively entering the debate and assuring 
Zambians and Malawians that there were ways to work around them accepting 
the food aid, by making sure the food was milled or ensuring that if protections 
were put in place crops from Zambia and Malawi would have remained 
acceptable to the EU.  This study has greatly added to the knowledge base of the 
implications of the GM technology debate for the developing world. 
One of the reasons this dissertation is important is that it studies two 
specific countries, but the theoretical framework used also allows for the lessons 
learned about international pressure and domestic concerns to be applied to 
other developing countries in similar circumstances.  These lessons include the 
fact that while countries may seem to be in similar situations and could thus be 
expected to make the same decision, in fact small differences can have a big 
impact.  Zambia and Malawi were both poor in 2002, but the nature of their 
poverty impacted their decision.   The dissertation also addresses a weak place 
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in the literature of understanding how GMOs are being received in the developing 
world, and how the developed world’s attitude affects this.  It is very important to 
understand because the GMO debate continues and countries are still being 
affected by it.   
It is important to understand the reasons behind all the actors’ decisions 
because understanding the reasons might change the actions of the international 
community, particularly the U.S.  The U.S., as players on Level I, tried to change 
the game by attempting to persuade Zambians and Malawians of the health and 
safety of the genetically modified food aid.  In Zambia, these attempts at 
influence caused negative reverberation and backfired for the U.S.  
Understanding that this reverberation was part of the motivation of the Zambians 
for rejecting the food has implications for how the U.S. could approach a similar 
situation differently in the future, though making changes to the food distribution 
process would necessitate a revision of U.S. food aid policy.  And it is entirely 
possible that this situation will happen again.  Africa is still subject to droughts, 
bad governance, corruption, and thus famine.  Many of the countries still greatly 
fear GM technology.  All of the elements exist for almost precisely the situation of 
2002 to occur again.  This makes it critical for the U.S. to understand its role in 
the decisions of 2002.  
Though the famine and decisions that inspired this dissertation happened 
15 years ago, the concerns about GM technology are still alive and well in 
Zambia, Malawi, and other African countries.  In Malawi, there are limited genetic 
modification trials happening, especially in the areas of Bt Cotton and cowpea, 
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but, according to Kingdom Kwapata, the principal investigator of the Bt Cotton 
trials, the mood in Malawi is still fearful and though trials of nonfood items may be 
allowed, any trials approaching food are still prohibited.153  Likewise, Doris 
Musonda of the National Biosafety Authority in Zambia—the office created by the 
biosafety legislation discussed in Chapter 6—when pressed as to whether 
Zambia would accept genetically modified food aid should another crisis situation 
arise, said that the National Biosafety Authority would recommend that the food 
be accepted, on the condition that it be milled first so it could not be planted.154  
All of this means that the lessons learned from this dissertation, including a 
country’s relative position on the world stage, as well as its reactions to pressure, 
are very important to understand. 
The third area of knowledge that this dissertation contributes to is 
comparing and contrasting the two stories to look for lessons.  One of the major 
lessons is that both international and domestic considerations are critical to an 
understanding of the topic, but that, though countries may be similar, they may 
react entirely differently given the same situation.  Zambia and Malawi faced the 
same situation in that they were both subject to the same drought and 
subsequent limitations of food supply.     
The final area extends from the third one, and that is the contribution to 
two-level game theory.  Two-level game theory has not been applied to these 
specific situations before, but helped explain what happened and why.  This 
application helped both the understanding of the situation and improved the 
153 Kingdom Kwapata, Personal Interview, August 12, 2016, Lilongwe, Malawi. 
154 Doris Musonda, Personal Interview, August 31, 2016, Lusaka, Zambia 
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knowledge of how two-level game theory can be used in different situations.  In 
addition, as previously discussed, this dissertation has added to the complexity of 
two-level game theory by showing that not all players have to be actively playing 
the game in order to have an influence on it.  The EU is an example of this.  
There are several areas stemming from this study that would benefit from 
further research.  The first was mentioned in Chapter 3 and has to do with 
selection bias.  With more time, it would be useful to study the decisions of 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe to see how each of them made their decision and 
how the decision-making process plays into two-level game theory.  This would 
allow for a fuller description of what happened, eliminate any selection bias, and 
leads to the next area for further study, and that is how GM technology is 
spreading in the developing world, and what the implications are for its spread.  
This subject has been partially addressed by this dissertation, but merits further 
attention because of the implications for both the developed and developing 
world.  Following on with this subject, further study is needed on how the differing 
attitudes and regulations of the U.S. and EU towards GM technology is affecting 
the rest of the world.  This is a large subject and needs to be researched further 
in future studies. 
Using two-level game theory emphasizes that there are multiple sides to 
decision-making in countries, and that one must look at both the international 
level and the domestic level to understand it.  But the theory goes further than 
that, because it also explores the interplay between the two-levels, largely 
through reverberation and win-sets.  Knowledge of these mechanisms of 
220 
decision-making and attempted influence add nuance and complexity to the 
discussion of how the decisions in Zambia and Malawi were made, adding 
greatly to the knowledge of these decisions. 
APPENDIX A 
IRB-APPROVED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
A.1 Survey Instrument- Policymakers
The questions below are suggestive. Depending on their position at the time, not every 
interviewee will be able to speak with the same knowledge and authority. Some of these 
questions may not be posed and the interviewee might take the conversation in a 
different direction--raising new questions altogether.   
Potential questions for interviews with policymakers 
Background 
1. What was your position at the time of the decision?
2. What were your subsequent positions? (If it's easiest to provide me with your
CV, please feel free)
3. What were your perceptions of the effectiveness of food aid in your country
prior to 2002?
a. Did your perception of food aid play a role in your decision?
Decision 
4. How was the decision made?
a. What sort of meetings were held?
b. If a member of Parliament, were you consulted?
c. What do you feel were the primary reasons for the decision?
5. On what level was the decision made? Was it voted on in Parliament? Was it a
Cabinet decision?
a. Who did the research on the scientific aspect?




7. Was there pressure coming from organizations outside the government?
a. NGOs?
b. The scientific community?
c. Farmers’ or Growers’ Associations?
d. Other organizations?
8. Did you feel pressure from the U.S. or EU?
Discussion 
9. Was there talk of future consequences or opportunities if you went one way or
the other? What possibilities were discussed?
10. Was there a discussion of possible consequences from the U.S.?  If so, what
was the discussion?
11. Was there a discussion of possible consequences from the EU?  If so, what
was the discussion?
12. Were you concerned about future Zambia(Malawi)-U.S. relations?  If so,
what were the concerns?
13. Were you concerned about future Zambia(Malawi)-EU relations?  If so, what
were the concerns?
14. Was there a discussion about what would happen to the people who needed
the food aid? If so, what was the discussion?
Consequences 
14. Has there been a change in Zambia(Malawi)-U.S. relations?  If so, what are
the changes?
15. Has there been a change in Zambia(Malawi)-EU relations? If so, what are
the changes?
Other 
16. Any other comments?
17. Do you know of any official sources that I could get access to? Meeting
minutes, scientific papers read, official decisions, etc.?
18.Do you know of anyone else I should speak to?
18.May I use your name when I contact potential sources?
Pressures 
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A.2 Survey Instrument- Farmers’ Associations
The questions below are suggestive. Depending on their position at the time, not 
interviewee will be able to speak with the same knowledge and authority. Some 
of these questions may not be posed and the interviewee might take the 
conversation in a different direction--raising new questions altogether.   
Potential questions for interviews with Farmers’ Associations 
Background 
1. What does your association do?
2. How large was your association at the time of the 2002 decision?
3. If you had a position on what your government should do prior to the decision
being made, what was that position and why did you hold it?
4. What were your perceptions of the effectiveness of food aid in your
country prior to 2002?
Decision 
5. Did you know the decision was going to be made before it was made?
6. If so, were you privy to any of the conversation?
7. Did you feel you had any say in the decision?
8. How were you informed of the decision?
9. Did you consult anyone else regarding the impending decision?
10. Do you agree with the decision made?
Pressures 
11. Did you have any pressure coming from individual farmers?
12. Did you have any pressure coming from others?
13. Did you try to apply pressure to the government to sway their decision one way
or the other?
14. If so, describe your efforts.
Consequences 
15. Have things changed in any significant ways since the decision was made?
16. If the same situation was happening again, what would you advise?
Other 
17. Any other comments?
18. Do you know of any official sources that I could get access to? Meeting
minutes, scientific papers read, official decisions, etc.?
19. Do you know of anyone else I should speak to?
20. May I use your name when I contact potential sources?
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A.3 Survey Instrument- NGO workers
The questions below are suggestive. Depending on their position at the time, not 
every interviewee will be able to speak with the same knowledge and authority. 
Some of these questions may not be posed and the interviewee might take the 
conversation in a different direction—raising new questions altogether.   
Potential questions for interviews with NGO Workers 
Background 
1. What does your organization do?
2. How large was your organization at the time of the 2002 decision?
3. How many workers did you have on the ground in 2002?
4. If you had a position on what the government should do prior to the decision
being made, what was that position and why did you hold it?
5. What were your functions in relation to food aid/food security at the time?
6. What were your perceptions of the effectiveness of food aid in your
country prior to 2002?
Decision 
7. Did you know the decision was going to be made before it was made?
8. If so, were you privy to any of the conversation?
9. Did you feel you had any say in the decision?
10. How were you informed of the decision?
11. Did you consult anyone else regarding the impending decision?
12. Do you agree with the decision made?
Pressures 
13. Did you have any pressure coming from individuals?
14. Did you try to apply pressure to the government to sway their decision one way
or the other?
15. If so, describe your efforts.
Consequences 
16. Have things changed in any significant ways since the decision was made?
17. If the same situation was happening again, what would you advise?
Other 
18. Any other comments?
19. Do you know of any official sources that I could get access to? Meeting
minutes, scientific papers read, official decisions, etc.?
20. Do you know of anyone else I should speak to?
21. May I use your name when I contact potential sources?
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A.4 Survey Instrument- Scientists
The questions below are suggestive. Depending on their position at the time, not 
interviewee will be able to speak with the same knowledge and authority. Some 
of these questions may not be posed and the interviewee might take the 
conversation in a different direction—raising new questions altogether.   
Potential questions for interviews with scientists 
Background 
1. What was your position at the time of the decision?
2. What were your subsequent positions? (If it’s easiest to provide me with
your CV, please feel free)
3. If you had a position on what the government should do prior to the decision
being made, what was that position and why did you hold it?
4. What were your functions in relation to food aid/food security at the time?
5. What were your perceptions of the effectiveness of food aid in your
country prior to 2002?
Decision 
6. Did you know the decision was going to be made before it was made?
7. If so, were you privy to any of the conversation?
8. Did you feel you had any say in the decision?
9. How were you informed of the decision?
10. Did you consult anyone else regarding the impending decision?
11. Do you agree with the decision made?
Pressures 
12. Did you have any pressure coming from individuals?
13. Did you try to apply pressure to the government to sway their decision one way
or the other?
14. If so, describe your efforts.
Consequences 
15. Have things changed in any significant ways since the decision was made?
16. If the same situation was happening again, what would you advise?
Other 
17. Any other comments?
18. Do you know of any official sources that I could get access to? Meeting
minutes, scientific papers read, official decisions, etc.?
19. Do you know of anyone else I should speak to?
20. May I use your name when I contact potential sources?
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A.5 Survey Instrument- Civil Servants
The questions below are suggestive. Depending on their position at the time, not 
interviewee will be able to speak with the same knowledge and authority. Some 
of these questions may not be posed and the interviewee might take the 
conversation in a different direction--raising new questions altogether.   
Potential questions for interviews with Civil Servants 
Background 
1. What was your position at the time of the decision?
2. What were your subsequent positions? (If it's easiest to provide me with
your CV, please feel free)
3. If you had a position on what the government should do prior to the decision
being made, what was that position and why did you hold it?
4. What were your functions in relation to food aid/food security at the time?
5. What were your perceptions of the effectiveness of food aid in your
country prior to 2002?
Decision 
1. Did you know the decision was going to be made before it was made?
2. If so, were you privy to any of the conversation?
3. Did you feel you had any say in the decision?
4. How were you informed of the decision?
5. Did you consult anyone else regarding the impending decision?
6. Do you agree with the decision made?
Pressures 
7. Did you have any pressure coming from individuals?
8. Did you try to apply pressure to the government to sway their decision one way
or the other?
9. If so, describe your efforts.
Consequences 
10. Have things changed in any significant ways since the decision was made?
11. If the same situation was happening again, what would you advise?
Other 
12. Any other comments?
13. Do you know of any official sources that I could get access to? Meeting
minutes, scientific papers read, official decisions, etc.?
14. Do you know of anyone else I should speak to?
15. May I use your name when I contact potential sources?
APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS: ZAMBIA 
B.1 Richard Chanda
Dr. Richard Chanda, Lead Scientist, Seed Certification and Control Institute 
Protea Hotel, Lusaka, Zambia, 8-23-16 
MB: Ok, so you’re Richard Chanda 
RC: Yes 
MB: And what is your position currently? 
RC: I’m the acting principal research officer of the Seed Control Certification 
Institute 
MB: And what is your background? 
RC: My background in terms of work history and so on.  After I finished my first 
degree with the University of Zambia I worked as an agronomist with Zambia 
Sugar. And I think I was in charge of about 500 hectares of cane, ensuring that 
it’s growing nicely, and the proper yield and qualities that would be fed into the 
factories. And then at the time I was done with sugar, the conventional ratio was 
8 tons of cane to 1 ton of sugar. Yes, then from there, the job was routinized 
basically, because when they cut cane, it becomes more routine. And so I think 
the company was not allowing me to go for studies at that time. Thus I joined a 
private company, Steelco was part of a group of companies. That was held, the 
owners were the Indians…[irrelevant chatter]. That’s where I worked for some 
time.  I was laid off and at that time I decided to join the government.  So I was 
hired as Seeds officer and since that time I have been raised to Senior Seeds 
Officer and I was attached to the section that is involved in variety registration 
and testing limit section. 
MB: Ok 
RC: And over time, they, we have evolved to the extent that we have also 
attached other duties, now we can do protection because we have the Plant 
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Breeders’ Rights Act. So now are also administering the Plant Breeders’ Rights 
variety registrations and protection and testing. 
MB: Ok. Plant Breeders’ rights act. Ok, and what was your position in 2002? 
RC: Ah, can I remember in 2002?  Yes, in 2002 I was seeds officer. 
MB: Ok. So, were you involved in any way in the decision as to whether to accept 
or reject genetically modified? 
RC: No I was not involved at that time. 
MB: Ok, what do you know about that decision? 
RC: What I know about the decision and the contact that I had at that time when, 
it’s like when the late President Mwanawasa said we didn’t need GMOs there 
was a lot of noise, others for, others against, and the person who talked to me 
personally, he was amongst the team that was identified to do a study to the 
U.S.A.  I don’t know which city they visited, but he told me they were going to the 
U.S.A. to learn more about GMOs. 
MB: And the conclusion of that team was that GMOs were dangerous? 
RC: Ummmm, according to, if my memory gets me correct, I think the talk at that 
time was to follow the Cartagena Protocol, which talks about the precautionary 
principle.  
MB: Mmhmmm. Ok 
RC: Implying that we need to be, we need to apply precaution, that was it, 
implying that it was not a definite no, nor a definite yes, but precautions can only 
be done when the person has accepted that all issues he has raised have been 
cleared. If they haven’t been cleared, he will not. 
MB: Ok, I understand that. 
RC: So that’s it. 
MB: Ok. Did you know that the decision was going to be made before it was 
made? 
RC: I didn’t know. 
MB: You didn’t know. Ok, and who’s the person you were referring to on the 
committee, on the team, what’s his name? 
RC: The one who supervises me, at my working place? 
MB: Mmmm 
RC: Is Dr. Francisco Metye. 
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MB: Ok. Ok. Let’s see. What do you think were the main reasons for rejecting the 
GM maize? 
RC: In my own view I think the main reasons that, this I discovered after time, 
after study, just thinking, is because of the information.  And I would say it’s us 
scientists who are to blame. Because when you for example, are breeding, and 
come up with a good variety, it’s me who knows the details of what I’ve done to 
that. Now when I come to the market instead, I need to be careful to transmit 
information. So they’re so sure, companies that think of us, and in every situation 
whenever there is a crisis that has happened, it’s not the technical or the 
normality or the theoretical, if there’s social issues that come in, it overrides.  For 
example, you can have a situation where I’ve got a plot, and somebody has 
encroached and for example he has built up a structure and he has a family.  
And the court rules that it’s my property and I need to bring it down.  Finally I’ll 
bring it down. Now, the social component of it is going to raise more dust than 
the legality. And everybody say, how can he do such a thing, he’s got no human 
heart, blah blah, all those things.  So the moment the GMOs started into the 
social, just know now that there is confusion that arises. 
MB: So you think that the social is that people believed it was bad for them? 
RC: Yes, and people talk about, no, how can you take genes from a fish and put 
it into maize, and also the reactions to this and that and that 
MB: So they were given both not enough and too much information? 
RC: That’s it. 
MB: Yeah, yeah. But why, so I was just in Malawi doing research and their 
argument was that people were going to starve, now isn’t that another social 
issue that should have come into play? 
RC: That would have been a social issue that could have come into play, but in 
the worst case scenario, when you look at the national reserve, because he was 
the President so he has information at that time about food security, and other 
options that are available to him. But thereafter we never heard of any report that 
because we made this decision that that happened. 
MB: Ok. 
RC: Yes. 
MB: And what about, was milling an option, was that an option that was 
considered?’ 
RC: I think that was an option that was considered. Later on there was talk to, 
should we bring in grain, or should we bring in milled? But I think form what I 
heard what was more preferable was grain, I mean was in powder form, than in 
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grain, because they said in grain people may decide to plant and that is going to 
create more work. So milling it was more better.   
MB: But they decided, even milled it was not going to work. Because it would 
make people sick is what they believed. 
RC: Exactly. The challenge that you have is when the head of health says no, 
even if he has said no, only for this particular, it is, there are all those people who 
tend to ignore the information, for whatever reason. As soon as they hear it’s the 
president who said it, even they will start moving up and down. 
MB: Did you agree with the decision? 
RC: At that time I agreed. 
MB: K 
RC: But what I accepted is that it was never said, not GMO research 
MB: They didn’t ban GMO research. 
RC: No, it was not clearly put. But personally and scientifically my view was we 
weren’t in control of GMOs, to detect whether GMOs were coming into the 
country. So we weren’t in charge.  So for me, I think that when you are doing 
research you are being defensive when you say no, and you are doing quality 
control, but you are also having an opportunity to respond, in the event that they 
find. So and in our findings, when you as a scientist you find that GMOs do not 
have these reactions, I say ok fine, in my own research I have reactions, 
therefore I have now counteracted yours. And subsequently we have two 
conflicting ideas, then you have to come together to come to consensus on what 
is true. 
MB: Now, there is a drought in Zambia now, so it is possible that Zambia will be 
in the same position it was in 2002. What would you advise now? 
RC: No, currently yes we have a drought, but we have declared that we will have 
enough food. 
MB: Ok then let us speak hypothetically.  Let us say that the drought continues 
and you run out of maize. What would you advise now? 
RC: What would you advise, hmmm. 
MB: As an expert in your field. 
RC: Since you have asked me hypothetically I will answer hypothetically. To use 
what we have experienced this year as a basis to what the future is, then the 
answer will be different. Because, I’m saying this because even people who have 
come from Zimbabwe and Malawi, they confirm that Central Africa has a drought, 
but Zambia has excess maize. 
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MB: That’s amazing 
RC: Yes and that’s why at some point maize was being exported to Malawi and 
to, to, to Zimbabwe. The government offloaded the maize that it had in FRA to try 
to push the price of mealie meal, because that was the outcry at that time.  
However,  
MB: This happened this year? 
RC: However, it looked like some millers, instead of doing what they agreed, 
started exporting the maize. 
MB: So then that could cause a shortage here? 
RC: So it means that here we had enough to feed ourselves. We have enough to 
feed ourselves. Now, if you ask yourself, how did Zambia come up to this? It’s 
because last year there was a prayer that was made.  Yes. So it implies that if 
our having adequate, we have realized that we cannot solve this and God has 
helped us, it means even this year we can do the same and God will still answer 
us. 
MB: Ahhh 
RC: So, it means in the future, it will not happen 
MB: Ahhh. 
RC: So if you are going to the bible, I’m assuming you read the bible. 
MB: Yes 
RC: There was a dream that came before Pharaoh, and he was told you were 
going to have five years of lean, and five years of what?> 
MB: Plenty. 
RC: Yes, so it’s this component that we lack in our government system. Implying 
that if you read Romans chapter 13, every authority that is here is distinct by 
God, it’s God that put it there. But the challenge that we have is that this authority 
does not ask God, such that when the dream comes to say, the next 3 years you 
are going to have a bumper harvest, but there is no guarantee that it will 
continue, so prepare for it. We do not have that. 
MB: Ahhh. Ok. 
RC: And this is why God has demonstrated for the country of Zambia that when 
you pray, yes, things may still be bad, but it will not be as bad as if you didn’t 
pray. 
MB: Ok. Ok. Alright. 
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RC: Yes. Paul was going to another place and had a shipwreck, but God told him 
that no, you are going to suffer loss, but no one is going to die.  So let’s assume 
that hypothetically we had a drought, we have several options that are open for 
us which we can do against that drought. And the several options we looked at 
what is available.  What we can better do is to make sure people are informed. 
What is key is for people to make decisions from the information that they have.  
When you have a lack of information, then you have people being manipulated 
here and there. So the key point here is that we set up structures that are going 
to be informing people of what they are going to receive.  So in the even that you 
are at the point of dying, it triggers the issue of survival. You have heard of 
people that are in plane crashes, and because of the desire to survive, they start 
eating other people. And that case came before the court when they were 
discovered. And the judge just said no, in that situation, the present precarious 
situation. So the mode of survival comes in, and when the mode of survival 
comes in, the judgments are subdued. 
MB: Ok.  So if it came to true survival... 
RC: If it came to true survival, that’s when the mode comes in.  In that case you 
can even eat a dog, a chicken, whatever comes in.   
MB: Or GM maize 
RC: Exactly, if I eat a dog, the Chinese eat dog, so what makes me think I will 
die? That’s then the…start flowing in. For GMOs you ask yourself, which 
countries have brought in GMOs? Have they died? No, so why should I think I 
will die? But for you to compare you need to have information. For example now 
we can ask ourselves, which country has accepted GMOs, and then we should 
follow the statistics. It’s from there that now you can infer to say, if it has 
happened to them, if it doesn’t’ happen, why should it happen to me? So you use 
inference. And for us to use inference, we need information.  Then it’s what my 
heart tells me to do now, that’s what I will do. 
MB: Because there’s still, even 14 years on, most people believe that it’s bad. 
RC: Yes 
MB: What do your studies tell you? 
RC: My research, I have never carried out research here in Zambia, so what I 
know is published research, and people can say, maybe this is propaganda, and 
so on. And that’s why me I say, when you do your own research, you are far 
better off.   Because if I expose this to the people who are the so-called, these 
individuals who are against, they will say oh it is just sponsored by this, they just 
want to convince us. 
MB: So do you see any softening in the government's position towards 
233 
genetically modified food? 
RC: There is nothing that stands forever.  
MB: OK.  
RC: Yeah.  
MB: Are they a little more favorable than they were? 
RC: The moment we set everything right as scientist we start speaking nicely to 
them, we address their concerns, then we start speaking together. Once they 
become part of the solution what should make them against? So we should, 
then, it's not like we're working in isolation. We should work together with them, 
they are our bosses, so they should tell us what to do. When they have 
information what will make them to say no? There is nothing forever, everything 
comes and goes. 
MB: True 
RC: Everything comes and goes. 
MB: Yes, it's very true. 
RC: We were a one party state for a long time. Yes, for 27 years, and things 
changed. 
MB: Because everything changes. 
RC: Yes. 
MB: OK. Any other comments? 
RC: No, there are no other comments, except to say that I'm happy you were 
carrying out this research and I wish you the best. 
MB: Thank you. 
NEW RECORDING BECAUSE THE CONVERSATION CONTINUED 
MB: Were a lot of these acts passed because of the situation in 2002? Was there 
any regulatory structure before that? 
RC: There were no regulatory structures before that decision in terms of, for the 
biosafety. Yes, but I know that something was happening underground. 
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MB: OK, so they were kind of anticipated what was going to happen? 
 
RC: Yes. When I joined the seed Control certification Institute in 1999 I found it 
there.  
 
MB: Ah, it already existed. 
 
RC: Yes it already existed there everything was formulated. We even engage the 
lawyer and were involved in this, but you know, I don't know for whatever reason, 
when you take it to the legal section, it takes a long time. So I believe that the 




RC: So that like even the Plant Breeders’ Right Act, even if it was passed in 
2008, I have been working with that since 2001. I drafted the regulations, I 
drafted everything. 
 
MB: And it took that long? 
 
RC: I was like a secretary. Until someone came and finished it up. 
 
MB: Well, seven years seems about reasonable. 
 
RC: Yes. 
[Both laugh]  
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B.2 Beatrice Chola
Mrs. Beatrice Chola, Founder and Executive Director of Bwafwano Community 
Services in Chazanga compound, Lusaka, Zambia 
Bwafwano offices, July 7, 2016 
MB: Ok, The government said no, we don‘t want the food, because it has been 
genetically modified 
BC: Yes 
MB: Do you remember that decision? 
BC: I remember that decision here in Zambia, yeah 
MB: Were you receiving food aid at the time? 
BC: We were receiving food aid at the time. 
MB: Ok 
BC: At the time we are receiving when we discovered that Mothers Without 
Borders had given the pots and plates so we had something to cook in.  Let’s 
give them food. 
MB: Ok 
BC: Yeah 
MB: Ok. Did the food stop because of that decision? 
BC: The food stopped because of the decision 
MB: Ok. Did you have any say in whether that happened? Did you talk to 
anybody about that decision? 
BC: Yeah, we talked to the manager for World Food Program 
MB: Ah 
BC: Even came here. Coming to see what this food, the problem, the food do, 
the problem with stopping 
INTERRUPTION 
BC: Yes, they even came here to see where the food go which you have 
stopped, but it’s going to affect the communities, especially those who are taking 
care of the children 
MB: Uh huh. And so you spoke to the manager of the World Food Program 
BC: Of the world food program.  The problem talking to the manager how it is 
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going to affect the children. But they said that the government said that they 
cannot go on with the food which is, which is uhhhh 
MB: Genetically modified 
BC: Genetically modified. 
MB: Mmm hm 
BC: I said you cannot because  it will bring a lot of illness to the people.  Yeah 
and if it is not taken care of there most of them are positive, so maybe it can 
affect them more 
MB: Aaahh, because they were already sick 
BC: Yeah, because they were already sick, it would affect them more 
MB:And did you, did you get a chance to talk to anybody besides the WFP? 
BC: MMmmhmmm 
MB: Who did you talk to? 
BC: Oh to talk to them concerning why they had stopped? 
MB: Yes 
BC: Well I had to go to UNICEF to find out that 
MB: UNICEF? 
BC: UNICEF. Because they are the ones who are…..I didn’t know it was going to 
affect the children, but the goodness of uh the food was that the children were 
concentrating in the class 
MB: Uh huh 
BC: And they attend. So them coming to the school had improved very much.  
Because even if they were taking  care of their siblings, their mother was sick, 
they were not eating well, these people are poor 
MB: Uh huh 
BC: Because they were staying without eating. 
MB: Uh huh 
BC: So having food here, the children started coming to school because there 
was something to eat.  And when they eat their food, they can concentrate in 
school 
MB: Yes. Yes 
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BC: They were not even staying away from school.  So that is the benefit of the 
food. And this is why I had to go to UNICEF to complain.  Now they have stopped 
this, the children are not coming to school and so on.  
MB: Uh Huh 
BC: And so this is when Cecily’s Fund came in to help. 
MB: Ah, Cecily’s Fund 
BC: Yes.  Because they are the seeing good results of it. 
MB: OK 
BC: But the World Food has stopped, now we can work with them. So Cecily’s 
Fund came in. 
MB: Ok, so in your case you had someone step in to bring the food 
BC: Yes, because of the way I was moaning and complaining. So it made others 
to know that I’m complaining because of the good results I had seen because of 
this food 
MB: Ok and so was the WFP manager telling you about that, was that the first 
you heard about the decision? Or did you know that there was a decision? 
BC: I knew there was a decision because it had been talked in the paper 
MB: Ok 
BC: Uh huh. Yeah they had talked in the paper, trying to discourage it in so many 
ways.. 
MB: The papers were against? 
BC: Yeah, they thought it was going to give us for a lot of fellow Zambians said 
there is no reason for us to keep taking this food which is modified in such a way 
MB: Uh huh.  So did you, you disagreed with that decision, the decision to reject 
the food? 
BC: Yeah, I didn’t disagree as such, but I had to complain the effect it was going 
to cause in children, now to stay away.  For them to stay away from school. 
IRRELEVANT INTERRUPTION 
BC: So, this is what I thought, that no, yes you are saying the food is bad, but to 
me I have seen the good of it. 
MB: Mmm hmmm 
BC: It has made the children to come to school and so we have seen the good of 
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it.  But the effects are good on the children. It had affected them very much 
MB: So you were concerned about how genetically modified food would hurt the 
children? 
BC: Yes, I didn’t know about it but when they explained and they said well maybe 
this is the reason why it would hurt the children. 
MB: And was it the papers that explained that it was bad?  Where did you, where 
did you, how did you know that? 
BC: They are just criticizing it.  They were just criticizing that the food was not 
good. 
MB: Ah, and who’s they? 
BC: The government had started criticizing it, 
MB: The government? 
BC: Yeah, that we could not be eating the modified food, it’s going to affect the 
people and so on and so on.  So this is how they stopped but by then it was in 
the country almost five years. 
MB: Oh 
BC: So when the contract ended they would not renew the contract because they 
say no, the modified food is not good, not good, you know there are all sorts of 
things out of it. 
MB: OK. So you were very lucky that you had Cecily’s Fund 
BC: Because of my movements 
MB: Yeah 
BC: Because of my cry 
MB: If you hadn’t protested 
BC: Yes, yes, the children, I didn’t want them to stay away, because knowing 
what was happening in the community, others were now going in the street, 
these kids, the children will be like that, I said no, something must be done 
MB: Mmm hmmm 
BC: and it’s not me, they even found me the donor themselves. Even USAID 
again 
MB: USAID found you Cecily’s Fund? 
BC: Yes. Project Concern International, they are under USAID.  They are the 
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ones who found me Cecily’s Fund. Because of the very complaint 
MB: Ok ok.  So probably there were other organizations like yours that if they 
didn’t complain they didn’t get the food? 
BC: Yeah, there are even now, they are not getting the food are, mm hmm, they 
didn’t complain, maybe they are not concerned, they said, well the government 
said, and they left it.  But me, I’m so concerned that these children stay away 
from school.  This is what I want, I didn’t want 
MB: Yes 
BC: That they go again in the communities they will start leaving their parents 
when they are hungry, they will go in the street. Starting from 1990s, we had a lot 
of children in the street because they were running out from their parents tey go 
and beg in the streets for them to eat.  So this is what I didn’t want. So I had to 
complain. Then they say the food is modified, find me someone who should keep 
on feeding my children so they don’t, you know, stay away from school 
MB: Yes 
BC: And they found me that donor.  For quite some years now. Since the food 
went, I’ve had that donor to date 
MB: Wow, that’s very nice 
BC: Yes 
MB: That’s very nice. Um, what else. (laughs) I don’t have my papers with me, so 
I’m trying to think what I need to know 
BC: Yes 
MB: Um, will you, your name is Mrs. Chola, and this is Bwafwano in the 
Chazanga compound 
BC: Yes. 
MB: Ok. And you started this in 1990 
…Background info 
MB: Um, one more question, just going back a little bit, when you spoke with the 
WFP and UNICEF, did you, did you think they were going to speak to the 
government and maybe pressure the government to change their minds and say 
no, we’ll have the food? 
BC: Well, they tried very much.  They tried very very much to pressure the 
government so they can still come back for that, but I’m sure they have been 
given, they were given some time and for the time being let’s see what is 
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happening and then when we see that the food is not modified, then we’ll bring 
some back. 
MB: I see, I see 
BC: You only worry, the government really worries, the modification, modified 
food, they think it might be harmful to the people, the patients.  Because the food 
comes specifically for the patients, it’s not for the general community, no. 
MB: And what did they think it would do them? 
BC: Well, they were sort of, they think it would affect them in more ways since 
their immunity is low already. 
MB: Ok 
BC: Yeah, uh huh 
MB: So they were more at risk if they were sick 
BC: Yes, this is what they thought, uh huh. 
MB: Ok. Alright, well thank you Mrs. Chola 
BC: Thank you very much, and so, this is how it is. 
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B.3 John Deloko
John Deloko, Aid Worker, Save the Children Zambia 
Save the Children offices, Lusaka, Zambia August 26, 2016 
Save the Children- we were not consulted, it’s outside of our mandate to protest 
or question.  That is the province of the government 
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B.4 Doris Musonda
Doris Musonda, Chief Executive Officer, National Biosafety Authority 
National Biosafety Authority  offices, Lusaka, Zambia 8 -31-16  
MB: So your name is Doris Musonda. 
DM: Yes please 
MB: Tell me your position 
DM: I’m the registrar as well as the chief executive office for the National 
Biosafety Authority 
MB: And what does the National Biosafety Authority do? 
DM: The National Biosafety Authority is a government agency which was 
established by the Biosafety Act, to regulate all issues that pertain to GMO 
issues in Zambia. Or basically in biotechnology. 
MB: Ok, umm, and I don’t know if I told you the background of my research. I am 
looking at the decision in 2002 to accept or reject GMO food aid. And I’m looking 
at both Zambia and Malawi because they made opposite decisions. 
DM: Ok 
MB: Even though they were in similar positions, so I’ve been in Malawi and now 
I’m in Zambia just kind of asking questions and trying to figure out how the 
process worked and how the decision was made. I’m not judging the decision in 
any way, saying one was right and one was wrong. That’s beyond my scope. 
[Both laugh] 
DM: I am grateful. 
MB: So, um, so the decision was made in about 2002, finally, yes? What were 
you doing in 2002? 
DM: In 2002 I was working for an NGO. Yes, yes. But um, I was aware about the 
GMO issues and the GMO discussions and I think later on where I was working, 
we did organize an international meeting concerning the GMOs. 
MB: What was the NGO called? 
DM: It was called Program Against Malnutrition. The background as far as I know 
was that when we started to know or to learn about the GM technology, or GMO 
as it was known at the time, technology, I think it was brought in with a lot of 
negativity. I don’t remember that time hearing much about anything positive 
except that it could increase yields, especially for crops, but apart from that time I 
do not remember, maybe I did hear, but I also considered it mostly negative, but I 
243 
think the fear was about the dominator gene which could compromise the seeds 
in the country, because we were informed that if our GM crops were grown then 
and they cross-pollinated with our local varieties, that would be the end. Yes, 
yes, so I think that was quite scary, but also there was a lot of fear that they 
cause cancer, and different diseases and everything. So I think that it was from 
that background that when it came the Zambian people were not comfortable 
when the GM maize was presented.  But the government took that position as far 
as I know because after analyzing the research that was associated with the GM 
grain, which was actually a living modified organism because certain living…the 
government felt that we didn’t have the capacity to handle GM, GM living 
materials.  In terms of human resources, I think by then most of us knew of GM 
technology, but not many of us had learned about it, but also we didn’t even have 
the legal framework to regulate or do anything about the GM materials. So the 
government felt it was safer to reject the maize in order to protect the country, 
and especially the biodiversity and seed, to be specific.  But I think on the other 
hand, I’m not too sure, maybe checking the documentation, I think the 
government was open, from what I heard, to receiving maize grain which was 
milled into mealie meal, because then that could not be replanted. Yes yes. But 
that was impossible because the donor country didn’t start to do that. So the final 
thing was just to reject the maize. 
MB: That’s interesting, Malawi had the same, some of the same issues with GM 
technology and they chose to have it milled before it came in, but I think they did 
it at their own expense 
DM: Yes of course. 
MB: So yeah, that would have been different. Ok, so at this time there was no 
regulations or acts, or there was no framework in place, right? 
DM: No, no policy. 
MB: So the, the Biosaefty Act, is that what it was called? Was that signed in 
2008?  
DM: 2007 
MB: 2007. do you have a copy of that? 
DM: Yes I do. 
MB: Ok, when we’re finished I will give you my email and if you could send that to 
me that would be wonderful. 
DM: Yes yes. No problem. 
MB: Ok, so um, are, you’re a scientist by training? 
DM: Yes, I am 
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MB: Ok, and how much study is being done on GM technology now? In Zambia? 
DM: In Zambia, I would say it’s fair. But no, you mean experimenting with these, 
or just learning the science? 
MB: Ummm, let’s do learning the science and then experimenting. 
DM: Ok. Learning the science I think is fair, because the University of Zambia 
and the Copperbelt University, and probably a few private universities are 
teaching, are offering courses on biotechnology. They are. And then we have a 
few labs which are interacting with this technology and trying out a few things 
here and there, so I think I would say it’s fair in terms of training. We have some 
upcoming biotechnologists, yes. But in terms of research, I’m not aware officially 
that anyone in Zambia is doing any research. No, we do have two applications 
though in the NBA where people want to conduct research regarding GMOs. But 
these applications are not yet approved. 
MB: And any applications come through your office? 
DM: Yes. Yes. One was recommended for approval, but the applicant put it on 
hold, so we are waiting. Even the other one was put on hold by the applicant, but 
then wasn’t almost approved. There are other, I think, other the different 
departments need to meet with agencies and administrators, so they put it on 
hold. So those are the two which are in the pipeline. Apart from that I’m not 
aware that anyone is doing any, if they are there, then they are doing it illegally.  
MB: Oh. No good. 
DM: But then before we go on I can explain how we transitioned from non-GMO 
maize to the policy and the legal framework. 
MB: Please do. Yes. 
DM: I think after that incident did realize that we needed to put in a legal 
framework in order to protect ourselves because we realize that GMO materials 
had come to stay and it was like the whole world was moving with it. So if we 
didn’t have the legal framework then people would just be free to bring it in. so 
Zambia did put together a taskforce to study what was happening on GMO and 
GMO migration around the region and in other countries beyond the region. So 
that time they went around and learned what was happening and the legal 
frameworks they had in place. And then we started drafting the policy, which was 
in I think in 2003, and then from there they turned it into in the Biosafety Act in 
2007. After that then there was the ….instrument for food ingredients and policy 
in 2010. That’s how we have developed that position from the legal framework. 
MB: Ok. Great, great. Um, going back to the decision in 2002, how were you 
informed of what was going on? Was it through newspaper, was it government 
announcements? Do you remember? 
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DM: I think what I remember was just through the press. I remember that the 
minister did address the nation through the press. 
MB: And was the press pretty uniformly negative? 
DM: Ummmm 
MB: What I’m asking is was there anyone pushing for acceptance? 
DM: No, not for acceptance, not that I can remember. 
MB: Ok 
DM: I think generally, I think Zambia has been anti-GMO. I think the majority was 
at that time, and um, issues of GMOs in Zambia are quite emotive. People view it 
with a lot of emotions, especially anti-GMOs. So I can’t remember quite well, but I 
think it was generally against. 
MB: And um, should, so you’re in a drought now. 
DM: Pardon? 
MB: You’re in a drought now 
DM: No, not really, but we didn’t have very good rains. 
MB: Ok, then let’s speak hypothetically for a minute.  Suppose there were a 
drought and there were to be severe food shortages again. 
DM: Mmhmmm 
MB: What would the National Biosafety Authority recommend? 
DM: We would recommend that the grain can be brought in and then can be 
milled and then given to the people.  I’m assuming that government would solicit 
our opinion. So we would recommend that the grain would be brought in and 
milled because if it is milled then you really can’t have a problem with a 
prospering nation. But I think it’s still the grain or the mealie meal would have to 
be assessed for food safety. But the law does provide for assessment. 
Somebody even now, if someone wanted to do research, to walk in here with 
materials, whether in crops or medicine, whatever, they are free to do so, they 
just need to apply for a permit and then the application goes for assessment. If 
they are at a scientific …committee then the National Biosafety Authotiryt can 
determine that it is by and large safe. So I think we can recommend that the grain 
can be brought in and milled, because then I think there will be no one applying 
for, for growing it. So it will safeguard. 
MB: Ok. I know that there are a lot of beliefs surrounding GM food as to its 
harmful effects. Do you think it would be eaten? Would that be a problem? 
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DM: Ummmm, I know people do talk about these negations, so to say, and um, 
there are quite some strong groups which claim…yeah, but um, I’m sure if the 
grain was sent to Risk Assessment and then certified by the Biosafety, I’m sure it 
would be accepted, though not by everyone. 
MB: Ok, that’s good to know. Ummm, let me just make sure I’ve asked all of my 
questions.  Ok, any other comments? 
DM: Ummm, I think in Zambia the …of GMOs has sort of…In spite of having the 
Biosafety Act in 2007, then the National Biosafety Authority was not at the center. 
Yes there was an interim secretary that was consulted and I’m sure that at first 
there was one or two people just to do one or two things and then the board was 
only appointed in 2013, and the Permanent Secretary was appointed in 2015. So 
the implementation of the Biosafety Act has lagged behind. So a lot of people in 
Zambia do not know about the legal framework that exists. A lot of them don’t 
even know the National Biosafety Authority exists in Zambia. So their reactions 
are still, can still be, they don’t still make friends with the law. A lot of them will 
base it on the announcement when we rejected the GMOs. They will just say, no 
we don’t take GMOs because the late president, may his soul rest in peace, 
banned the GMOs. But the same president who rejected that grain is the same 
president who signed the Biosafety Act. Yes yes, when he was still in office. 
MB: This was Mwanawassa? 
DM: Yes, Mwanawassa. So a lot of people don’t know about the legal framework 
and don’t know about the existence of the NBA so their reactions are quite 
reactive and quite emotive, so we need to raise awareness about the legal 
framework so they know their interests are protected.  Yes, yes. 
MB: You have some marketing to do. 
DM: Yes, a lot actually. 
MB: Very good. Ok, my final question is, do you have any documents that you 




Yande Mwape, Program Officer Disaster Management Affairs, Office of the Vice 
President 
Office of the Vice President, Lusaka, Zambia, 8/29/16  
YM: It wasn’t just GM food aid, but all GM food 
MB: What was Disaster Management’s response to the famine in 2002? 
YM: We didn’t import any food, we were able to use our strategic reserves.  In 
addition, we started a maize project with the help of the World Bank.  It included 
growing maize and many other projects.  I have the proposal 
MB: Do you have it electronically? 
YM: I will see. 
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B.6 Robert Sichinga 
Robert Sichinga, former Member of Zambian Parliament, former Minister of 
Agriculture, former Minister of Commerce 
Residence, Lusaka, Zambia, 8-24-16 
MB: So your name is Robert Sichinga. 
RS: Yes, my name is Robert Kenneth Kaponda Sichinga. I am a former member 
of parliament, I was the Minister of Commerce, Trade, and Industry in the Sata 
government, from 2011 to 2014, end of 2014, although it carried on into 2015. 
I’ve also been a Minister of Agriculture in Sata’s government. So I’ve been a 
member of parliament for 10 years, in the opposition, then I was a minister of 
government for 3 years under the Betreuidg and then Mr. Sata. Since then I’m 
out of that government. 
MB: Ok, and what was your position in 2002? 
RS: My position in 2002 was that of a member of parliament for Kafue 
constituency for the United Party for National Development, UPND, in Kafue, 
which is 50 kilometers south of Lusaka. 
MB: So, ummm, at the time of 2002, what were your functions in relation to food 
aid, the drought, all of that? 
RS: Well I didn’t have any direct responsibility for it, suffice it to say that as a 
legislator it would be part of my responsibility to monitor what the government is 
doing and during that time I was chairperson I believe of Education, Science and 
Technology.  If not, it would have been one of government assurances or 
delegated legislation and because of that it meant that I had responsibility or 
oversight over the executive, as it were, in the committees of parliament. OK, and 
therefore any policies that the government would be pursuing, I would be 
interested, obviously, because as a legislator it is important that we take a 
position, especially if you were in the opposition and I was in the opposition, I 
was almost a de facto leader of the opposition. So because of that to my 
responsibilities were to ensure that the government was doing the right thing. 




MB: To reject genetically modified food aid? 
 
RS: Most of this was carried out within the executive realms. And I was not 
directly involved in the initial aspect of that. However, as I've indicated to you 
already, that is a legislator our interest was that as I recall very well that we had 
gone to Chamanuka to hear the arguments in favor of genetically modified 
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organisms Buy some of the scientific, you know, shall we say six, subscribers, 
who felt that we should, we should accept genetically modified food aid which 
was coming from the United States. So they were making their case about what 
genetic modification was, and this obviously came on the heels of The debate on 
the government’s decision to reject the genetically modified food that was being 
offered by the United States. I can also recall that the United States government 
itself had organized, the embassy had organized these kind of individual, this 
particular lobby that was for genetically modified, especially the official side of the 
embassy was basically justifying the fact that the aid was justified because we 
needed that assistance and there was nothing wrong with that food, Americans 
were eating it and why shouldn't we eat it? Basically that was the kind of 
argument. So these scientists were brought in to give that version, if you want to, 
and D's for local as well as some of the foreign scientist that were putting forth 
the argument. And I do know that, from my recollection, that Monsanto was one 
of the companies that was deeply involved with the modification, although not 
directly addressing The parliamentarians, I think they were finding other means 
to put their case across, so to say. And so that is that workshop at Chamanuka 
was intended to educate us, in inverted commas, to educate us about genetically 
modified organisms. 
 
MB: OK, so was the involvement of Monsanto an advantage or disadvantage? 
How was Monsanto viewed? 
 
RS: Well, Monsanto is viewed in here, we talk about not only a scientific position 
we also looked at the other side, the economic the long-term economic 
implications of that. And also… 
 
MB: And what did you feel the long-term economic implications was? 
 
RS: But also well the aid was needed, the question was, was this not going to tie 
us completely to Monsanto as the supplier of the seed? And you must 
understand that as far as Zambia is concerned, the most research that has gone 
into seed reproduction has been basically to improve, OK? This is derived to 
improve the seed varieties now and even the yields as it were, that's where the 
research has been centered. It has not been centered on genetically modifying 
the seed. Now, if you look at it from the point of view of a legislator, what would 
be the implication of accepting the genetically modified commodity? One, our 
concern was that we did not have the technology to, to, to verify the claims that 
were being made about genetically modified organisms. And the question was, 
how will this impact on other seats? How will it impact, because obviously the 
maze was not going to be grown in isolation, it would have indications for the 
other crops around it, meaning that if you genetically modify, you would have to 
rely on the source of your seed. Now, you need to know the cultural background 
of this within our own country, that the way we've kept seed is that once you've 
harvested, the practice has been to take the best, all right of the cobs of maize, 
without getting it into a grain form, and what they do is they put this above the 
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fireplace in the hut, OK? So that the smoke would prevent weevils and other 
insects from invading that which you put aside as your seed for the next season. 
That's how the practice has been, for every commodity, it was put aside. Now, 
meaning that you picked the best cobs that you had, so that you could have a 
similar yield. There were qualities in, for example, in the maize seed that we do 
not find in the current varieties, even the ones that have been done in terms of 
improving the sweetness of the cob, because part of it was that people use to eat 
most of it, even now they do that, they eat the cobs while they're just ripening, as 
green maize. They would roast it, they would toilet, for their feeding. Normally by 
that time they are, their bins would be running out of the grain that they kept from 
the previous year, so normally whenever the food ripens, the practice was that 
you went to the chief. The chief would be the first person to eat of the fruit, and 
so there would normally be prayers for the harvest that would start. You cannot 
eat, whether it's pumpkins or beans or whatever, until the chief had done that. So 
that was kind of the practice, and of course the, the storage would follow 
thereafter once the harvest had taken place. So this was the practice and so, for 
us as legislatures the question was, if you therefore decided you're going to go 
for genetically modified commodity seed, what would be the implication of that 
vis-à-vis the ability of the, for example, the residents to purchase that? And then 
the receipt issue, where would you buy it from? You could only buy it from one 
supplier, and what would that mean? That would mean the supplier to charge 
any price, so you become dependent on that. Surely that would not be an 
acceptable situation for any country. You know, you become dependent on any 
country to provide seed, it would mean that your food supply is really restricted to 
that country. Politically that's unacceptable. And then the other thing was that 
there was tremendous amount of pressure from the embassy officials of that day. 
And the question was, why were they pressurizing us if it was so good that it 
would appear on its own? Why were they doing that? So clearly it created 
suspicion to say well, you want to do this, and you need to understand the issue 
of HIV aids was said to have been an American generated strategy to limit or to 
cause this diseased to affect the African population. That is basically what it was, 
so clearly the relationship was that of great suspicion, that was this another 
method that they want to use to limit the quantity, the population, the growing 
population of the Africans, and therefore restrict their capacity and ability. 
 
MB: Would you like a drink of water? 
 
RS: No no, I'm just fine. 
 
MB: Do you, that just put me off my train, what was I going to ask? Was there a 
suggestion that if the grain was milled before it was distributed that that would 
alleviate the problems? 
 
RS: There was that suggestion as well in the sense that the question was the 
impact it would have on other crops, that they would be growing around it if it 
would have been grown. So by milling it before it arrived in the country, it was an 
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attempt to say, look if it's milled, then it won't have that effect. But I think that 
issue was not just of the impact it would have on other crops, the issue was what 
would be the impact on the body? What does this entail? I think it's important for 
us to appreciate. So whether it was milled or not milled is neither here nor there. 
The issue was that, why was this genetically modified organisms of maze being 
pushed on us was this genetically modified organisms of maize being pushed on 
us, literally push down our throats, and people really get irritated, some of the 
officials, the American Embassy officials would really get irritated, saying this 
tomato you're having maybe modified, and that was not the issue, our seeds 
called hybrid seed. Basically, you know which one gets approved and not 
approved, mostly to enhance the yields. That's basically what we rely on, and 
there's enough technology here, in fact Zambia was exporting to the region. So 
from that point of you, you also need to recognize that there was an economic 
consideration as to what do you do if you rely now on a foreign country, a foreign 
company which is located in a foreign country, to control your seed supply? And 
then there's the cost of course that is involved in, as well. 
MB: Was there any talk about future trade with, say the EU, with the EU so firmly 
opposed? 
RS: I don't think the EU came into it, you were seen as a part of the group that 
were also in the same situation, had rejected the GMO's 
[Interruption] 
MB: OK, so the EU didn't really come into it? 
RS: You know, the EU was simply seen as another country, or another block that 
had rejected GMO's, and the question was where they in a better position than 
we were scientifically to understand the implication of this? But I don't think the 
issue was even asking the EU to come and assist us to understand the genetic 
part of it, because I think the political and the economic consideration we already 
had were strong enough we didn't need the scientific component. It was 
essentially, the argument was that you cannot rely on another country for the 
security of your food. That was the major argument. 
MB: Yes, and it's a powerful one. What about internal pressures, such as from 
civil society, I know that, I've spoken with the head of an NGO Who said they 
were quite upset at the decision and went to the WFP to try and pressure them to 
pressure you. 
RS: I think you need to understand that most of the NGOs and the CBO's were 
normally driven by similar organizations outside the country, so for example, 
those that were pushing that, did they have scientific know how? Did they have 
the political consideration, did they understand that, or were they simply used as 
to us to make this case? 
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MB: OK. 
RS: So basically the NGOs do not have an independent position, as it were, 
where they have the capacity to undertake research on this scientific analysis, 
and so on and so forth, or even economic analysis. They don't have, they rely 
almost entirely on what is being said to them from their sponsors. Now if their 
sponsors were prepared to give additional monies for you to push, for example, 
on a similar subject like that, I suppose which is still running at the moment, 
which would be the issues of sexuality, the issues of same sex marriage, and 
they are pushing for this, and you ask, and they raise it as human rights, but 
there are those of us in the country who believe that this is not right, it's immoral 
to do that, according to the Bible, according to our understanding, According to 
our social logical practices. It is a taboo, taboo, taboo, that a man marries 
another man, that a woman marries another woman. It's just not right. It's not 
about human rights, it's just that it is wrong. 
MB: But they weren't arguing from a science point of view, they were arguing that 
they had people to feed? 
RS: Yes, but the question was, were there alternatives to do so? 
MB: And were there? 
RS: Yes, there were. You could grow more. But it did change, it did change. It 
was an issue of emphasis within the country, and this is how the programs, for 
example the Ministry of agriculture, got FSIP, Farmer Support Input Program 
came about. What do you do? They needed to recapitalize these farmers 
because of the drought and because of the floods and because of this climatic 
change, at the time it was not fully understood, the el Nino, And changes in the 
weather, were obviously causing impact, it was not as well understood at the 
time, or we felt at the time, or the implications understood in the context of 
changing our pattern or doing things. So, so President Mwanawasa, at the time 
he became the president, and he basically took the decision that if we do not 
understand something, let's not do it. And he was basically of the view that if we 
assist farmers they can overcome this, and they did. From that time on, Zambia 
has never ever been in a deficit situation, the fact is we have had surplus that 
has supplied the region because there was input required for the small-scale 
farmers, and it is the small scale farmers that supply the whole country with food 
security. So it was possible. It could be done. It was a policy issue, it was not a 
scientific issue. 
MB: OK. OK. So you said that there was tremendous pressure from the US, 
specifically the embassy, have you, did you notice any change in your 
relationship with the US after this? 
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RS: Yes. They were very adversarial, they were very aggressive, they were, they 
would invite you to, say four instance, lunch, And they would push it down your 
throat, saying this is an important thing after you did this. And the question was, 
why were you pushing it against us, I mean it's us who are hungry, So why are 
you pushing it down our throats? And that seemed crazy rather than helping the 
situation. OK? And obviously the US was very, very calm at the Embassy officials 





RS: That was the, basically the position that the US was pushing its agenda 
because they want to justify what they have done within their own country, and 
they would argue that, look, we have increased production by so much, and the 
question was then what? How about for us? How would we criticize that? Would 
we have to rely on you to do the same since supply of seed and the same supply 
of fertilizer? And the need was greater than just the seed, there are also issues of 
other support services, and the fertilizers would be needed, the plowing, for 
example, would be needed to enhance the yields. And just that change, where 
we had the farmer input support program, Which was supporting small scale 
farmers to get out of that situation, that alone change the situation and Zambia, 
right now amongst their neighbors, is outstanding. It has never, never had a 
shortage of maize which is typical for the region. 
 
MB: So, right now you were in a drought, is Zambia in a good position still? 
 
RS: Yes. It's as if, the consumption of our country, as a country, on our own is 
1,250,000 metric tons per annum. That's the consumption the country has. 
However, places like the Kitanga province of Congo , It's almost entirely 
dependent on Zambia. So when you take that into account, and they have 
probably about two thirds of our population, about 9 million, maybe somewhere 
there. We have to take that into consideration, that one way or the other, this 
crop finds their way to them, whether legally or illegally, it doesn't matter, but the 
thing is when you grow, the crop, you must recognize that they will stand in need. 
And since the pattern of kind that climatic change, it's not on the Congo or 
Katanga, for example, which in fact should be in a better position than even 
Zambia. But there's Malawi, there's Zimbabwe, there's the northern part of 
Namibia, there's the northern part of Botswana, there is Zimbabwe. They all 
stand in need. In fact, even Tanzania. When I was the minister of agriculture we 
supplied all these countries, except we supplied Tanzania, Malawi, and 
Zimbabwe. When we came in to office, the president expected us, to go help the 
situation in Zimbabwe, and we went to the vice President and I, as a minister of 
agricultural, to go and conclude a deal. And the question was, it was not about 
supply, it was now about payment for it, because the president said, go ahead 
and give them the food, so that people don't die, but then I said, who is going to 
pay for the purchase of that food. The World Food Program was in fact buying 
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part of that for Malawi and Zimbabwe as well. OK, so certainly the situation has 
never been desperate, there are specific pockets where there has been 
insufficient food, either because of drought, or because of consistent climatic 
conditions in those areas, especially in areas like the valleys, the Zambezi valley, 
The, the coming down, Kariba.  Same with the place called Luangwa valley, 
Bordering with the Congo. Again, that has always been a problem area, but that's 
because the way it's located, it's very, very hot there, so things grow only during 
the time of the rainy season, and then because of that there has been sick 
persistent problem. Now, before 2002, or leading up to thousand or two, we start 
to see that there were certain areas that had surplus before, we're now being 
affected in a negative way because of climatic change. So the issue is not 
whether you had genetically modified food or not, it was now an issue of how 
shall we do with the climatic change that is taking place and affecting those areas 
that are normally vulnerable, even worse than others? So normally you have that 
challenge in the valley areas, whether it's Luangwa Valley, or Zambezi Valley, or 
other valley areas which cannot sustain rainy season for long, so you have to 
grow crops quickly and then store them. So normally those areas have been 
affected even before this issue, this particular time, the 2002 draft. 
 
MB: OK. Let's see, OK I think that's it, are there any other comments? 
 
RS: Well, I think that there, that there are bigger issues that need to be 
addressed. I think the bigger issue is climatic change. How does the world 
respond to climatic change in, in, in the light of the vulnerability of many countries 
in Africa? If you go towards, you know, as for Zambia, I became even more 
acutely aware of this when I became Minister of Agriculture. Or a pattern is that if 
you take from the south east going to the north northwest now that it's bordering 
with Congo, starting with Zimbabwe, coming up through Lusaka and then 
onward, the climatic change has affected the country in that matter. Using that 
angle if you will, the line of angle. Now, the question is put what can you do about 
it? There's need for a policy change. Policy change should be, let's grow those 
crops that need much more rain more towards the northwest, in other words 
boarding with Congo, bordering with Angola, and so on and so forth. Now why is 
that so? The rainy season, the rainfall pattern is that in the southeast you have 
got as low as 600 mm of rainfall per annum. Whereas if you go towards the 
northwest, which is, This would be Luapula, this would be northwestern province 
and partly northern province and joining Tanzania, you find that the rain fall 
pattern is much, much higher, you can get as much as 1800 mm as compared to 
600. So three times more in the Northwest has opposed to the south east where 
it starts from. Then you've got areas which are traditionally dry areas, for 
example the western province which is very sunny, bordering with Namibia. Now 
they are, even the cost of production is very very high. In the year 2013 the cost 
of producing a bag, a 50 kg bag of maize for Zambia range from a low of 30 
kwacha Per bag to a high in western province of 96 kwacha. So, the same bag 
that you are producing 30 kwacha in eastern province or Northwestern province 







RS: And if the price, which was fixed by government was about 70 kwacha per 
bag, it was profitable in eastern province and Northwestern and many other 
places, it still was not profitable enough for the western province because most of 
the fertilizer would simply go into the sand, you know, it would drain away, as it 
were, as soon as the rains came in. So, there is a policy and framework that is 
needed, in other words, don't grow maze in those places which are horrid, but 
are very good for growing things like rice. Very good for growing crops such as 
cashews. And those people they are dependent on fish farming, or rather 
catching Fish from the river, so fish farming would be perfect because they are 
right by the river, the Zambezi, and therefore fish ponds and so on and so forth 
for freshwater fish. And also as you come further out words from the western 
province, as you come into areas like Goma, For example the crop of maze is 
very good. So you may have to grow that maze in one part of the province to 
feed the rest of the province, in other words, increase your yields in that 
particular part so conservation , For example the crop of maze is very good. So 
you may have to grow that maze in one part of the province to feed the rest of 
the province, in other words, increase your yields in that particular part so 
conservation farming, for example becomes an important issue, so that even 
when the rainfall isn’t sufficient, you would still get a good deal to justify the cost. 
And also, there is a management issue: should we be growing just for Zambians 
conception which is 1.2 million metric tons per year? The answer is no, but then 
we have to also sort out the issue of, to rehabilitate her storage issues for 
example. Now if you're going to keep main crops, maze in particular, because it's 
a stable commodity, if you're going to keep it, how many years supply should you 
keep? Should you supply your neighbors? Should you include the neighbors? 
Should you just restricted to your own consumption, and if you do, does that 
mean that then you must restrict the export? And if you restrict the export, what 
does that do to enhance production, to increase production? Does it not stifle? 
So, there are those policy issues which need to be resolved, those policy 
questions that need to be resolved. Having served as a minister, my own view is 
that, I think this calls for more than just the issue of private sector and 
government control. I think there is a role for government sure, but this is, there is 
sufficient food for the people, all the time. In fact, I would say that we should be 
looking at it from a regional point of view, OK? And saying, how much do we 
need? And the question is, if the neighbors, Zimbabwe for example are affected, 
do need this food, then we need to discuss with them, how much should we carry 
to support them? What is their deficit? So it's like, it's like the issues of a cu then 
we need to discuss with them, how much should we carry to support them? What 
is their deficit? So it's like, it's like the issues of epidemics which affects the whole 
area, whether you're talking about polio or you're talking about malaria, or you're 
talking about foot and mouth disease. When you have got these academics, you 
need to talk to the neighbors because they are as much affected as you are, and 
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you need to have a common policy. So SADC could be very useful for that, or 
COMESA, As the case might be. The challenge is, where would you get the 
money to carry these talks? Would it be done by private sector, or would it be 
done by government funding? And if it's going to be done by government funding, 
where will you get this to raise the capital itself? So who's going to rehabilitate 
these storage facilities? Is it going to be the government? Is it going to be the 
public sector? And if it's going to be the public-sector, do you have sufficient 
money for that? So those are the issues in my view, but need to be addressed. 
But if, politically, they archaeologist and today are tackled, they can be dealt with. 
MB: But they are complicated. 
RS: Yeah, they are complicated, just like the situation in 2002 was complicated. 
Wasn't it? 
MB: Yes. 
RS: But it was resolved. 
MB: Yes. 
RS: One of the challenges that we have has been the issue of the yield of the 
crops, for example in terms of maze. We were doing very poorly in terms of yield. 
You need to understand that as a country we also need to recognize what are 
our comparative advantages and what are our challenges? Comparative 
advantage is that we do have modest rain, quite a lot of rain as we go towards 
the Northwest, we do have. So if we decide that's the area we're going to grow 
the most crops, OK? It's a policy issue we take, and so we invest in infrastructure 
for that, in those particular areas. So in other words, and then you have to 
recognize that you've got to transport it to the deficit areas, just like I talked 
about, the western province where you can have that prop to service the western 
province, which has better yields. We need to recognize what is our comparative 
advantage because Zambia's comparative advantage it is in the end mount of 
arable land that's available. 
MB: Yeah. 
RS: OK? We have, as we stand right now, something like 2,400,000 hectares of 
arable land which is not cultivated. OK? Now that, by any comparison, is 
Zimbabwe pales. Malawi is nowhere near. Botswana, even with the good 
financial management that they have, they can only have something that comes 
anywhere near a fraction of that in the northern part of Botswana. Southern part 
is very much like our western province it's an arid Area because of the Kalahari. 
Namibia can't even match us, so the question that I think we need to do is to say, 
look, this problem is regional, it is global, but it is also regional, it has A regional 
dimension. So, what do we do? We need to discuss that together. Then we make 
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the investment and decide all those elements that you talked about. Yes they are 
difficult, so you keep at it. Do you say, just because they're difficult we don't 
tackle them? I think that human ingenuity can overcome that and for us, definitely 
the Lord is still kind to give us the water, and that is another comparative 
advantage. Zambia has 40% of freshwater resources in southern Africa. 
Freshwater! 40%! You know in the lakes, we've got something like six major 
lakes here. Those become reservoir is it for freshwater. So, for example within a 
distance of about 300 km an area called Cushing, it's a large farming block which 
normally commercial farmers use, mostly expatriate farmers use. There is drop 
there, there is no river, there is no major river. But just above, 300 km away, 
there is huge amounts of water which go to waste every year. So how about 
putting up a, a pipeline from there for irrigation purposes? So every line do you 
have along the way can be irrigated? 300 km it will become m is huge amounts 
of water which go to waste every year. So how about putting up a, a pipeline 
from there for irrigation purposes? So every land you have along the way can be 
irrigated? 300 km it will be, coming down into Kafue, For example. We draw, here 
in the socket, we are 50 km away from the river. So it's a possible thing, we can 
do it. It's a question of investment which is needed to do that. So it's a project 
that should be done immediately, once it's been done, that's it. If you go further 
north, huge, huge amounts of water. We can grow sugarcane. We can grow rice. 
We can do all that. We can do freshwater fish farming. We can do bananas. This 
country imports something like 80 to 100,000 metric tons of vegetable oil, oil 
which is imported from Malaysia. We can grow Palm oil, people do it now. So it 
can be done, but we must make a project. So if you, never to come back to the 
question which you are raising, is it possible? Of course it is possible. It is 
possible. 
MB: It is. 
RS: So it's a question of what we prioritize, for this way. And if the Americans 
were really serious about helping, then they should help us with those major 
projects, and say, OK, we want you to be self-sufficient, so you don't have to cry 
out for genetically modified food crops, OK? That's what they should have done, 
they should've said will help you with the pipeline, The water pipeline. Just like 
we bring water from the river to Lusaka, in South Africa they import water from 
Swaziland and Lesotho. So you can do that. So if the Americans wanted to, that's 
a good project for them to undertake. But the thing is, as you grow that pipeline, it 
doesn't have to be done all in one year, it's over 10 years for example, as you 
grow it, the crops also grow. As you extend that line, those crops along the way 
should be grown. OK? So that the food supply situation, not only for Zambia, but 
for the region, Congo, and Zimbabwe, and Malawi, and South Africa, can be able 
to get from there. So the situation that comes about because of lack of food is 
very serious. And it overspills, it does not recognize a border. If somebody's 
hungry in Congo, they will come to Zambia to get the food. They will do that. In 
any case, it also makes economic sense. We can then mill the maze and make 
mealie meal and send it. It's good value added for us as a country. And also the 
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fact that it's humanitarian, we would have performed a humanitarian feat, to 
provide the support to our neighbors who are affected, maybe in a worse matter 
than we are. So you ask the question, all this is possible. It's a question of 
prioritization. Can the Americans put the money on the table for this project? I 
don't know. To me, I think they should be doing that. 
 
MB: OK. All right. Well thank you so much. 
 





INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTS: MALAWI 
C.1 James Bokosi
Professor James Bokosi , Member of staff at Bunda, Lecturer 
Telephone Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, 8-20-2016, Notes 
Delegation to Mozambique- Standards, PS From agriculture, minister of 
agriculture 
Purpose of delegation- to do with gm maize, issues about trans-border crossings, 
Mozambique was worried about the maize passing through the country, had to 
put up a case to let it pass through 
Involved in the decision- asked to meet president and cabinet and discuss the 
safety of gm maize, we were actually taken to Blantyre to palace to meet the 
cabinet and president 2002- giving facts about the safety- at that time no 
evidence that it was dangerous to human health 
Consulted with faculty at Bunda College 
Involved with policy about biotechnology 
Did you advocate milling it first?  Yes, when were discussing with the ministry we 
were discussing the modalities of bringing the gm maize, it would be prudent to 
actually mill it, because they were concerned that people would plant it 
Did you believe there was harm in people planting it? There was no follow up to 
that that he knows of 
260 
C.2 Scholastica Chidyaonga
Scholastica Chidyaonga, Director of Disaster Response and Recovery, 
Department of Disaster Management Affairs 
Disaster Response and Recovery, Department of Disaster Management Affairs 
offices, 8/11/16 
Also present: Madalitso Mwale 
SC: In Malawi most of us do subsistence farming 
MB: Uh huh 
SC: We don’t have a lot of commercial framers, and the subsistence farming is 
what is feeding the whole country  
MB: Uh huh 
SC: And the way we grow our food, we put in a lot of things 
MB: Uh huh 
SC: You know? 
MB: Uh huh 
SC: By the time, and I always get surprised, you know, at the time we are 
harvesting the maize, already we have these pigeon peas or cowpeas? What are 
they? 
MM: Cow peas 
SC: So these are food that Malawians grow. So you see, then already, soon after 
the harvest, they have already got…there was a time I was wondering, where are 
you going to plant them, and they said, we will plant them together. Soon after 
harvest something has to grow, it’s because land, we have limited land, it is 
precious our land, and that is the whole purpose of subsistence farming. We put 
in even pumpkins before the maize is ready, we have even pumpkins.  We don’t 
have enough land to say, on this land I will only grow pumpkins, because we 
don’t have the land available.  So everything has to grow together. 
MB: Uh huh. So you said, with the GMO maize, just to go over what you’ve said, 
that’s the only thing that will grow? That’s your belief, I mean, that’s what you’ve 
heard. 
SC: Yes, that’s the only information the local farmer has got 
MB: Ahh 
SC: If there’s not enough…I don’t know because the government at the national 
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level makes those decisions. But there hasn’t been any research on what GMO 
maize is like. But what I’ve heard is that once you put in GMO maize you lose 
local varieties, you know? 
MB: Uh huh 
SC: And also these days in Malawi you have people who are, uhhh, what are 
these seeds, we have our local maize seeds, and then we have the hybrid.  
Every year we hear of a different hybrid.  This hybrid they say is early maturing, 
but you can’t do it for a long time, because of, you know, …that we have. So you 
have the, you know, the hybrids, all these changes, and maybe they are 
genetically modifying and you don’t even know it. There is some modifying, 
modification when they are doing hybrid maize, but there are still people who 
want our local maize.  Our local type of maize, you can’t store it for a long time, 
it’s got, the seed is very hardy, and you know? Basically people like it, so even 
when you are eating the hybrid maize I can tell. When I’m eating the local variety, 
the taste is different.  Yeah, so, but when you use the hybrid type, you know? 
You eat more of the husks, and maybe you have to put in a lot of, when you are 
eating your corn you put in margarine, but in Malawi we just boil it. It’s the natural 
taste you want coming out from your food. 
[Both laugh] 
[Irrelevant interlude] 
SC: So in Disaster Management Affairs, when we bring in aid, we have to be 
careful what people will want to eat 
SC: Because sometimes we give them something, if they don’t feel like they want 
it, no matter how hungry they are, or they are desperate, they won’t eat it.  I 
remember one time I hear that the government, it was a donation from the Arab 
countries, dates and it was all dates, and it was fine, but Malawians don’t eat 
dates. 
SC: It was rejected, yeah 
MB: So do you think, do you see a problem, if you do end up having to have 
GMO maize, do you think Malawians will eat it? 
SC: Ummm 
MB: Is there that big a taste difference? 
SC: I don’t know. I may have tasted GMO things outside the country.  I’ve tasted 
a grape that is almost the size of a plum. 
[Both laugh] 
MB: Too big, too big 
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SC: I couldn’t finish an apple, which was so big, I said what sort of apple is this? 
There is a normal size of apple that I know.  I have tasted that, but on maize, if 
you process it into flour, you know flour is different than.  Also, it depends, most 
of the maize coming outside was yellow. Do you mostly eat yellow? Because 
here they eat white maize. Yellow maize is ok, but if you are used to white maize, 
you won’t eat.  So there are all these peculiarities that people have.  Sometimes 
you just have to respect what they need.  Because recently we had some 
sorghum donated. We had to identify where they eat sorghum, where they 
naturally eat sorghum.  Anywhere else, if we give them sorghum they will just 
reject it.so people are really sensitive to what they eat.  It doesn’t matter if they 
have nothing, there are certain things even they will shun them. 
MB: Huh, ok. That is interesting. 
[Both laugh] 
SC: That’s what I have observed 
MB: No, hey, you are from Malawi, you should know 
SC: Yes 
MB: Um, ok, let’s see, what else can I ask? Umm, are you at all concerned, and 
you may not be able to answer this, but are you at all concerned about your 
relationship with the U.S. should you choose to reject GMO maize.  Are you 
worried that they will be upset or anything like that? 
SC: Uhhh, not really.  What sort of maize have they been giving us all these 
years? They don’t send maize. 
MM: they’ve been sending cooking oil in the parcels 
SC: In the parcels. No, not maize. 
MB: As a matter of course about 30% of food aid that the U.S. sends is GMO. 
Different kinds, not just maize. 
MM: so the parcels we have received, even the beans and like, could be GMO 
MB: Could be, yeah. I don’t know that for sure, don’t quote me on that. 
SC: I think the main thing was, because I’ve seen the parcels, the parcels are 
medicine and clothing. It’s just that having something which we cannot normally 
grow, that’s why I think that decision was made, to mill.  People should be well-
informed. Like I’ve said, that’s the information that I have, I haven’t proved it, or 
looked to say, what is the difference? Right now, I’m telling you we have these 
hybrid varieties, with this climate change, you know? The problems we are 
having, we are experiencing it.  At least 90 days, or less than 90 days a year of 
rain. Grain, which has matured, but quick maturing, you don’t store it. You have 
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to use it immediately.  But then, what the challenge is also climate change. So 
people just need to be well-informed, before that decision, we need people who 
are well-informed. But it should not be imposed on us, and people should at least 
have the feeling that, we took part, we understood. What are the different 
advantages , what are the disadvantages? What is that we need to do?  Are we 
being unrealistic? So people need to be well-informed. 
MB: I agree. Ok, so your name is Scholastica? 




Katherine Chiweza, Communications Officer, Biosafety Systems, National 
Commission for Science and Technology 
National Commission for Science and Technology offices, 8-19-16 
National Commission for Science and Technology Offices, Lilongwe, Malawi 
MB: Ok, so first tell me your name 
KC: I’m Katherine Chiweza. 
MB: And what is your position here? 
KC: I work with the program for biosafety systems, I’m the communications 
officer. 
MB: Ok, and this is the National Commission of Science and Technology 
KC: Yes, the program for biosafety systems is housed within the National 
Commission for Science and Technology.  They manage the project 
MB: Ok. Were you here in 2002? 
KC: Here, as in…? 
MB: Working here, I mean 
KC: No, no 
MB: Do you know anything about that decision? 
KC: At that time all I knew was there was yellow maize that came to Malawi. Now 
that I’m working in this field that I now understand that it was GM maize, you 
know. But I wouldn’t know anything about the decision, but there is a professor 
in, I don’t know if you’ve met him. Have you met Professor Bokos, he was the 
one who did all the negotiations with the president, they went to Mozambique, 
they went to all these places. If you haven’t met him and if he’s not on your list, 
he’s someone you should meet 
MB: He’s on my list. So thank you. Ok, then let’s talk about right now because 
the same thing is happening right now. What…is your commission involved in the 
decision to accept GM maize? 
KC: I don’t think so. 
MB: Ok, what does your department do? 
KC: The commission? 
MB: Mmmhmmm 
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KC: Ummmm…it is there, it was established to advise government and any 
interested stakeholders on any issues of science, technology, and research.  So 
this is an area that falls in the interest of the commission for science and 
technology. And it is also to promote the research that is going on in the GM 
technology.  So definitely if they had been approached, they would have given it 
a go ahead because they understand the science and promotes the science 
behind GM, but to be honest I don’t think they were approached during the 
decision-making process. 
MB: Ok 
KC: I don’t think so. 
MB: Ok, ummm. Yeah, I haven’t spoken with Professor Bokos, I did speak with 
Kingdom Kwapata who is also involved with the BT cotton trials. Let’s 
see….alright, well I think that’s it.  That was short, right? 
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C.4 Kingdom Kwapata 
Kingdom Kwapata, Senior Lecturer, Bunda College 
Bunda College, Lilongwe, Malawi, 8-12-16 
 
KK: The issue of disclosing what we’re going to say for public consumptions. 
MB: Yes 
KK: Yeah, I have no problem with that. You can, you can go ahead and publicize 
wherever you need to 
MB: Ok, thank you 
KK:  And quote me, yeah I have no problems 
MB: Ok. So you are Dr. Kingdom Kwapata, and what is your position here? 
KK: Here I am a lecturer and researcher in biotechnology. 
MB: Ok. In 2002 what was your position, were you here? 
KK: No, I was in civil society in 2002. Yeah, so I was heading an organization 
called the Malawi Human Rights Network 
MB: Malawi Human Rights….? 
KK: Human Rights Network, we were a human rights organization. So during that 
crisis period, that’s when I began to become involved with issues of GMOs 
because as you may  have probably read, there was resistance to accept that 
maize, particularly because neighboring countries were so resisting, Zambia and 
Mozambique, and I think even Zimbabwe.  So I think the challenge was they 
didn’t want this maize to pass through their borders. 
MB: Uh huh 
KK: And then there was also growing pressure to government to, to, to tell them, 
don’t accept this maize from outside the country. 
MB: Who was giving pressure? 
KK: Civil society organizations. One of the pressure groups, and generally, the 
majority of people didn’t really understand. So my role in that context was that I 
was at the forefront of advocacy to, you know, urge the government to accept the 
maize on humanitarian grounds. Because my position was to say that look here, 
what was going on at that time was that people were speculating that this maize 
was not fit for human consumption. They were insinuating that the U.S. was 
giving it to animals, and if humans eat this, there will be a lot of complications, 
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health complications. And also, issues related to impotency, fertility of males, and 
issues related to if people plant this maize it might contaminate this soil.  So, 
environmental concerns, Issues of trade also, you know, came in. So there were 
a lot of complex issues that people brought up as why government should not 
receive that maize.  And during that time there was no expertise in this country, 
or limited expertise, may be here and there.  People didn’t really understand 
biotechnology concepts themselves. So as I was advocating government should 
accept this on the basis that, you know assuming that this maize is poisonous 
and people die, right? And then you have two options- you either accept the 
maize and people die if it’s poisonous, or you reject the maize, people still die 
because of hunger. So I was saying, either way, l just bring it in. If we all perish, 
then that’s fine! As opposed to, you know, withholding it, because you’re fearing 
the consequence. Yeah, so, I think our advocacy worked very well during that 
time. 
MB: Clearly. 
KK: Yeah, and the maize was ushered into the country.  And it’s because of that 
that I caught the attention of the then American ambassador, who invited me to 
her office and, because I already had a background in agriculture by then.  I had 
a master’s degree in agriculture. She said, why don’t you go train in a PhD in 
biotechnology so you can come back and be an expert, an authority in this and 
probably if this crisis happens again, you will be in a better position to advise 
your government on scientific points. So I accepted a scholarship , that’s how I 
went to the U.S. and started a PhD in biotechnology. 
MB: Where? 
KK: Michigan State. So since I came back I’ve been working on this, doing trials 
on BT Cotton.  I was the first one to introduce BT Cowpea into the food crops, as 
part of my research investigation. I have the potential to use this for, as improved 
variety for farmers. 
MB: Mmmhmmm. I read a little about your BT cotton proposal. Has there been a 
lot of resistance to that? 
KK: Very much, a lot of resistance to that. Sometimes you, as a scientist, you 
derail from your whole objective in science and then you start focusing on 
managing the public aspects, politics, human relations and all of that, yeah? In 
order to bring people up to speed, but also to convince people that, you know, 
what we’re doing is absolutely safe. Yeah, so there’s a lot of resistance, and a lot 
of uhh, ummm, yeah.  Particularly the cowpea, the food crop, is the worst, 
because we really don’t have support from a wide range of stakeholders on that 
aspect. 
MB: Ok. Let’s see, you’ve answered most of these. How were you informed of 
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the decision in 2002? 
KK: That the maize is coming? 
MB: Yes 
KK: I think it was public announcement on the radios, and the newspapers. That 
the government wanted to tell people they had accepted at that time, I think it 
was yellow maize. I think traditionally people don’t eat yellow maize here. There 
are a lot of stereotypes around it; it’s normally the white color. So, people had to 
explain, the government had to do an explanation. By the way, this maize was 
milled, it was not given to people as grain normally. So yeah, there was an 
explanation to the public. 
MB: Ok. Let’s see. So who did you speak to, you said you were trying to apply 
pressure, who did you speak to, were you speaking to government officials? 
KK: Yes, by then we had a very charismatic Minister of Agriculture, his name was 
Maliki Banda. So, these were the people who we were constantly engaged with. 
And we also spoke to the PS, the Director of Agriculture who was then Dr. 
Mahonga. Yes, so, you know, it was… 
MB: And were they both on the, what is it called, the National Disaster 
Preparedness Relief Committee? 
KK: They must have been because they, uhhh, as Minister of Agriculture, they 
were representative, but I’m not sure whether they actually had the seat there, or 
sent someone. But in terms of top officials making the decision at this time, it was 
these guys. Yeah. And uh, I think there was a team that flew to Mozambique to 
discuss with the government of Mozambique to let the maize come in. I wasn’t 
part of it, but the Minister was there, and another professor, a colleague of mine, 
Professor Bokosi, was there as an advisor to the Minister on these issues. So the 
food discussion with the Mozambiquan government was to use that as a route for 
the maize. 
MB: And you’ve kind of answered this, but have things changed in any significant 
way since the decision was made? 
KK: Mmmmmm 
MB: Is the, is the country a little, you spoke about how there’s still resistance, but 
are they less resistant because it’s already happened and nothing happened? 
KK: No, they aren’t less resistant 
MB: They still believe… 
KK: They still believe…because…I was recently in China and I happened to meet 
the Minister of Agriculture of China, and we were discussing a program to bring 
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in a new variety of maize that is drought tolerant. So the minister’s first reaction 
was, is it yellow maize? Is it GMO? Because if it’s yellow maize, or GMO, I don’t 
want to hear anything about it. So a couple of years ago, the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation offered to do trials on water-efficient maize in Africa, and the 
government found out and refused. So, I think, what I am seeing is that, in terms 
of genetically modified crops, the government is somehow relaxed to allow 
research in other crops, like cowpea, I think there is now banana. But when it 
comes to maize, they won’t even discuss. 
MB: Because it’s such a staple 
KK: Yes, no one wants to hear a proposal about trials in maize. 
MB: And yet, they’re now in a position where they are having to look at the 
decision again as to whether to accept GMO maize. 
KK: Yes, because they have no choice. They are starting to scavenge for maize 
in different countries with big farms, but the U.S. government is saying, we have 
so much maize, but it’s GMO, so it’s up to you to make a decision. 
MB: And if they were to accept it they would again say, it has to be milled first? 
KK: I would think so, I would think that’s what they would say.  It has to be milled 
first, which is just a headache and an unnecessary expense. Yeah. 
MB: Yeah. Because you have studied this, you don’t find any problem with this? 
KK: Not at all.  
MB: Yes, in the U.S. the National Academy of Sciences just came out with a 
report saying they cannot find any harm in GMO food, and yet, there is a big 
campaign in the U.S. for GMO free food. 
KK: That’s right 
MB: And I find that a little silly.  MB: Um, ok, it wasn’t’ the science, there wasn’t a 
lot of science in 2002.  
KK: Not at all 
MB: So it wasn’t the science that convinced them, what do you think convinced 
them? Was it purely humanitarian? 
KK: Political pressure as well from the grassroots. People were really in need of 
the maize. Yeah, so that pressure was significant. In addition, to maybe 
institutions like mine that were involved, they came to a decision that, let’s accept 
this. 
MB: Ok. Ummm, you’ve answered that. Any other comments? 
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[Both laugh] 
KK: No , I mean, what I can say is that I, you know, yeah, issues to do with 
GMOs are very thorny still, and not only in Malawi but throughout the region. And 
I think that the majority of the background is due to fear of the unknown, but also 
purely lack of knowledge of the science behind it.  
[Phone interruption] 
KK: so as I was saying, that it is a thorny issue because of lack of knowledge. 
Particularly those who make our policies, there is a lot of fear, doubts as to 
whether the benefits that your scientists claim are really indeed substantiated, 
worth taking the risk of,  you know, ummm, of introducing genetically modified 
food in the country. And I think that the anti-GMO lobbyists are very strong, 
stronger than us. 
[Both laugh] 
KK: So because of this, you know, their voices are more pronounced and 
prominent. Yeah, so it’s very difficult for meaningful engagement to really 
convince the policymakers, but in my opinion, I think it’s really a loss because, 
you know, some of the varieties are very promising. Particularly maybe the 
drought maize that has been developed. Considering the fact that we’re 
experiencing episodes of drought, and that will be able to stop the problem, and 
compliment other efforts that are also being done. So little by little maybe we will. 
MB: Are you doing any lobbying this time? 
KK: Uhh, no. 
MB: You’re busy 
KK: Yes.  
[Both laugh] 
KK: Yes. Yeah, so there’s another institution, I don’t know if you’ve talked to 
them, it’s called PBS. 
MB: PBS, and what does that stand for? 
KK: Public Biosafety Systems, something like that. It’s an American based 
organization, but domesticated in Malawi. It’s director is Mr. Mkoko. I’ll give you 
the number. 
MB: Thank you 
KK: So how we’ve structured our working relationship, we are mostly concerned 
with the science aspects and they are concerned with the issues related to 
advocacy. So there’s some coordinating between us. 
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MB: I see. 
KK: Yeah.  
MB: And was PBS around in 2002? 
KK: I’m not sure. I think I’ve just come to know of it recently. But now the 
gentleman 
[Contact info discussion] 
MB: Ok, I will contact him, thank you. And do you know of any official sources 
that I could get access to? I don’t know that you would have any access, but 
meeting minutes, scientific papers read, documents like that. Do you have 
contacts that I could… 
KK: Let me see if I can give you the phone number of Professor Bokosi. He is 
here and was also on the advisory team. 
MB: he was part of the delegation 
KK: Yeah, so he may also have more information. 
[Contact info discussion] 
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C.5 Wilkson Makumba
Dr. Wilkson Makumba, Director of Chitedze National Research Station, Lilongwe, 
Malawi, 8-16-16 
MB: Ok, please tell me your name 
WM: I am Wilkson Makumba, Director of Agricultural Research 
MB: Ok. And what was your position at the time of the 2002 decision? 
WM: By then I was the National Research Coordinator for the Ministry of 
Agriculture. 
MB: Were you at all involved in the committee, the National Disaster 
Preparedness? 
WM: No, I was not. 
MB: You were not, ok.  What were your subsequent positions or if you would 
rather you can provide a CV for me. 
WM: Yeah actually, from that, actually I was promoted to become the station 
manager for Chitedze Agricultural Research Station which is one of the biggest 
research stations for the Department of Agricultural Research.  That was the 
position of Senior Deputy Director for Agricultural Services.  Then later in 2015 
that’s when I was promoted to the Director of Agricultural Services. 
MB: Congratulations 
WM: Thank you. 
MB: What was your involvement in the decision? 
WM: I would say I was not directly involved in the decision, but rather being a 
member of staff for Agriculture, I definitely was looking at the issues that were 
surrounding to the problems that we had by then.  And the only option that we 
had was to allow for actually that corn to come into the country, so that at least 
we save the people.   
MB: Mmhmmm 
WM: Indeed Malawi, according to our policy, we did not allow for the introduction 
of the GMOs.  However, we were not 100% strict with regard to the importation of 
GMOs, but rather--  
[Small interruption for the secretary to bring in water] 
WM: The recommendation is that, uhhh, in times of great scarcity in the country, 
of which this year is one of, we could not allow the people to die when the grain 
is there, simply because it is GMO.  But we did not want to introduce the GMO so 
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that at least it affects the germplasm that is in the country.  So we do advise that 
any grain that is imported into the country that is GMO, that one should be milled 
straightaway.  You know? At the point of entry.  Or it will be monitored to where it 
can be milled or hulled, so that no farmer can use that grain as seed.   
MB: Mmhmmm 
WM: You may wish to know that of course not all the farmers are capable of 
buying actually the hybrids.  That is the commercial grain that has been produced 
by commercial seed companies.  So some of the farmers, they recycle the seed 
that they have.  In this case you find that the local maize varieties, a number of 
farmers actually, a good percentage of farmers actually, they are using that, 
because they cannot afford the hybrid varieties.  But with the farm input subsidy 
that we had, that we have actually, because of the high reduction of, you know, 
of the grain, I mean the seed, of the price, the farmers actually were able to 
afford to buy the hybrid.  And that has seen Malawi actually, led to the farmers 
adopting the hybrid varieties, but not GMO. 
MB: Not GMO. Ok, and what were the arguments against accepting? 
WM: Uhh, definitely because scientifically it is not actually conclusively proven, 
the side effects.  You know? 
MB: Mmhmmm. 
WM: There’s a lot that is being talked about it. And some research of course, it 
has even shown that like, where they have used the guinea, you know? The 
guinea pigs, they have shown that of course they have developed some tumors 
after feeding with it.  Yeah, so we’re looking at that, saying, we might be having 
those.  And the side effects on people.  But we are still waiting for it, you know, 
the actual conclusive work or scientific proof that it did it.  You could actually say 
that it’s being pushed here.  Look at Malawi.  I would tell you that the average 
Malawian actually takes breakfast, you take grain, porridge.  Come lunch, we 
take our common nsima.  Supper, we take nsima again.  So every day, three 
times a day, we are taking nsima.  So whatever problem that might be introduced 
in the grain, you know, the consumption is very high. It is the effect, you know? 
MB: Yes, because they eat so much. 
WM: We eat so much. For us, every time we go to the table, there is maize.  And 
sometimes I think, if you were to stay a little bit longer, you would even find that 
there is a lot of maize that is being roasted along the road.  And people are also 
eating that. So most every hour you are eating maize. 
MB: It’s truly a staple. 
WM: Yes, so the consumption is so much.  You look at Europe or America where 
maize is grown, most of it actually is for animal feed.  Some of it actually goes 
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into cornflakes.  People eat cornflakes in the morning, you see? And it’s a choice, 
because it’s not only cornflakes, there’s some that is rice, and what. So it’s 
different. 
MB: It’s true. 
WM: So the consumption rate of maize is very low. So whether it is GMO it can 
affect people, the genetics of people actually, usually that cannot be so much 
feared because of the rate of consumption.  Let it be on wheat, where wheat 
consumption is very high, just like maize in Africa.  
MB: True. 
WM: It will be different.  Of which you don’t see the same, because wheat, there 
is no GMO that we hear of.  I don’t know, maybe I’m aware of. 
MB: Not that I’m aware of. 
WM: I’m not aware of that.  It is on maize.  And those stories behind it, this is why 
we are saying, no no, this is risky.  And in the meantime there is no issue with the 
varieties we have developed which are GMO free.   
MB: Yeah. Ok.  Was there, was there any talk of, I don’t know how to phrase this 
exactly, but, that it was a plot by, say, Monsanto to get Malawians to eat it, and 
get them kind of addicted to it so they would continue to eat it? Does that make 
sense? 
WM: Uhh, but what I know is, well that might be there. But the problem is that 
whether it is GMO or non-GMO, the taste doesn’t differ. 
MB: Ok, so it wouldn’t make a difference to people. 
WM: Doesn’t make any difference. And there’s no way to make people addicted 
to GMO maize, as far as I know. 
MB: Well, but I guess I meant that if it was grown, then if it grew better, that 
would be 
WM: Yeah, that would be the thing. Ok? Because we would be looking at the 
yield.  And if anything, if the genetically modified, if they are adaptable to certain 
conditions or situations, so farmers might be looking for that.  But basically when 
it comes, the traits that the farmer likes, then for sure they cannot go for the 
GMOs, because most of them, they are dented (?) varieties, which most of the 
Malawian farmers they don’t like. 
MB: Ok. 
WM: They would get the dented varieties for sell. Not for their own domestic 
consumption. 
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MB: Oh, ok. 
WM: They like most of the frittered (?), and the frittered type we have in the 
country, they are not GMOs.  Unless they were to come in and introduce the 
GMO frittered ones.  But so far the ones I have seen, they are the dented ones. 
So the preferences of the farmer actually it is going more towards the local maize 
rather than the hybrid varieties.  This why there has been resistance in the 
adoption of the hybrid varieties.  
MB: Ok. Was, let’s see, as National Research Coordinator were you consulted? 
WM: Yeah, by then of course I was not consulted. 
MB: Ok. And were you aware of any pressure coming from either the U.S. or the 
EU to make the decision one way or the other? 
WM: Well I would not say it was not necessarily pressure, but advice.  By then it 
was coming through, the problem that we had.  There was hunger and they were 
saying, we have got aid, and this is the form of aid that we have. So it’s up to you 
to accept it or not. Just like Zambia, because they had the alternative by then, 
you know?  So at least they had the courage to say, no no no, to GMO, it 
shouldn’t come to our country, because at least they had the alternative.  Malawi 
did not have the alternative, that’s why we had to accept it, but with the condition 
attached to it. 
MB: That it be milled. 
WM: Yes. 
MB: And what alternative are you saying Zambia had? 
WM: They at least had some grain, and they had where they could also buy 
because they had some resources, so they could buy some grain that was not 
GMO. But for us we don’t have the resources, you know? So we depended on 
the donations.  Yeah. So we had limited choice. 
MB: Was there concern that your relationship with the U.S. would be damaged if 
you didn’t accept? 
WM: No. Actually I wouldn’t say that would be a reason to damage the 
relationship actually between the two countries.  Later on there’s this issue of, 
like, the gay issues, you know? 
MB: Mmmm 
WM: Which Malawi is still resisting. We are not comfortable with that.  Is our 
relationship damaged because of that? No, we are still moving on those other 
issues. 
MB: And was there concern that your trade relationships with the EU would be 
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damaged? 
WM: In this case it was no, it was a donation to us, we were not buying. So I 
don’t think there would be an issue of trade. 
MB: But if you had GMOs in the country and the EU is so opposed, was there 
concern that they would stop trade? 
WM: Yeah, because the other thing was that actually within the EU there are so 
many countries that are saying no to the GMOS. 
MB: Yes, they are very opposed. 
WM: So I don’t think they would be hard on us.  Because even within 
themselves, they are divided. 
MB: Yeah. Ok. Let me make sure this is all.  Was there pressure from anybody to 
reject the aid, and if so, who was pressuring to reject? 
WM: In this case since I was not on the committee, so I’m not aware if there was 
any 
MB: Ok, but you didn’t know of any farmers’ associations or NGOs? 
WM: You mean within the country? 
MB: Mmmhmmm 
WM: Uhhh, not necessarily, of course sometimes we have unnecessary 
comments that come from civil society organizations, but they are not the things 
that can make the government bow down.  But rather, you know, because the 
government actually has technical advisors, ok? And sometimes the people that 
are anti are not in this country.  They would go and consult the wrong person on 
issues of agriculture.  Eh? I will give you an example, we have got actually two 
colleges in the country, universities. That’s the University of Malawi and 
University of Luana, this is the Lilongwe university of agriculture and natural 
resources.  There comes someone who comes to consult a professor from the 
University of Malawi who does not do agriculture.  Is there any research they 
could get out of that? 
MB: No 
WM: And that is what normally happens. And you get even some of the 
journalists. They get people who are just vocal and talkative from the University 
of Malawi, just a college that does not offer agriculture, to talk about agriculture, 
leaving the professionals in agriculture.  Yeah so, sometimes actually this is what 
journalists do.  Or the articles they write, it is just misleading, the people that are 
being consulted, they are not professionals in that subject matter. 
MB: They are not qualified to offer an opinion 
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WM: They are not qualified to argue, but some they just argue politically. But 
there’s no research that they are actually bringing in. So those are the things that 
is that of course the government will look at, the subjectivity of the issue.  
MB: So they are less likely to listen to those opinions because they’re not 
qualified. 
WM: They are not. You know, there are some people who may not be qualified, 
but they might be talking sense.  But it is right to consult the real professionals in 
that particular field.  Because they will tell you technically how it should be 
handled. And even the implications that might actually accrue.  
MB: Ok. Do you have any other comments? 
WM: No, I don’t have any comments. 
[Both laugh] 
MB: Ok. And do you know of any official sources that I could get access to? 
Scientific papers, legislation, government documents, anything like that? 
WM: On this issue I don’t know whether you have consulted the Department of 
Environmental Affairs. 
MB: I’ve tried. I have not been successful in reaching anyone there, but I have 
tried. 
WM: Really? 
MB: Do you know of anyone I could speak to there? 
WM: Yes, of course I know of the PS (principal secretary), but I don’t remember 
whether I still have the contact number.  Let me just check. 
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C.6 Boniface Mkoko
Boniface Mkoko, National Commission of Science and Technology, Director of 
Public Biosafety Systems- Lobbyists 
Telephone Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, 8/20/2016 
What was your job at the time? In that time I was, I think I had retired, I was no 
longer working in government, doing my own thing 
Our org wants to make sure that there is a good delivery system in place 
Ideal delivery system- following the acts of the nation and the international 
observed standards  
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C.7 Madalitso Mwale 
Madalitso Mwale , Assistant Director, Disaster Response and Recovery, 
Department of Disaster Management Affairs 
Disaster Response and Recovery, Department of Disaster Management Affairs 
offices, Lilongwe, Malawi, 8/11/16 
MB: Ok, so please tell me your name. 
MM: My name is Madalitso Mwale 
MB: And what is your position? 
MM: I am a Relief and Rehabilitation Officer in the Department of Disaster 
Management Affairs 
MB: OK. Or DODMA? 
MM: DODMA 
MB: Ok, were you working at DODMA in 2002? 
MM: In 2002 I was still a student. 
MB: I thought you looked a little young. 
[Both laugh] 
MM: Yes, so then I was in 3rd year of college? 
MB: Ok, and how long have you been at DODMA? 
MM: At DODMA, this is my 4th year now, since 2013 
MB: Ok.  So, you’ll be speaking perhaps to things that you have heard about, 
rather than experienced, but how was the decision made to accept genetically 
modified food aid? 
MM: From 2002, from my knowledge, based on the meeting we had at the Office 
of the President and Cabinet. 
MB: Mmm hmm 
MM: Uh, when the committee, the National Disaster Relief and Preparedness 
Committee met to make a decision whether to accept GMO maize or not, there 
was actually a brief discussion whether to accept it or not, with reasons.  So 
based on what was discussed in that meeting, those who met in that meeting 
were there in 2002 when the decision was being made to accept GMO maize. 
MB: And that committee is called the national… 
MM: The National Disaster Relief and Preparedness Committee 
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MB: OK 
MM: Yeah, I can give you the proper name at the end 
MB: Wonderful 
MM: That’s a high level committee where the principal secretaries and directors 
meet and make decision on what the nation should do 
MB: And who was on that committee, you said principals and directors, but 
directors of what? 
MM: These are, It’s mainly principal secretaries 
MB: Ok, in the cabinet? 
MM: Yes 
MB: Because it’s in the OPC 
MM: Yeah. And it’s mainly chaired by the Chief Secretary of the government 
MB: Ok 
MM: So, the…at that meeting it was…not agreed whether to accept or not, but 
some quarters were saying, if we don’t get non-GMO maize, then we have no 
option  
MB: Mmmmm 
MM: But to accept the GMO maize, with reference to the 2002 where we 
accepted the gmo maize. 
MB: Mmhmmm 
MM: Yeah, so, it was indicated that the GMO maize would only be accepted if its 
milled at the point of entry 
MB: Ok 
MM: Yeah, with the reasons that if we accept the GMO maize here, it may affect 
other varieties in the country 
MB: Mmmmhmmm 
MM: Because we may not know whether all the maize will be, may be milled, and 
used for food, because some people in the rural areas maybe want to try to plant 
it 
MM: So, that would be dangerous and would affect the varieties of maize, and 
that would bring problems.  So on the basis most people said, if we are to accept 
GMO maize then it has to be milled at the point of entry so it comes here as flour.  
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I’m not sure what happened in 2002, but the indication is that  maize was not 
milled as such, and I don’t know how it was controlled.  But this time around as a 
control measure, it was indicated that if we are to accept the GMO maize, then it 
has to be milled. 
MB: Mmhmmm 
MM: And that would only happen if we don’t find non- GMO enough to feed the 
vulnerable people of the nation 
MB: Ok, and by this time around, you mean what’s happening right now? 
MM: Yes, yes. Right now the government is still procuring maize, and no decision 
has been made yet. 
MB: K 
MM: …On whether to accept the genetically modified maize. We hope, we’re just 
hoping that we’ll get enough maize, non-GMO maize. 
MB: Mmmhmm. So, but I know that there is a current genetically modified cotton 
experiment happening. 
MM: Yes 
MB: So Malawi as a country is not necessarily opposed to GMO. 
MM: Yes 
MB: Is that accurate? 
MM: Actually, Malawi is not opposed to GMOs crops, but with this culture now to 
say, because I heard the principle secretary for the Ministry of Gender 
MM: Yes. She was that in meeting.  She had her own reason to say, let’s not 
accept this maize now, because it may affect our health.  She cited a few 
examples on the effects of GMO maize on health 
MB: Um, what were, what did she cite? 
MM: Well, as far as I remember, she mentioned the issues to do with the 
reproduction, that it may affect reproduction, or the reproductive system.  That’s 
from her knowledge of GMO, though some people really indicated that it doesn’t 
have any effect on the reproductive system 
MB: Mmhmmm 
MM: Then she also mentioned issues of nutrition, nutritionally 
MB: That it’s not quite as healthy? 
MM: Yes, nutritionally she said that it’s not that healthy to be eaten. So she cited 
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those examples to say we don’t accept this maize. 
MB: Hmmm, ok. 
MM: Yeah 
MB: Ok 
MM: Sure.  
MB: Was parliament involved at all, other than the cabinet ministers?  They didn’t 
meet to vote or anything like that? 
MM: No, no. at this point, no, parliament hasn’t been involved 
MB: K 
MM: I think if a decision is to be made, then it’s that committee that will make the 
decision. Because that committee will also have some ministers who attend. So 
once that committee approves to accept the GMO maize then it’s actually done. 
MB: Then it’s done. Ok. Ok. What do you feel were the primary reasons for 
accepting GMO maize 
MM: Come again? 
MB: What were the main reasons that Malawi accepted GMO maize even though 
they had concerns? 
MM: I think that the main reason was…there wasn’t enough. Ummm, non-GMO 
crop available, even originally, to meet the demand that was there in 2002, 
because I remember, was it over 5 million people who were food insecure? 
MB: Wow 
MM: Yes, so 
MB: That’s a large part of your population 
MM: Yes, and demand was just so high. And I remember that here it was not 
only Malawi was the country which was affected, so in the region other countries 
were also affected, so there was a scramble for the little maize that was there. 
MB: I see 
MM: So, so looking at the population which has been affected this year due to, 
we are calling it El Nino, it’s mainly dry spells in the southern region, see over 6.5 
million people 
MB: Even more than last time 
MM: Yes, so that’s why there’s been mention of GMO as a second option. But if 
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we don’t get enough non-GMO, then possibly we will go for the GMO maize 
MB: Ok 
MM: Yeah. Right now the National Food Reserve Agency is procuring maize 
locally 
MB: Mmmm 
MM: Yeah, there are good indications that the maize can be sourced locally, 
even from neighboring countries like Zambia, though Zambia, I understand has 
banned the export of maize 
MB: Yeah, Zambia is in trouble as well 
MM: So, so like if we exhaust all the local reserves from farmers, um, looking at 
the need this year, we are likely not to meet the demand with local non-GMO 
maize.  So I, I, I, I’m looking at us as a country, at some point we’ll make the 
decision to accept the GMO maize 
MB: Mmm, you think it’s likely 
MM: Yes. But then, with that caution that that maize should be milled at the point 
of entry, so that no one uses the seed which may affect other varieties of maize 
in the country 
MB: Ok. Ok. Ummm, let’s see.  Who was consulted about the decision, did you 
consult scientists? Other governments? 
MM: About the decision to accept GMO or not to accept? 
MB: To accept [both laugh] well, both, it’s the same decision, right? 
MM: Yes, it’s the same. It’s the same. Normally a decision could be made, but 
any consultations have to to take place with the scientists, especially our 
colleagues at the Bunda, there’s the Bunda College of Agriculture 
MB: I’m actually meeting with Kingdom Kapwata tomorrow 
MM: Yes, that’s where they’re testing the GMO cotton. So actually, that decision 
will be made with the support from the experts. 
MB: Ok, ok. At Bunda College, is the best place. Ok great. 
MM: Yes, Bunda is the best. So I’m hoping that those people be consulted before 
that decision is actually approved 
MB: And they’ll be consulted by the committee, the committee will consult them? 
MM: Yes. Yes. Yeah. Sure 
MB: Ok. Was there pressure coming from organizations outside the government, 
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such as NGOs, or I know tribal chiefs played a role in Zambia, did tht play a role 
here? Uh, farmers’ associations. Was there pressure saying don’t accept or do 
accept? 
MM: No, the pressure was emanating from the figure 
MB: From the… 
MM: The figure, or the number of people 
MB: Oohhh 
MM: Without food.  The food insecure households.  Looking at the figure, saying 
it has never happened in the history of Malawi to have such a huge number of 
people food insecure households. Yeah, so so, just looking at the number they’re 
looking t how the agriculture season has performed.  It has performed poorly, 
and we haven’t raised enough.  We have a deficit in terms of production, maize 
production.  So likely it’s coming from that understanding that we will not be able 
to meet the needs and the demand.  And then looking at the market regionally, 
we also have our colleagues of Africa, they have also have production problems.  
Zambia, the same thing.  And then, at the time, people were mentioning Brazil, 
Ukraine, Mexico, that’s when the issue of GMO came to say, is this maize which 
would be imported from Mexico be GMO or non-GMO?  
MB: Mmmhmmm 
MM: So from that point some people say, whether it’s GMO or not, we will accept 
it.  If it’s GMO then we have to control it from the point of entry. So it’s coming 
from that background. 
MB: Uh huh. There are just too many people hungry to worry about other 
pressures, is what you’re saying? 
MM: Yes. 
MB: Yes. Ok.  Ummm, did you feel pressure, was there pressure from the U.S. to 
accept GMO maize?  
MM: No 
MB: No? Ok 
MM: No, the pressure is not from the U.S. 
MB: No? 
MM: No. 
MB: Alright. Was there concern though that the U.S. wouldn’t like it if you didn’t 
accept it? 
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MM: No, not to my knowledge.   To my knowledge, I haven’t heard the U.S. or 
ministry here say anything about the U.S.  maybe having an influence on the 
GMO accepting or not accepting.  I haven’t heard on that. 
MB: Ok. And what about the EU? Because the EU, the European Union is very 
opposed to GMOs.  Does Malawi do a lot of trade with the EU? 
MM: Yes it does, but then maybe the issue is, that’s why there’s that caution to 
say you only accept the GMO maize in the form of flour.  So that it becomes here 
as flour, but not as maize seed. 
MB: That’s one of the reasons to mill 
MM: Yes. So it’s like maybe, I don’t know how the EU decided, but the people 
are saying if it comes as flour then we will have no problems because we will be 
distributing flour, not the maize.  So maybe it’s from that understanding that it’s 
safe to bring the GMO maize, which will be in the form of flour, not the seed here. 
Because normally we distribute the seed so that it’s milled.  So it’s the grain 
which is not wanted. 
MB: Ok 
MM: Yeah 
MB: Ok. Um, oh. Umm. Ok, any other comments? 
MM: Yeah, maybe my comment will be, from your understanding, would you 
support the idea, the decision to import GMO material in terms of maize or flour?  
Looking at it, from your knowledge, looking at the GMO maize and then the flour, 
nutritionally or healthwise.  Because we are just focusing on the health of the 
people and then that food should not have negative effects on members. 
MB: Well, personally, and this is not as a researcher, I don’t think there’s a 
problem with GMOs. I don’t know if you know that the National Academy of 
Sciences in the U.S. just came out with a report, and what that report said is that 
we cannot find any harm in GMOs. So, personally, that’s my opinion, but I am not 
a specialist or scientist in that area 
MM: Ok 
MB: And do you know of any official sources I could get access to, such as 
meeting minutes, scientific perps, official sources, that type of thing 
MM: Maybe I could get that one.  I could also check with colleagues and then I 
could send you any links where you can get those papers. 
MB: That would be wonderful. 
MM: So you leave me with your business card then I will be able to provide that 
information. 
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MB: Ok, and do you know anybody o the National Committee that I could speak 
with? 
MM: On that committee, let me…probably if you talk to the principle secretary in 
the Ministry of Agriculture, that’s Mrs. Erica Manganga 
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C.8 Duncan Ndhlovu 
Duncan Ndhlovu, Aid Worker 
Lilongwe, Malawi, 8-17-16 
MB: Ok, so your name is Duncan Ndhlovu 
DN: Yes 
MB: Did I pronounce that correctly? 
DN: Yeah it is. 
MB: Oh good. And you are an aid worker? 
DN: Yes 
MB: Ok, so we are talking about the decision in 2002 for Malawi to accept 
genetically modified food, specifically maize. Did you know, or did your 
organization know about the decision before it was made? 
DN: Before it was made? 
MB: Mmm, the decision was pending 
DN: Yes, because we had a crisis situation in the country, food crisis situation in 
the country, and ummm, it was also a regional problem, so Zambia was affected, 
Mozambique was affected, Zimbabwe was affected, so I think South Africa was 
the only country that was better off in the region, and they couldn’t supply for all 
the needs in the region, so there was need for most countries in the region to 
accept U.S. ummm, GMO and the issue was corn, maize. Yeah, and at the time, 
if I recall, in Malawi we didn’t have the policy or regulations in place, in terms of 
how we would go about, which product would be accepted, if it would be used. 
That was not in place. So I think whatever decisions that were made at the time 
were based on lack of information by the government in terms of implications on 
taking GMO maize 
MB: You felt like the government didn’t have information, enough information 
DN: I would say, because different departments in the government had different 
positions, so consensus was difficult 
MB: Yes. Yes 
DN: There’s a National Research Council of Malawi, there’s the Department of 
Agriculture, there’s research stations, there’s Department of Crops, within 
Ministry of Agriculture, then there’s Environmental Affairs department, which is 
concerned about safety, biosafety and the like.  Then there’s the Bureau of 
Standards. So, you know, the government is a very big bureaucratic institution 
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and constituents from all these entities to say, let’s make this decision from now, 
it took a lot of time, but eventually the decision was made. So I’m saying that the 
decision was made in the absence of regulations being in place, or guidelines, 
there were no guidelines. So it was an issue of, people are dying, we feed them 
or they die. 
MB: Seems like a simple calculation 
DN: Yes 
MB: Um, were you aware of, or did you have any say in the conversation that 
was happening in the government? 
DN: As WFP? 
MB: Mmmhmmm, your organization 
DN: Ummmm, it was just I think to provide guidance in terms of, or information, in 
terms of what it means, what GMO means, the implications.  So the decision was 
ultimately government’s.  You know, at the same time, Zambia was also facing, 
was also going through drought. And if I remember correctly Zambia said no. 
MB: You are correct, I’m actually studying Zambia and Malawi. 
DN: Yes. Zambia said no, Malawi said yes.  And Malawi said yes on the 
condition that we do a,b,c,d. 
MB: And that was that it be milled before it entered the country 
DN: Yes 
MB: Ok. And did you feel that your organization had any say in the decision, 
other than advice, was there any say in it? 
DN: No, it was more of guidance, yes advice to the government 
MB: Ok. How were you informed of the decision, did you find out from the 
newspaper, did someone tell you from the government? 
DN: Ummmm, I cannot trace the documentation, but obviously there must have 
been some correspondence between the government, I think, it should be 
Ministry of Agriculture or Department of Disaster Management Affairs indicating 
what the government decision is. 
MB: Did you agree with the decisions made? 
DN: Obviously, yes.  So the corn from U.S. was received as a grain into the 
country, and then before it was distributed it had to be milled, yeah so, 
by…facilitated the milling 




MB: Um, and did the WFP have concerns about health issues, or was it just, 
people are dying, we need to get this flour to them? 
DN: Of course, of course, WFP had some standards in terms of safety. So all the 
food distributed is supposed to be certified as fit for human consumption. So I’m 
sure those checks must have been made on the maize meal, on the corn meal. 
Yes. 
MB: Now, do they call it mealie meal here? That’s what they call it in Zambia 
DN: In Zambia it’s mealie meal, in Malawi it’s maize meal or corn meal. 
MB: Did you have any pressure coming from individuals or organizations saying, 
you might have some pull with the government, please help? Such as other 
NGOs, farmers’ associations, thing like that? 
DN: Ummmmm, I think most of because, the government was not doing enough, 
people were starving, people were dying, so I think that helped to make the 
government to make the decision. Because it was a death situation, and the 
government wanted to be seen as doing something , and with the calls from all 
centers that the government should do something, I think it facilitated the 
government to make that decision. But also I think that if the government had 
alternatives I think perhaps they were trying to be aware of it, but I don’t think 
there were alternative sources of grain at that time. 
MB: K, and it was yellow maize coming from the U.S. at that time? 
DN: Yes, it was yellow maize 
MB: Which is not something Malawians eat 
DN: Yes. We eat white, grain, non-GMO 
MB: Ok. Was there concern that yellow maize wouldn’t be eaten. That people 
would just reject because it wasn’t what they were used to? 
DN: No, I think there was some advocacy about what it is and that it should be 
accepted. Although there were some reports of diarrhea and all this all because 
of preparation, so there was also some messaging around how to prepare it. 
MB: Ok, ummm. Let’s see, we’ve answered that. So the government’s current 
position is still, they are not a fan of GMO. 
DN: Mmmmm 
MB: But your country is in the same position it was in 14 years ago, now.  
DN: Mmmmm 
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MB: Do you think that that will, that they will make the same decision? They have 
made the same decision, is that correct? Or have they not made it yet 
DN: I think they have made the same decision, that the GMO maize can be 
accepted if it is milled before it’s distributed, or its, yeah 
MB: And the WFP is again facilitating that? 
DN: There’s no indicated contribution as far as I know, from the U.S. that they will 
be bringing GMO maize at the moment. Yeah, you may have to talk to the 
American  
MB: Oh, I intend to 
DN: To USAID, say, are you planning to give to WFP GMO maize or not.  But at 
the moment I don’t think the U.S. has indicated contribution of that kind. 
MB: Ok. I’ve heard from others that there may be maize coming from Mexico. 
That’s GMO as well, yes? 
DN: No 
MB: No, it’s not 
DN: It’s not GMO 
MB: Ok. So what are the main sources this time, of the food aid? 
DN: It’s Zambia. The maize is Zambian 
MB: Really? 
DN: Yeah 
MB: Huh, ok.  That is interesting 
DN: So, they are buying from Zambia, and the traders, but if you talk to the 
traders they will also say that some is locally source, some is from across the 
border.  So Zambia is the main source for Malawi at the moment. 
MB: And what happens when Zambia is in trouble? 
DN: Yeah, that’s when are now looking at the international markets like Mexico 
and Ukraine and others 
MB: But that hasn’t started yet? 
DN: No 
MB: Ok, because you’re depending on Zambia 
DN: Yes. 
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MB: Ok, that’s good to know. Any other comments? 
DN: Have you talked to the Environmental affairs department? 
MB: That’s actually my appointment at 2:00 
DN: Ok, because they make the regulatory framework on food biosafety 
technologies in the country. So, they may have the bill on biosafety regulations. 
MB: Good, ok. 
DN: And they are the ones who made that bill. There is also a national committee 
on biosafety. There’s also the national biosafety regulatory committee. 
MB: OK. I will look into that when I’m there. 
DN: Yeah. 
MB: Do you know of any official sources for documentation in the WFP? 
DN: The information in the WFP is kept for 5 years and then it’s archived. So that 
means going into the archives, so the information that you could find, it would 
only go as far as 5 years back. Beyond that, it’s sent to the archives. 
MB: Ok, that’s good to know. 
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C.9 Tamani Mvula Nkhono
Tamani Mvula Nkhono, National Director of CISANET 
Residence, Lilongwe, Malawi, 8-16-16  
TMN: It’s been awhile 
MB: Yes it has 
TMN: I think that time the challenge which was there was that, the country was 
faced with a crisis. 
MB: Mmhmmm 
TMN: And there were people that were dying of hunger. And they knew when the 
government made an appeal for food, there was this donation that came from the 
U.S. , WFP of genetically modified food. Now, the issue at that time was that 
genetic engineering was a largely new thing 
MB: Mmhmmm 
TMN: There were a lot of myths about GMOs, how GMOS are made, the effects 
of GMOs, all those things. So there was all that talking, especially, because 
much of the position was coming from the EU. NGOs and the EU. So, you know 
CISANET is a network of a number of NGOs. 
MB: Mmhmmm 
TMN: So others anti, the food and others were for it. Those that were for it put 
forth an argument that they are not documented evidence that people have died 
after eating GMOs. Of course there is all this talk that it can cause all sorts of 
health problems, but there is no evidence for that. As a matter of fact, much of 
the food that is eaten contains some trace, especially processed food, contains 
some trace of genetically modified food. It would not only be maize, but maybe 
potatoes.  
MB: Mmhmmm 
TMN: Now, the other thing was that the region in general, the region I’m talking 
about is the Southern region. Countries such as Mozambique and Zambia, there 
were those countries that openly said no. 
MB: Yes, I’m also studying Zambia because of that 
TMN: Yes, the president then of Zambia put it clear that he would rather die than 
eat genetically modified food. Mozambique also had the same stand, but I don’t 
think Mozambique was as tough as Zambia. Now the issue was that the maize 
was supposed to go through Mozambique. So South Africa at that time was still 
accepting genetically modified food, so our maize entered through, was it through 
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Durban. But it had to be milled. There was a fear that if it goes through 
Mozambique, one grain would fall on the ground and genetically modify the crop. 
MB: So it had to be milled in South Africa? 
TMN: Yes, it had to be milled and of course not all of it was milled because there 
were others who received the actual maize. 
MB: Mmm 
TMN: Now at CISANET our main concern at that time was that as a country, 
because this has just come, it’s an issue that we never thought we were going to 
come face to face with it. So the institutional framework was not there. We didn’t 
have policies, we didn’t have laws to manage issues of biosafety.  So at 
CISANET we wanted to push for a policy to be there. What is the policy of 
government for the genetically modification. Because with the coming of this 
maize- this maize would be accepted because we would say...and we had also 
engaged some experts at Bunda, some experts in biotechnology who helped us 
in terms of giving us the information. All about genetically modification, and 
evidence and all those things. So the people from Bunda were of the view that 
there is no problem with these things. Whatever is being said is just politics and 
not necessarily that if there could be challenges, fine, maybe in the long run, but 
the choice is there: eat this food and be alive, or die of hunger. So that was the 
choice that people were being faced with. So at CISANET it was difficult for us to 
stand and say, we don’t want this, because in the country there was very little 
knowledge, and the experts are saying it’s ok. So we didn’t have a good basis of 
saying no, though we had organizations like ActionAid and other, Oxfam, and 
other NGOs who were opposing this thing.  
MB: Oh 
TMN: Yeah, but we said, ok, fine, but let us come up with the policy. We may 
accept this because of this crisis, but what about from here onwards? What will 
happen if people plant this maize? What will happen if Bunda wants to do 
research? What will happen if Monsanto comes up with a variety that is 
genetically modified? It may not be maize, but BtCotton is still something which is 
genetically modified. What is the government policy? 
MB: Mmmhmmm 
TMN: Yeah, so at CISANET we initiated that process. 
MB: Oh 
TMN: But at the same time because this maize was coming into the country, 
there was also a process of coming up with the biosafety Act for the country. So 
the Biosafety act and the policy, we started with the act because we needed to 
come up with the act fast enough so that we knew this maize landed into the 
294 
 
country, there at least was an act of government. But it was to be an interim 
regulation so that we’d come up with the policy and then form there we can 
develop and strengthen the Biosafety Act.  Yeah, so at CISANET when that 
policy was being developed, we did, what we then used to call People’s Voices, 
so we hear what people are saying. We tried to explain to them what GMOs are, 
and what do you think needs to happen and all those things. 
MB: Who were these people? 
TMN: These were now NGOs, especially local NGOs, but CBOs, community 
based organizations, farmers, and all those things. But of course we had to 
explain to them the little knowledge we had of what genetic modification was all 
about, the effects and all those things, and what people were saying about it. But 
one of the biggest gaps that we had at that time was information and knowledge. 
It seems it was something that came, it was a necessary evil that needed to be 
accepted. But we did not have much information. 
MB: Yes, it seems like from what I’ve talked to other people about, there was little 
knowledge but a lot of belief about what was going on. 
TMN: Yes, so, as you said there was little knowledge, but the thing is, because 
there were people who were hearing convincing arguments from both sides, from 
the pro-GMO and also the anti-GMO. All sides were putting forth cases that 
made sense. So for us we needed to go for people we felt could be neutral, and 
that was the university. So the university at that time, most of them were pro-
GMO. I’m saying this because there were other people in the government, who 
were also experts in genetic modification who were very much against this thing. 
And we had professors at Bunda saying, no, it’s fine, don’t worry, many people 
have been eating this and all those things. So we found ourselves in a situation 
where we now need to confront government, so the question is, what type of 
message are we taking to the government? But by that time the genetically 
modified flour had already come, the position was already done. 
MB: Did you get a biosafety act done in time? 
TMN: I would say no, because we had the GM flour already in the country when 
the act was not finalized. Yeah, but to me I think that the act was not necessarily 
looking at the current consignment at that time, but what’s next, what will happen 
after this? Because if we had accepted the GM maize into the country, or GM 
flour into the country, I think they’re eating and nothing is happening, there was a 
feeling that others would come and just start doing it, but now we need to control. 
We may have accepted because of the crisis, but beyond that there is need for 




TMN: Yeah. Sure 
MB: Let me look through my questions because you’ve answered a lot of them. 
[Irrelevant chitchat] 
MB: First of all, let’s go back a little bit, your title is director of CISANET? 
TMN: National Director 
MB: Ok. Who were the individual organizations who were for bringing GM in? 
TMN: Among the NGOs? 
MB: Yes 
TMN: Well, the thing is that the challenge was…those that were not for; they 
were not as vocal as those that were against. 
MB: Ok, why do you think that is? 
TMN: Well, the other thing is that the influence was coming in from the donors. 
Those that were being supported by the European Union, ActionAid, Oxfam, they 
were for.  They were the ones that supported CISANET at the time. Then there 
were others like World Vision, they were for, but not as vocal as these others. I 
think maybe it was because how genetically modified crops were greatly 
demonized at that time. I think you look at the stand of Zambia which had great 
influence over the region. All of us knew what President Mwanawasa had said. 
So I think that for these NGOs to stand and say it, maybe they felt that they may 
be working against their wealth. So we had those others CRS, World Vision and 
others which were for but were not that vocal. 
MB: Now, I understand that part of the problem was that right before the crisis hit 
Malawi had sold off their grain reserves at the urging of the IMF and the World 
Bank.  Do you know anything about that? 
TMN: Yes. Yeah, ummmm I think what had happened was that, because this 
was in 2000-2001.  If you look from 1997, 97, 98, 99, Malawi was having a 
surplus.  There was a program called Starter Bank. Starter Bank was a program 
supported by DFID, European Union and the Malawi government. And the 
Starter Bank was a program that was giving corn to small farmers.  A pack, and 
in that pack there was seed, fertilizer, two types of fertilizer, two types of seed, 
and maize. So that helped in terms of boosting production. So in 1997 we had a 
surplus.1998 we had a surplus. 1999, yeah, there was a surplus. Now, what was 
happening was that, because of this surplus, the maize in the strategic grain 
reserve was just staying. Of course, there couldn’t be a release onto the market, 
but because of the surplus there was a feeling that maize was rotting anyway 
because it had stayed for some time. 
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MB: Ah yes. 
TMN: So, now in terms of managing the reserve, it was very expensive. Because 
there wasn’t a need to release maize onto the market because there was already 
oversupply. So strategic reserve had to keep the maize, I think for 3 years.  Now, 
there was a recommendation from these institutions, the World Bank, and EU, 
and IMF, to, there was a recommendation of why can’t we offload this maize? 
We offloaded it, maybe exported it, whatever, because it would be easy to buy 
again on the world market, to replenish the strategic grain reserve.  Yeah so, I 
think it was out of that recommendation that the government decided to sell to 
Kenya. But, these strategic reserves are supposed to be replenished 
immediately.  After 3 months they are supposed to be replenished. Now, 
because of the supply that was on the market, the grain reserves stayed empty 
beyond the time they were supposed to. Maybe there was a feeling that in the 
next, in the other year’s harvest we can buy maize from the market and refill the 
grain reserves. 
MB: Mmmm, so they were counting on the surplus continuing. 
TMN: Yes. Now what happened is that in 2000 there was a drought, so they were 
caught unawares, there is no maize in the strategic grain reserve, which they had 
exported, and there was a drought, meaning they had to find grain somewhere 
for the reserves.  So it was in such a situation that they found themselves to have 
no maize in government reserves. And now there was now this influx of 
genetically modified maize, food aid and all these things. Yeah, but the mistake 
the government did was not to replenish the grain reserves immediately, which is 
the rule.  They are supposed to have maize for crisis. 
MB: Yeah, I passed some of the silos yesterday and there were just trucks for 
kilometers, lined up.  Ok, let’s see.  So have things changed in any significant 
way since the decision was made. Do you feel like the attitude towards GMO has 
changed? 
TMN: Well, to me I think it has not changed.  There’s still a lot of resistance in 
terms of, because up until today I think, I don’t think that there is a general 
consensus on whether genetically modified food are health hazards or not. 
Because that argument which is there is that most of the genetically modified 
crops come from countries like U.S., Mexico and all those. And the message 
which is going around is that in those countries it’s not people that eat it, it’s 
animals. So now, the question is, why they are feeding it to animals and not 
humans. But the thing is, what I am trying to say is that I don’t think there is a 
consensus on the health hazards of genetically modified food. So as much as 
there is a general feeling that people have some information, that they can make 
an informed decision, but the fear is still there.  Even the people that the ones I 
talked about from government and Chitedze, there are still people there who 
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argue against it.  They’re going to give you presentations showing you the tests 
that they did on a rat, on how a rat is looking and all those things.  So, with that it 
is difficult to make policy decisions.  And the government, we have a problem 
with bananas in Malawi where we have lost, I think we have lost about 70% of 
our bananas to banana….disease.  Now the research that is being done now, 
they have come up with GM banana. This variety has been imported from 
Australia and is being tested on a research station. But now the question is, how 
is it going to be accepted, is it going to be accepted. Because the guy doing the 
research is saying that this banana is different than most bananas because it 
doesn’t produce the genetically modified protein. There are terms they are using, 
R, something like that. So this is safe to eat because there is no genetic 
modification of the type of proteins that come out. So the question is, I mean  the 
issue is as long as it is called genetically modified, the guardians of whatever are 
going to explain, it’s that attitude which is, which needs to be changed for us to 
fully accept it.  But because of maybe talking about these things, and also maybe 
putting forth an argument that the people who ate the maize in 2000 are still 
alive, they are not dead, well, these things can be eaten.  I think that’s now the 
argument which is going on. 
MB: That’s a good argument 
TMN: But still the fear is still there because those that are in the know, they are 
still arguing about this thing. So for some of us who are waiting for ideas from 
them, and this one is saying this, that.  It’s still argued. 
MB: You might be interested, the National Academy of Sciences in the U.S., last 
month came out with a report on genetically modified food, they concluded that 
there is no harm in it. So that was big in the U.S.  So, it just so happens that your 
country is in the same position right now. 
TMN: Yeah, of course. 
MB: What is CISANET doing, or are they doing anything this time around? 
TMN: Well, of course we have been asked so many questions about this as to 
the likelihood because the government will be importing maize from Mexico, from 
Ukraine. Of course maybe Ukraine could be safer than Mexico, but the likelihood 
of having genetically modified food is there. Now, as for CISANET, we have not 
come up with a complete position on this, but our argument has been the same 
like the one we had previously. That we are in a crisis. If people don’t eat this 
maize, they will eat something else. And the something else that we eat is much, 
much worse than this maize.  So I may say that the official position has not been 
established.  We are yet to. We will be having a meeting in October, the first of 
October. So one of the presentations that will be made is on genetically, all on 
biotechnology. Because what will go on as an institution is first it will have as 
much information as possible so that when you are putting forth an argument on 
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something, at least it is something that is informed by sound research, because 
the problem is that there is a lot of emotion in the argument. Sometimes you see 
people that, I mean the fears that are presented sometimes, they are 
unwarranted fears.  Because you look at the level of argument and what they are 
putting forth, because at CISANET we have said we accept this, but with caution. 
MB: Of course 
TMN: There are less, for example, you talk about BT Cotton. BT Cotton is not 
edible.  Of course there are seeds that come out of that, but the understanding 
we have is that when there is refining it’s much safer to eat a refined genetically 
modified something, but those are the arguments that are coming forth, but what 
I was saying is that BT Cotton is acceptable to us, looking at what it can do, what 
it does. Because if you look at the cost of production in cotton, about 40% of that 
is chemicals, so if we go for BT Cotton we should be able to reduce the cost of 
production by at least 40%.  Not from labor, but from chemicals.  But if you make 
that economic argument some will come with an environmental argument, so 
sometimes it’s all chaos at the end of the day. But because maize is edible, that’s 
when I say, let’s be cautious, let’s have as much information as possible before 
we make that decision. 
MB: Yeah, I spoke with Dr. Kingdom Kwapata at Bunda College and he said that 
they’re doing BT Cotton trials, but they’re also doing BT Cowpea, which is edible. 
So they’re moving towards that. 
TMN: Yes, you know I sit on this committee, what do they call it, Agricultural 
Biotechnology something, so of course it’s been awhile since I attended their 
meetings and this issue was presented. 
MB: Is this a national committee, what is this? 
TMN: There is a national committee on biosafety, but this is a subcommittee on 
agriculture.  So this issue was presented, the cowpea and also the banana, but 
of course, as I said in that meeting it was only those that are against who were in 
that meeting, because it was all government.  So the argument was no, let us 
grow peas and all those things, but Bunda was given the go ahead because I 
think the, how they had put it, the, they had presented it as though their research 
was for academic purposes and not necessarily they were going to release a 
variety of cotton. But somebody was going to do a PhD on this and then he 
wants to research it. So it was on that basis that it was accepted. So I don’t know 
if they have certificated that they can do trials on something which can be eaten.  
So it’s been awhile, you should ask someone else is better informed on this. 
MB: Ok. Did you feel that your advocacy was effective, I mean obviously it was 
effective because they accepted the food, umm, let’s move past that.  Do you 
have any other comments? 
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TMN: Ummm, well maybe the thing is that what happened before is that when we 
are drawing these policies I think maybe it was because of the timeframe, and 
also the fact that genetic or GMOs, it was something that was alien to this part of 
Africa.  I think we did not have a benchmark in terms of how does a biosafety 
policy look like. The only probably inference that this may be American, Mexican 
all those, but what about an African country that has accepted this? And then 
what about the effects?  How are they doing? Of course we had some…that we 
are poor. But looking at the level of position that they were facing I think our 
policy was not developed on a good basis. So I think with what has happened 
they maybe need for us to review our policy and try to put into place measures 
that are looking at what other countries are doing or have done and then maybe 
we can learn from them. 
MB: But you were essentially pioneers in this. 
TMN: Yes, our role as I said that it was mainly to seek for advice from people.  
We said as CISANET, we said that we need to make sure that the government 
position on this is normal. This food, the GM food at that time, we accepted it on 
moral grounds, people were dying. We have maize others have given which we 
don’t have evidence that some have died because of it.  The choice that we have 
is let them do it so that they survive at least for one year.  Let them not die of 
hunger. So it was on that moral basis that it was accepted, but now we said that 
beyond this let us make sure that we have got a position as a government, a 
policy as a government. Yeah, so the good thing that the government was of the 
view and then the process went on. 
MB: Ok. Do you know of any sources that I could, documentation sources that I 
could see such as minutes, meeting minutes, things like that from either 
CISANET or other sources?  
TMN: Yeah, I can try to look at some of the documents that we had produced 
then, but as I said it’s been awhile. 
MB: It has been awhile 
TMN: Yeah, I will try to go through some of the documentations. And I don’t 
know, have you met Dr. Beniss? Dr. Beniss is the one I talked about who was 
against all this. One who didn’t want to hear. 
MB: So he was in the government? 
TMN: He was in the government but now he’s started his own company. So I 
think he may also be an interesting person to meet. So in terms of documentation 
I can look for them. I think Beniss will also have information. 
MB: Do you have any contact information for him? And that was my next 
question, who else can I talk to? 
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C.10 Yanira Ntupanyama
Dr. Yanira Ntupanyama, Chief Director for Environment and Climate Change 
Management, Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining 
Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mining offices, Lilongwe, Malawi, 8-
17-16
MB: Yes, it was a long time ago, it’s hard to remember. Ok, so what was your 
position in 2002? 
YN: Actually I was principal environmental officer, so the positions in the 
government is such that you start with like, the professional officer, and then the 
professional officer is someone with a degree, a starting position in the 
government. So you get promoted to a senior and then after that you interview 
and you become after that a principal environmental officer, so I was a principal 
environmental officer.  Now I know, I must have been a Chief Environmental 
Officer, which is equivalent to Assistant Director. So in each, in the departments, 
the Department of the Environment, we had different sections. So the Assistant 
Director, or the Chief Environmental Officer would have been responsible for 
planning, policy and planning. So I was in that department, that section rather. 
Um, and then there’s a section for Environmental Impact Assessment, and for 
Environmental Outreach, which deals with the formation and such, and then we 
also had a section on legal. So, at that time I was a Chief Environmental Officer 
responsible for biodiversity, and because biodiversity and the conventional 
biodiversity, then we have the protocol, biosafety protocol, so I was dealing with 
that too. But I also had a biosafety officer. 
MB: Ok, so I’m going to ask you questions about that time, and if it’s in the 
background you’ve given me, just tell me, refer to the background. Ok, did you 
have a role, or did you know of the decision being made to accept or reject 
genetically modified food aid? 
YN: Yeah, we, I basically knew because the biosafety committee is under the 
Environment Department, and I was part and parcel of it, so I was the secretary 
of the biosafety committee. It was being chaired by, I think it was being chaired 
by Agriculture. So in issues relating to genetically modified have to go through 
that committee, but it also has to go through a committee in Agriculture which I 
think deals with species and what. Yeah, so it had to go through our committee.  
We debated about it, we had to find out what is the best way to bring in this? 
Knowing that I think the main concern was that even myself or even my 
grandmother, if she sees the seed and thinks, oh this seed looks unique and she 
would try to plant it. So the concern was that someone in the village or someone 
who was interested in crops would decide to plant it. So if they plant it, then what 
next? I think at that time we struggled with issues that bringing genetically 
modified seeds or crop into the country might end up having problems that other 
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countries in Canada, framers have had problems with Monsanto, where you find 
some of the genes in farmers’ land and then people start questioning, so where 
did you get this? But on the other hand we did want to conserve our genetic 
maize and the vitamins, so we didn’t want it to be polluted.  I have a background 
of agriculture, so I worked at Chitedze Research Station almost 10 years. 
MB: I was there yesterday. 
YN: Yeah, so I worked there. 
MB: Ok. So your main concerns with not having it in the country were: you didn’t 
want to get in trouble with companies, potentially. 
YN: Potentially, yeah. Potentially, first we didn’t want our people to start planting 
it. 
MB: Now, why? 
YN: If they planted it, I think at that time the reasoning was, then there would be 
cross pollination with our crops. But on the other hand, being a hybrid, they 
harvest anyway, probably they wouldn’t harvest. Because. 
MB: You thought they wouldn’t grow 
YN: Yeah, it would grow but then at the end of the day the potential harvesting 
wouldn’t be there. But the main issue was polluting our own. 
MB: You wanted to keep that 
YN: And then when you go out of the country and when you read a lot you learn 
that sometimes they also get in trouble with the genes. And the genes that are 
probably being protected by certain companies, are now being found in the 
farmers’ fields. 
MB: OK. So how many people were on the national bio safety committee? 
YN: Sure there were many, because if I can recall, because the bio safety 
committee is still the bio safety committee, we still have it. I am 
MB: Are you still on it? 
YN: I'm not still on it because my position is, has changed since then because at 
that time I was just the chief environmental officer, dealing with a very technical 
issues, trying to implement the convention and also trying to implement the, 
trying to make people understand the fire safety protocol, the Cartagena protocol. 
Yeah, UMMMM so, I'm not in that position but I do recall that we have a 
consumer Association of Malawi and they can make noise and they cannot 
accept things which probably you understand. 
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MB: Mmhmmm. 
YN: We also have a people from the police 
MB: Why is that? 
YN: We want them to monitor what's coming in and what's going out of the 
country. We also have people from gender, minister of gender 
MB: Ahh, yes 
YN: Because whatever is coming out of the biosafety should be… to the masses, 
and the underprivileged should be…we have people from The forestry research 
Institute of Malawi because genetically modified organisms are not on just crops 
that end up in our food chain, but also forest issues that are genetically modified. 
Agriculture is in charge of it. And I think that's as far as I can remember. We also 
have fisheries, yeah we have fisheries. 
MB: OK, so this, if you can recall and it might be in here, when was the 
committee about genetically modified food eight specifically? Was it 2002? 
YN: I think it was 2002, we had some meetings, we had some meetings when 
basically it was meetings to decide how do we deal with the situation that we 
have, that we are in. Our people need food, and we also need to protect the 
biodiversity of the country, which is our varieties in the country. So in 2002, we've 
had these meetings before so that we're not having them just because of this. 
We dealt with these issues 
MB: This was an ongoing concern 
YN: This is an ongoing thing. So it was in a special meeting where there are 
special issues now coming up. So we need to deal with them. And after 
deliberating over it and the minister of agriculture was also deliberating over it, 
well people need food and what and as we are saying no, we don't wanted to 
because it's genetically modified, how best do we do it so that it's milled,  Bring it 
milled so that no one uses the seed. 
MB: Mmhmmm 
YN: So it was in 2002. But on the other hand while we had made a decision, 
because that year was a unique year you learn from the paper that as in 
southern Africa we depend on each other. So if rains were not good this year and 
there was good rain in Zambia, we would import seed, we would import food from 
Zambia. We would import food from Zimbabwe, but that year all the neighboring 
countries had also drought, so it was a unique year where you had to import now 
food from as far as USA. And then you end up with genetically modified food, so 
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that's the reason why we really had to debate over it. On the other hand, you 
should also, I don't know what do you know that in some countries when you are 
exporting your food, let's say this year we import the genetically modified food aid 
and it so pollutes our seed, there are other countries who do not want any trace 
of genetically modified organisms into there 
MB: Were you concerned about any countries in particular? 
YN: Not really, it was just the debate. It wasn't like unique debate. I know that 
there's been some debates over cotton, cottonseed. Bringing in genetically 
modified cottonseed. I don't know if that's true, that other countries don't want to 
import cotton that is genetically modified. Yeah, because I think I've moved 
further from that, dealing with those issues, so I really don't go deep into it. But 
anyway, the cotton we have confined trials. 
MB: I actually spoke with Dr. Kingdom Kapwata. 
YN: Oh, you spoke with him, did you talk with Victoria? The lawyer? Because she 
is the one who's dealing with this now. 
MB: OK, I, if you have her information I would love it now. 
OK, I will definitely give it to you. She's working on a deadline on 
biogenetic.biodiversity so she's not in the office today, but if you can find out and 
meet her tomorrow because the other lady who deals with it is not in the country. 
It's 0994643138. 
MB: What is her last name, her surname? 
Victoria Kachimera. She's our chief legal officer. 
MB: OK, I will phone her. OK, so once your committee reached a consensus, and 
was there a consensus, or was there just kind of a majority vote? 
YN: There was no voting, it was just a consensus. We did a lot of consultation 
because we didn't want people to come back and say it was made by the 
committee, they didn't consult the country, so we consulted widely. 
MB: OK how did you do that consulting? 
YN: It wasn't an issue of, that we are specifically addressing that issue, but if you 
bring genetically modified food, would you bring it in the form that it could be 
planted and what would be the reasons? Said they would give us and then they 
would say. At the end of the day most of the people would say mill it. 
MB: So are you saying you sent out people into the country to just ask? 
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YN: We invited stakeholders. 
MB: You invited stakeholders, OK and who were the stakeholders? 
YN: NGOs, line ministries, International organizations, like you NDP. So we 
invited lots of people. 
MB: And asked them what they thought. 
YN: What they thought about genetically modified food. We did provide 
information, we may presentations, and then they would debate over it. So we 
made like neutral kinds of presentations on what genetically modified, because 
you know people have strange thinking about genetically modified. They would 
say that you inject in a gene that is from a pig to a tomato, all those kinds of 
things. So we provided the information so that when this maize comes they do 
appreciate what it is. 
MB: Yes. 
YN: Because if people receive something when they're hungry they might even 
say no, I'm not eating it 
MB: Because they're afraid of what it is. 
YN: Mm mm 
MB: And once your committee had consulted the stakeholders and decided 
where, who did you make your recommendation to? 
YN: Actually, what happened is that agriculture is supposed to apply to us. 
MB: Who is supposed to? 
YN: Agriculture.  
MB: They are supposed to ask you? 
YN: Yes. So we respond and say OK, you can bring it in but in a milled form. 
MB: Ah, ok, so they asked you 
YN: But on the other hand we also at that time were conscious of the fact that we 
didn't have a policy, we didn't have a legal structure, a policy we didn't have. So I 





YN: In September 2002. 
 
MB: That was fast. 
 
YN: Yeah, though you might, you know it was fast because we needed to defend 
ourselves, in case somebody took us to court. 
 
MB: Yeah, that was a concern. 
 
YN: So it was done quickly, we need to do a better job on this, because it 
changed. Yeah, but, it hasn't changed, we haven't revised it yet, yeah but you 
can see that after the act now that's when we we're doing things backwards, 
that's when we had the national bio technology and biosafety act that was 
approved by committee in 2008, so you can imagine that we rushed over the 
legal thing and then we went back and said, oh we don't have the policy. 
 
MB: Do you know where I can get these policies, a copy of these policies? 
 
YN: I used to have them, unfortunately if you had called me before you came I 
would've had them for you, but Victoria must have, in fact she's the one who's 
mostly keeping up on these things. I will check, but I think Victoria must have. I'm 
not sure whether they have uploaded it on our website. 
 
MB: Which is your website? 
 
YN: Let's see, I should write it down right there. But have you also talked to this 
guy who's ummm, I can't remember what he's working on, but there's a certain 
guy who is in the science and technology, national science commission. 
 
MB: I don't think so. 
 
YN: You haven't talk to him? He would also have been very influential on the 
committee. 
 
MB: Do you have his name? 
 
YN: It is Mkoko.  
 
MB: Was there anyone in particular who was very opposed to bringing in the 
food? Any, either organization or person? 
 
YN: You know what, I really can't remember, but I would assume that at that 
time, we've always had problems with the Consumer Association of Malawi. Very 
assertive, very aggressive in addressing issues of food safety. So as much as 
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possible they would love people to bring in things that they are so sure that it's 
safe. 
MB: OK. 
YN: Yeah, so at that time I think, we had meetings all over the country, so I 
remember that in the southern part of Malawi they really make noise. At that time 
it was like, oh bring it on the table, and let's see what kind of noise they can 
make. Yeah, so they think it's OK for people to start when in actual fact you can 
get some help. So I can remember those. Apart from that, I mean agriculture was 
troubled either way, so there was no way they could criticize but usually in terms 
of bringing in a technology, agriculture has always been negative. But the fact 
that it was food, they, they were very cooperative, and anyway they were the 
ones who are asking for it. 
MB: OK. OK. Good. Is the consumer Association of Malawi, do they have offices 
in Lilongwe? 
YN: I'm not so sure. 
MB: OK, I can look it up. 
YN: I have a number for their boss, do you have his number? 
MB: I don't. 
YN: This is the number. 
MB: OK, thank you. 
YN: And I do remember even that when we went to sign the Cartagena protocol 
on biosafety, which was signed in in 2000, we did get a lot of criticism from 
agriculture, despite that we had consulted before we went to sign the protocol, 
we did consult. And the reason we wanted to sign it is because we knew at one 
time we would be faced with this problem, when we needed food from other 
countries that might be GMO, and we need to have the protocol, at that time we 
were not a party but we were just a signatory to the protocol. So to a certain 
extent I remember that one of the principal officers, very senior, said why did you 
send this? When they came with the request that they wanted the GMO maze, 
we had to refer her back and say, but you didn't want us to sign this. 
MB: OK. Any other comments? 
YN: Well, it's not that easy when it's a new thing, as I indicated. People talk a lot, 
people don't understand genetics, they need to… People so that they can 
understand why genetically modified organisms can be imported. On the other 
307 
hand, people are also fed a lot of information on why GMO's are not good for the 
country. But in this year, and this time around where we have climate change 
issues, there is need to adopt any technology that will bring in food on the table. 
That's why it's important in African countries. But, cautiously. And we've been 
doing that cautiously, that's why we have confined trials. 
MB: Like that BT cotton, BT cowpea. 
YN: Yes. But on the other hand we cannot say that we will stop any scientific 
research on that. We also want to be progressive. To research that would assist 
us, to harvest by the end of the day and bring food to the people of Malawi. It 
hasn't been easy. To say, I'm a government official so I'm not supposed to say 
this, but I think the Ministry of adequate culture is very, very strict in terms of 
genetically modified organisms. 
MB: Do you think overly strict? 
YN: Overly strict, yeah. Because with the cotton we had to find ways how to bring 
it in knowing that the Malawian farmer would not be able to buy pesticides, but if 
they have the BT cotton then they would be able to still produce cotton, but 
without buying loads of pesticides. 
MB: So it's cheaper. 
YN: it's cheaper, yeah. 
MB: OK. All right, well thank you so much for your time. 




Ephraim Nyondo, Senior News Analyst, The Nation, Malawi Newspaper 
Telephone Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, 8/5/16 
What were your perceptions of the effectiveness of food aid in your country prior 
to 2002? 
What were the primary reasons for the decision in 2002? 
In a situation where there was a serious food shortage, most of all maize.  
What were the primary reasons against continuing to accept GMO food aid? 
They said we were being, ethical reasons, concerned that if you plant the GMO 
maize it would effect the land and the land would be bare, so you couldn’t grow 
other crops there 
Gmo maize would make people sick, traditional beliefs 
How was the decision made? The government, the cabinet, minister of 
agriculture made the decision 
On what level was the decision made? 
Who did the research on the scientific aspect? Office of the president 
Who was consulted? 
Was there pressure coming from organizations outside the government? 
a. NGOs?
b. The scientific community?
c. Farmers’ or Growers’ Associations?
d. Other organizations?
They were in a crisis, people were dying, some other NGOs were opposed, but 
they were a nation in crisis.  There was original concern 
Was there talk of future consequences or opportunities if you went one way or 
the other? What possibilities were discussed? 
10. Was there a discussion of possible consequences from the U.S.?  If so, what
was the discussion?
He doesn’t recall
11. Was there a discussion of possible consequences from the EU?  If so, what
was the discussion?
Was there a discussion about what would happen to the people who needed the 




Do you know of any official sources that I could get access to? Meeting minutes, 
scientific papers read, official decisions, etc.?   
Sector registrar, department of environmental national commission for scientific 
knowledge- literature on the issue , University 
18.Do you know of anyone else I should speak to? Moses Kapwata? Dr. Charles 
Mataya? 
He will send 
 
18.May I use your name when I contact potential sources? 
Yes 
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